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INTRODUCTION

Attorneys have a pervasive and influential role in the activities of
employee benefit plans. To help with the establishment of a plan, the
sponsor likely will engage an attorney to draft the plan documents
and, where possible, obtain a letter determining qualification from the
Internal Revenue Service. During the life of the plan, attorneys engaged by the plan and its fiduciaries may continually provide advice
and assistance to help them comply with statutes, regulations, and the
plan docu1nent. 1· For example, in the course of the plan,s operation,
attorneys may assist the administrator with preparing and filing annual reports and other required information; guide the plan and its
fiduciaries through contested benefit claims; obtain from the Internal
Revenue Service exemptions from prohibited transaction rules; advise
and assist on plan amendments; closely work with the fiduciaries to

1. Use of an attorney is sometimes required by law. For example, where the fiduciary is a national bank, it must "designate, employ or retain legal counsel who shall be
readily available to pass upon fiduciary matters and to advise the bank and its trust department." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(c) (1989).
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help them avoid breaches of their fiduciary obligations; and for1nally
request ,guidance on difficult questions from the Department of Labor,
the Internal Revenue Service or a federal court. When a plan is terminated, an attorney may be needed to help guide the parties through
the regulatory requirements and deal with any controversies that
arise. A plan without an attorney is as helpless as a would be
corporation.
This article deals with one group of attorneys who perform legal
work in connection with employee benefit plans: ERISA plan attorneys. By "ERISA plan attorneys'' (or "plan attorneys'') we mean
those attorneys who are engaged either by a plan governed by ERISA,2 or by a fiduciary of such a plan in his capacity as such. 3 The

2. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No.
93406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974), substantially codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001·1461 (1974) and
in various provisions of the, Internal Revenue Code. The original statute has been
amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96364, 94 Stat. 1426 (1980); the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98..:369,
98 Stat. 494 (1984); the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-483; the SingleEmployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub~ L. No. 99-272, tit. XI, 100 Stat.
237 (1986); the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509~ 100 Stat. 1874 (1986);
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330
(1987); the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat.
2106 (1989); and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, P,ub~ L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat.!388 (1990). None of these amendments significantly affect the policies or basic
regulatory approach of ERISA, and there generally will be no need in this article to
distinguish the original portions of the 1974 act from those added later.
3. Thus, the term "ERISA plan attorney'' does not refer to attorneys who represent
plan sponsors (such as employers and unions) in their non-fiduciary capacities. The reason for excluding them from the discussion will emerge in Section JV(A)(2), irzfra notes
363-375 and accompanying text. Nor does it refer to attorneys for plans not governed by
ERISA. ERISA§ 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b), exempts from the statute's coverage: gov-ernmental plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)); certain church
plans (as defined in ERISA§ 3(33)), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)); plans "maintained solely for
the purpose of complying_with applicable workman's compensation laws or unemploy'"'
ment compensation or disability insurance laws"; certain foreign plans; and unfunded
excess benefit plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(36), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36)). Some of the
conclusions reached here might be applicable to attorneys for such plans. The extent to
which they might be applicable would depend greatly on the character of the plan in
question and the nature of state regulation of it. Thus, it is difficult to draw general
conclusions and we do not try to do so here.
Finally, the term "ERISA plan attorney" does not refer to an attomey who provides
legal services through a prepaid legal services plan (which is a kind of plan subject to
ERISA). See ERISA §§ 3(1),
4(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1003(a). The reason for ex.
eluding those attorneys is discussed in Section II(B)(3)(b), infra notes 221-230 and accompanying text.
.

.
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purpose of the article is to demonstrate that there should be, and that
there can be, a federal cotnmon law comprehensively govertting the
plan-related conduct of these attorneys.
Although there are currently some federal comtnon law rules
that govern plan attorneys, they are few and isolated. They deal with
narrow topics, such as attorney-client privilege and liability for participation in a fiduciary's breach of duty, and they do so in an unsystematic way. There is simply no body of federal cotntnon law that
coherently and comprehensively deals with the plan attorney's fiduciary and professional conduct, and no recognized set of principles that
might be used to develop such a body of law. The reason is that there
is a little appreciation of the need for such a body of law and the
possibility that such a body of law can be developed. 'l'bis article aitns
to remedy that state of affairs.
The article is divided into three main parts. In the first part (Section 1), we review some fundamental principles of ERISA and characteristics of plans. One purpose of the discussion is to explain key
concepts to the uninitiated reader. Another purpose is to cl · a few
itnportant points
in particular, the nature of plans, the importance
of ERISA's disclosure policies, and the noncomprehensiveness of the
statute
that are central to the subsequent argument.
In the second part (Sections 11-111), we show that a federal common law of plan attorneys is necessary and that courts have both the
authority and discretion to develop it. We begin this part of the discussion by seeking to identify sources of rules that might legititnately
govern the conduct, responsibilities, and liabilities of plan attorneys.
We shall see that ERISA itself contains very little express regulation
of plan attorneys (Section II(A)). We will then see that, contrary to
nortnal expectations, state law is not available because ERISA's preemption provision is so expansive that it ousts all state regulation of
attorneys who are acting in their capacity as legal counsel to an ERISA plan or plan fiduciary. (Section II(B)). This obviously leaves an
unacceptable regulatory lacuna. As we shall see, the gap in the law is
one that may properly be filled by courts exercising their authority,
derived from ERISA and elsewhere, to develop federal common law
(Sections II(C) & III).
In the final part (Sections IV-VI), we show how a federal common law of plan attorneys may be developed on a principled basis.
We first address some fundamental issues concerning the relationship
between the plan attorney and the plan entities with which he deals
(Section IV). We discuss who, if anyone, may be deemed.the client of
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the plan attorney (Section IV(A)), and what should be the scope of
the attorney-client privilege in the plan representation context (Section IV(B)).- We next tum to the fiduciary obligations of the plan
attorney, first dealing specifically with his responsibilities when he
learns of a breach of duty by a plan fiduciary (Section V(A)), and then
dealing more generally with the contours of his various fiduciary obligations to the several kinds of persons involved in the plan (Section
V(B.)). Finally, we turn to the subject of the civil liabilities of plan
attorneys (Section VI). We show that courts have clear authority to
impose. liability on plan attorneys for their wrongdoings (Section
Vl(A)), and we deal with the question of who has standing to bring
remedial actions (Section VI(B)).
In dealing with the questions raised in this last part, we not only
try to develop basic rules, we also show how the policies of .ERISA
and the characteristics of plans must carefully be taken into account
to ensure that the rules developed properly address the specific needs
of plans, as well as the legitimate needs of their participants, beneficiaries and fiduciaries. In that regard, we shall find the following general conclusions to be most important for proper development of the
common law of plan attorneys:
• Plan attorneys, although not ERISA fiduciaries, have characteristics
that bring them within the ambit of some of ERISA's policies.
•Plans are sufficiently unlike corporations that one cannot uncritically apply to them rules
especially rules concerning legal repre~
sentation
that have been developed for corporations.
•The traditional concept of "client" is not appropriate in the ·plan
representation context.
•ERISA's policy of promoting disclosure of fiduciary conduct renders
much of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct inappropriate as guides to
plan attorney conduct.
•Courts have extensive, but hitherto largely unused, power to develop
common law rules for the remedy of wrongs by plan attorneys.
The rules and principles developed in the third part of the article
do not exhaust the important topics in the area of plan attorney conduct. Thus, we conclude (Section VII) by suggesting other topics that
are appropriate for further inquiry.
.

.

I. ERISA: AN OVERVIEW
ERISA is a lengthy, and in many respects highly technical, statute. Books and other resources abound that explain the technical pro-
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visions of ERISA and their administrative elaborations.4 The
arguments in this article, though, are based on only a few central features of ERISA and of benefit plans, and, in general, do not tur11 on
the more technical provisions of the statute. Thus, an overview of the
central policies -a nd a few of the key requirements of ERISA will be
enough for the reader unfa1niliar with ERISA or with benefit plans. 5

A. What Constitutes an ~'Employee Benefit Plan''?
Although the ultimate purpose of ERISA is to promote the availability and security of employee benefits, the statute cannot be characterized as the federal law of employee benefits. Rather, it is the law of
employee benefit plans, and its stated policy is "to protect .• . . the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans."6 If benefits are
provided to employees without a plan, ERISA does not apply. 7 Ac•
cordingly, to fully understand ERISA's policies and its rules, one
must first understand what an employee benefit plan is.
ERISA is surprisingly unhelpful. It presumes the existence of
employee benefit plans8 and immediately divides them into two broad
kinds: pension benefit plans,9 which are plans that provide for retire4. See, e.g., J. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW ERISA AND BEYOND
(1990); S. YOUNG, PENSION AND PROFIT~SHARING PLANS (1989); PENSION PLAN
GUIDE (CCH); M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PLANS (1990 ed.); Sollee & Shapiro, Pension Plans
Qualification (BNA Tax Manage·
ment Portfolio No. 351, 1990); Kroll, Reporting and Disclosure Under ERISA (BNA
Tax Management Portfolio No. 361-2d (1988)).
5. In this section, however, we do explain some important aspects of ERISA and
plans that are not often emphasized in either the case law or academic literature., Consequently, the discussion here may also be useful to the ERISA specialist.
6. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(b).
7. See Fort Halifax Packaging Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19 (1987); see also Taggart
Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., Inc., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (Sth Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
8. For example, the lengthy finding in Section 2(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a),
begins with a description of the then-,current state of affairs:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational
scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the
continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
are directly affected by these plans. . ., .
ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a).
9. ERISA§ 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2). See also 29 C.P.R. § 2510.3-2 (1990). Pension benefit plans are further differentiated into two major groups: defined benefit plans,
in which retirement benefits are determined by a formula, usually dependent on compensation and years of service, ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S._C. § 1002{35); and defined contribution plans (or individual account plans), in which an individual's retirement benefit is
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ment income, and welfare benefit plans, 10 which provide for medical
or other current needs of employees. Each of these kinds is respectively defined as a "plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained ... for the purpose of-providing'' delineated types of benefits to
participants and beneficiaries. The terrn "employee benefit plan" (or,
for short, "plan") is then defined purely as a shorthand term . . · as
"an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan
or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.''tt As a result of this definitional scheme,
the nature of ERISA's central concern, the benefit plan) must be inferred from the statutory and judicial treatment of it.
The treatment has been sparse, but it is reasonably cle_ar that employee benefit plans have two aspects, ones that are usually not found
together. On the one hand, a plan is just an established program for
paying benefits that are sufficiently regular to create in some people a
reasonable expectation of receiving the benefits. 12 The core concept is_
that of a program. 13 A plan is not a contract, 14 person, organization,

determined by the amount contributed over time to his individual account in the plan,
and to the investment performance of the funds in that account, ERISA § 3(34); 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34). A fundamental difference between the two types is that in defined

benefit plans~ the sponsor (who is responsible for contributing sufficient funds to satisfy
the promised level of benefits) bears the investment risk, whereas in defined contribution
plans, investment risk falls on the participant. Defined benefit plans cover more employees, see, e.g., R. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, EcONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 96 (1986);
HANDBOOK OF PENSION STATISI'ICS 1985, at Table-13 (R. Ippolito & W. Kolodrubetz,
eds. 1986), and are subject to more extensive-regulation under ERISA.
10. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). The kinds ofplans which are included in
and excluded from this category are specified in 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1.
11. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
12. Brundage-Peterson v~ Compcare Health Serv. Ins. Corp., 877 F.2d 509, 510-11
(7th Cir.. 1989); Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F . 2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (en bane)
("At a minimum . . . a 'plan, fund, or program' under ERISA implies the existence of
intended benefits, intended beneficiaries, a source of financing and a procedure to apply
for and collect benefits."); Rizzo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71-72, 549
N.E.2d 810, 813 (1989).
l3. Treasury Regulations concerning benefit plans clearly reflect this. Treas~ Reg.
§ 1.401-1 (as amended in 1976), which clarifies the kind of "plan, fund or program''
eligible for favored tax treatment, defines a (qualified) plan as a certain kind of "definite
written program and arrangement," and further explains that "[t]he tenn 'plan' implies a
permanent as distinguished from a temporary program.', Id. (b)(2). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.404(b)-l (as amended in 19_84), which relates to employer deductions for contributions to plans, is even more expansive, and explains that the provision of the Internal
Revenue Code which governs such deductions "is not confined to fonnal ... plans, but it
includes any method ofcontributions of compensation having the effect of a stock bonus,
.

.
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or item of property. Rather, it is an activity;: a regularly conducted
one, but one that may be more or less formal.
On the other hand, a plan is also treated by ERISA as. a legal
entity distinct from its sponsor. 15 It may sue or be sued, 16 have judgment .entered against it, 17 enter into contacts, own property, engage
attorneys, and hire employees. 18 In this respect, a plan is an artificial

individual, akin to a corporation or a trust.
This hybrid concept of an employee benefit plan as an activity
that is also a discrete legal entity is virtually without counterpart in
any other area of law. 19 It is entirely a creation of ERISA. 20 As we
shall later see, because of the unorthodox character of benefit plans,
extreme care must be.used in .applying to them rules designed for artificial entities of a more fatniliar nature.21

B.
1.

ERISA as Systematic, but Not Comprehensive, Pension Reform
ERISA ·~

Systematic Character

ERISA governs a wide variety of pension and welfare benefit
plans: profit-sharing plans, employee stock ownership plans, longterrn disability plans, severance plans,. and prepaid legal plans, to give
just a few examples. Despite the wide scope of its coverage, Congress's main interest was much narrower: programs that '-'provid[e]
retirement income for employees who have spent their careers in use-

pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or similar plan deferring the receipt of compensation/' Id. at (b)(l).
14. See, e.g., Jervis v. Elerding, 504 F. Supp. 606, 608·09 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
15. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal' Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 686
(1990) (plan and union sponsor were "distinct entities''; wrong by plan fiduciary to union
·.
sponsor was not wrong to plan remediable under ERISA).
16. ERISA§ 502{d){l), 29 U.S.C., § ll32(d)(l) ("An employee benefit plan may sue
or be sued . . . as an entity,).
17. ERISA§ 502(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2) ("Any money judgment under (the
enforcement provisions of ERISA] against an employee benefit plan shall be enforceable
only against the plan as an entity. . . .").
18. See generally ERISA§ 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (regulation ofbusiness activities of plans).
19. But cf. 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE 5476, at 173-74 (1986) (describing model of corporation as activity, rather
than person-like entity, for purposes of analyzing attorney-client privilege).
20. The Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, a statute superseded by ERISA,
contained definitions of "employee welfare benefit plan'' and "employee pension benefit
plan'' similar to those found in ERISA. Pub. L.. No. 85-836, 3, 72 Stat. 997 (1958).
However, that act did not recognize· plans as legal entities in any significant way.
21. See infra notes 357403 and accompanying: text.
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ful and socially productive work."22 The record of abuses in connection with retirement plans was a major irnpetus for pension refor1n, 23
and the legislative history is replete with horror stories about workers
who had unfairly been deprived of pensions that they had thought
that they would get. 24
In the early 1970's, when Congress took up the cause of pension
refortn, benefits and benefit plans were governed by a patchwork of
state and federal regulation. The Labor Management Relations Act
provided limited fiduciary regulation for those plans which had been
adopted through the process of collective bargaining.2 s The Internal
Revenue Code imposed some fiduciary standards for retirement
trusts, but only as a condition of their obtaining favorable tax treatment.26 The Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, the first federal statute to deal exclusively with employee benefit plans, imposed
limited reporting and disclosure obligations on plans and plan administrators.27 And some state trust laws governed the fiduciary obligations of retirement fund trustees. 28
Congress found this existing collection of laws to be inadequate
as a framework for protecting the interests of plan participants in
their benefits, and concluded that the problems it wished to remedy
29
demanded systematic treatment. Among the problems that Congress wished to remedy were overly-stringent vesting rules, un•

22. E.g., S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in II SEN. COMM. ON
LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLA'TIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY] at 1069 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4890.
23. See GORDON, OVERVIEW: WHY WAS ERISA ENACTED?, reprinted in Special
Sen. Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE (Comm. Print 1984).
24. See, e.g., I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 90, 207-08, 210-15, 673; II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1599, 1622, 1634, 1635, 1666, 1667-68, 1758,
1762, 1772, 1866; III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 3584, 3592, 4710, 4713,
4716-17, 4749-50, 4790, 4792, 4794, 4799.
25. Labor Management Relations Act§ 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988).
26. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-752, 56 Stat. 798, 862 (1942)
(formerly codified at 26 U.S.C. § 165).
27. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. §§ 997, 999-1001 (1958) (formerly codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 301-309), repealed by ERISA.
28. See, e.g., Humpa v. Hedstrom, 341 Ill. App. 605, 94 N.E.2d 614 (1950).
29. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in I LEGIS·
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 599 and in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4849 ("the nature and extent of the problems determined to exist required one omnibus
legislative proposal which would embody.essential and indispensable reforms"); id. at 15,
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 601 and in 1974 U.S. CODE
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derfunding of plans, inadequate disclosure requirements, insufficient
fiduciary requirements, and inadequate enforcement mechanisms. 30
To deal with them, Congress relied on the existing tax, reporting, and
fiduciary approaches, but added provisions and systems of provisions
that it believed would make federal regulation more effective. 31 In
particular, it added minimum vesting funding standards, more comprehensive reporting and disclosure requirements, an extensive regulatory and enforcement role for the Department of Labor, more
stringent and sweeping fiduciary rules, and a broad civil enforcement
scheme. The approach can fairly be characterized as systematic, in
that a well defined group of problems was sought to be corrected
through a single statute, taking an integrated approach based on articulate,d policy choices.
But, although ERISA is systematic, one must be careful not to
suppose, that it is comprehensive,. It is true that the Supreme Court
has described ERISA as a "comprehensive and reticulated statute" 32
and a ' ' comprehensive legislative scheme,''33 and that lower courts
have repeated those phrases endlessly. Yet the description is clearly
an overstatement. ERISA may well have been an initial attempt at
comprehensive regulation, 34 but, like many initial attempts, it failed to
4851 ("the problems in the private pension field ... are so
interrelated that they cannot be resolved without a comprehensive legislative program'').
30. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-8 (1973), reprinted in II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2352-55 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4643-46~ See also GORDON, supra note 23, at 19-20; WOODRUFF, THE
GOALS OF ERISA AND THE IMPACT OF ERISA ON PLAN PARTICIPANTS, reprinted in
Special Sen. Contm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE (Comm. Print 1984).
31. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in II LEG""
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2597 {"Your committee regards the present legislation as part of an evolutionary process which keeps [the] basic framework but which
builds on it new provisions which experience indicates are necessary, for the proper functioning of these plans.").
32. E.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
33. Id. at 147 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc~ v. Transport Workers, 451 u~s. 77,
97 (1981)).
34. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 4777 (1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE. HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 3583 (the act is "long overdue but represents a strong first step toward
reforrn'') (remarks of Rep. Reid); id. at 4779, III LEG-ISLATIVE HISTORY~ supra note 22,
at 3589 ("This bill is a necessary first ste,p") (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 120 CoNG. REc.
29,193 (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4658
(''the bill does not cover everything that we might desire but is a beginning that should
have been made long ago") (remarks, of Rep.- Perkins); id. at 29,196, reprinted in III
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4666 ("We know that there will be many trials
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS
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address issues and problems that were legitimate candidates for regulation through the same statute. 35 Some of those problems and issues
Congress just did not foresee~ 36 On others, Congress was unable to
reach agreement. Others, Congress did not intend to regulate by statute, preferring to let courts37 or agencies38 work out appropriate rules.
Others; it did not wish to regulate at all.
Congress, in fact, was well aware that ERISA was neither comprehensive nor the last word on the subject of benefit plan regulation. 39 To that end, it provided in the statute itself for six different
groups to study ERISA's effects and to report to Congress for purposes of further legislation. In particular; Congress established an
Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans,
consisting of representatives of a wide variety of interested groups and
enterprises,40 who were "qualified to appraise the programs instituted
under" ERISA~ 41 Its recommendations were to be submitted to Con,gress every year by the. Secretary of Labor.42 Congress also "authorized and directed'; the Secretary of Labor "to undertake research
studies relating to pension plans,'' in particular on the effects of Title
I, on the general role of private pensions, on the operation of private

and errors in its interpretation and in its administrationn) (remarks of Re,p. Dent); 120
CONG. R.Ec. 29,954 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
22, at 4,804 ("we can use our high ·hopes as a guide to future reforms") (remarks of Sen.
Nelson).
35. A paper prepared for a Senate Committee in 1984 identified benefit portability,
public employee plan regulation, mandatory employee pensions, and inflation protection
as the major areas left unaddressed. See WooDRUFF; supra, note 30, at 30-31.
36. "There are problems not contemplated in its provisions and we will be busy for
many years attacking those problems." 120 CONG~ R.Ec. 29,196 (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4668 (remarks of Rep. Dent).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 313·327.
38. See~ e.g., ERISA§ 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (plan claim procedures shall be "[i]n
accordance with regulations of the Secretary [of Labor]").
39. "It is a modest bill. It does not purport to solve every problem. Further study
and deliberation by our own committee and by other committees of the Congress will be
necessary." 120 CONG. REc. 4278 (Feb. 26, 1974), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, 3369 (remarks of Rep. Perkins). See· id. at 4279, reprinted in II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 3373 ("although this not a perfect bill, it does
provide a good beginning") (remarks of Rep., Brademas).
40. ERISA§ 512(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1142(a). The fifteen member council was to draw
representatives from employee organizations, employers, pension benefit recipients, the
general public, insurance companies, corporate trust companies, actuarial consultants,
investment counseling companies; investment managers, and accounting firtns .
41. ERISA§ 512(a)(1)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1142(a)(1)(2).
42. ERISA § 513(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1143(b).
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pension plans, and on methods of encouraging pension plan growth~43
The findings and conclusions were to be submitted to Congress annually.44 Congress also established a Joint Pension, Profit Sharing, and
Employee Stock Ownership Plan Task Force, which was to study
questions concerning discrimination, portability, small employer

plans, stock ownership, and preemption, and to report its findings to
Congress within twenty-four months. 45 Finally, three congressional
com1nittees were directed to study government pension plans and to
report their findings. 46
Thus, while ERISA may fairly be called systematic; it is far from
a comprehensive or complete law of employee benefit plans.

2.

Plans as Voluntary Arrangements

To understand why ERISA is not a comprehensive statute, one
must appreciate its key premise that pension benefit plans (and, a fortiori, welfare benefit plans) should be voluntary arrangements.47 Congress intended that the private retirement plan system should be one
that is voluntarily established and self-administered to the greatest extent possible.48 The rationale was not only to avoid "excessive Federal interference,"49 but as well the belief that employers should have
the flexibility to adopt or not adopt plans as they deemed best, and
should have substantial freedom to design plans that they believed

43. ERISA § 513(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1143(a)(2).

44. ERISA§ 513(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1133(b).
45. ERISA§§ 3021-22, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1221-22.
46. ERISA§ 3031, 29 U.S.C: § 1231.
47. See, e.g~, H.R. REP. No. S33, 93d Cong., lstSess.l (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2348, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.;
NE\VS 4639 ("The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension·

rights, but the committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans"); H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 8-9 (1974), reprinted
in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2591, 2597-98 and in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4671, 4676-78. See also 120 CQNG. REC. 7418, 7419 (Mar. 13,
1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 212, 215 (remarks of Sen.
Bentsen); 120 CONG. REC. 4777 (Feb. 28; 1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 3583-84 (remarks of Rep. Price).
48. Congress, though, presupposed the existence of the mandatory Social Security
system. See, e.g., 120 CoNG. REc. 30,010 (Sept. 8, 1973), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE_
HISTORY, supra note 22,.at 1619 (remarks of Sen. Moss) . For an analysis of the current,
mixed voluntary and mandatory retirement system, see Graetz, The Troubled Marriage
of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 851 (1987).
49. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 7419 (March 13, 1973), reprinted in l LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 215 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
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would best serve their needs and the needs of their employees. 50 As a
result, nothing in ERISA, or any other law, makes retirement plans
mandatory.

3.

The Cost-Benefit Calculus

ERISA's noncomprehensive character results from its two competing purposes. One of ERISA's main goals is to encourage employers to establish retirement plans for their employees. The other is to
safeguard participants' rights to benefits once a plan has been established. ERISA is largely a set of policy adjustments between those
two goals. 51
To implement the policy of encouraging employers to adopt retirement plans, ERISA, through the Internal Revenue Code, provides
favorable tax treatment to employers and employees. 52 The employer
receives an immediate deduction for contributions to the plan, while
the employees are allowed to defer taxation of the employer's contributions and investment income realized on plan funds until they receive their benefits. 53 This is the satne method that had been used
under prior law to encourage employers to establish retirement plans
for employees. s4

50. E.g., 120 CONG. R.Ec. 7418 (March 13, 1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIS·
TORY, supra note 22, at 212 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen); S~ REP~ No. 127, 93d Cong., lst
Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 599 and in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4646-47.
51. E.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 599 and in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4647; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 46 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1107, 1114 and in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4899, 4904; 120 CONG. R.Ec. 30,004 (Sept. 18, 1973}, reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1601 (remarks of Sen. Williams); 120 CoNG. REc. 29,210 (Aug.
20, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4706 (remarks of
Rep. Rostenkowski). See A-T-0, Inc. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 634 F.2d 1013,
1021 (6th Cir. 1980) (ERISA is a "finely tuned balance between protecting pension bene~
fits for employees while limiting the costs to employers").
52. "The basis of all private pensions is the tax law. We have private pensions because a payment or contribution to the pension fund is tax-free. Those pension funds
grow so they can do the job because the earnings are tax-free." 120 CONG. REc. 30,044
(Sept. 18, 1973}, reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1642 (remarks
of Sen. Curtis). See also S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 2, 10 (1973), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1070, 1078 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4898-99.
53. I.R.C. §§ 402, 404, 501(a).
54. See 120 CONG. R.Ec. 7417 (Mar. 13, 1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIS·
TORY, supra note 22, at 211 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
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Under prior law, the employer and the participants would rethe plan was said to be "qualified" ceive favorable tax treatment
if certain minimal protections for plan funds were in place. ERISA
changed the terms of this bargain. As new and additional conditions
for qualification, ERISA imposed standards that Congress believed
would help prevent unfair benefit deprivations. Favorable tax treatment was the reward for establishing plans that contained safeguards
of employees' rights to benefits. ss
In determining which new requirements to impose, Congress
sought to avoid placing such a burden on employers as to make it
undesirable for them to establish plans. As one Senate Report
explained:
Generally, it would appear that the wider or more comprehensive
the coverage, vesting, and funding, the more desirable it is from the
standpoint of national policy. However, since these plans are voluntary on the part of the employer and both the institution of new
pension plans and increases in benefits depend upon employer willingness to participate or expand a plan, it is necessary to take into
account additional costs from the standpoint of the employer. If
employers respond to more comprehensive coverage, vesting and
funding rules by decreasing benefits under existing plans or slowing
the rate of formation of new plans, little if anything would be
gained from the standpoint of securing broader use of employee
pensions and related plans. At the same time, there are advantages
in setting minimum standards in these areas both to serve as a
guideline for employers in establishing or improving plans and also
to prevent the promise of more in the form of pensions or related
benefits than eventually is available. 56

Thus, ERISA's scope and substantive requirements reflect a compromise between two not entirely consistent goals.

55. In fact, ERISA has a third ;major goal (in addition to voluntariness and employee protection), that of ensuring that the plans established do not favor the more
highly compensated employees or the corporate managers. This goal is reflected in the
discrimination rules that are part of the Internal Revenue Code's qualification standards.
See generally Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Inten-

tions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REv. 419 (1984). These provisions are of
little importance to the s~bject of this article, however, so we do not discuss them further.
56. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess_. 18-19 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1086-87, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4904.
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Two Aspects of Plan Content Regulation

For purposes of this article, it is necessary to consider two relatively nontechnical parts of ERISA's regulation of the content of the
plans.

1.

The Requirement of a Claims Procedure

ERISA contains very little regulation of plan content. Indeed,
the only content requirement applicable to every plan governed by
ERISA57 is the requirement that the plan have a claims procedure that is, a procedure for challenging denials of benefits
in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. 5 8 This basic
requirement is consistent with the conception of a plan as essentially a
regularly conducted practice of providing benefits to employees.

2.

The Writing Requirement and Written Plans

With insignificant exceptions, 59 ERISA requires every plan to
"be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument."60
The requirement that plans be established pursuant to a written instrument is a fiduciary provision, and it is a requirement designed to
strengthen the substantive rules governing fiduciary conduct. Its
chief purpose is to ensure that participants and fiduciaries will be able
to know their respective rights and obligations, and to ensure that
participants will easily be able to discover to whom they should tum
..
57. Reporting and disclosure obligations, described infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text~ are also universally applicable.
58. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133~ provides that:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary~ every employee benefit plan
shall(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary
whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the
specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
Id. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor are found at 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1.
59. See ERISA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § llOl(a).
60. ERISA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a). Lack of a written instrument is a violation of ERISA. However, it does not preclude the existence of a plan, see, e.g., Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372, any more than the lack of a written partnership agreement would
preclude the existence of a partnership.
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for infortnation or assistance in connection with the plan. 61 It also
"protects the plan's actuarial viability by setting forth the terms under
which benefits may be paid ... [and] protects ERISA plans from the
62
sort of corruption fostered by private verbal agreements."
All written plans must contain provisions dealing with the plans'
fiduciaries. Specifically, the plan docutnents must identify the named
fiduciaries who "shall have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan, " 63 and must identify the trustees
(if the plan has any). 64 Unlike the law oftrusts, 65 ERISA permitsbut does not require
written plans to have provisions that govern
the allocation and delegation of fiduciary responsibility among various plan fiduciaries. 66
ERISA also contains various prohibitions. One express prohibition, applicable to all written plans, is the prohibition of "any provision . . . which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or
liability for any responsibility, obligation or duty [under ERISA's fiduciary provisions]."67 Congress viewed the fact that state trust laws
had allowed such exculpation as a major flaw in existing fiduciary
regulation that had to be rectified in federal standards. 68

D.

Reporting and Disclosure under ERISA

Prior to ERISA, the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act
(hWPPDA")69 was the sole federal statute devoted exclusively to the
regulation of benefit plans. The WPPDA did not govern all plans
within the scope of the commerce clause: it regulated only larger

61. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1974), reprinted in Ill
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4564 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5075-76; see Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
579 (1990); see also Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989).
62. See Saret v. Triform Corp., 662 F. Supp. 312, 316 (N.D. ill. 1986).
63. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
64. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
65 . See RFSI"ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 171 (1959).
66. ERISA §§ 402(b)(2) & (c)(2), 405(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102(b)(2) & (c)(2),
1105(c)(1). The plan document must also describe a procedure for establishing and implementing a funding policy, ERISA§ 402(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1); specify a procedure for amending the plan, ERISA§ 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3); and "specify the
basis on which payments are made to and from the plan," ERISA§ 402(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1102(b){4).
67. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
69. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (formerly codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301309, repealed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (a)(l)).
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plans, those with twenty-five or more participants. 70
The WPPDA provided a limited framework for protecting the
interests of plan participants. It did so principally by requiring disclosure of information relating to the plan. 71 To that end, it required
plan administrators to publish a plan description and annual financial
reports for the plan, and to file them with the Secretary of Labor and
make them available for inspection by participants.
It was widely believed that the WPPDA was ineffective. As
Congress explained in one of the reports accompanying a bill that led
to ERISA: "[WPPDA] is weak in its li1nited disclosure requirements
and wholly lacking in substantive fiduciary standards. Its chief procedural weakness can be found in its reliance upon the initiative of the
individual employee to police the management of his plan."72
Notwithstanding the perceived inadequacies, ERISA clearly
builds on the WPPDA; several of the bills that led to ERISA were
designed as elaborate amendments to cure some of its inadequacies. 73
In those bills, and in others introduced around the same time that
contained rules to govern reporting and disclosure, a close connection
could be seen between the reporting and disclosure requirements and
the fiduciary responsibility rules. In particular, the requirement of
detailed reporting and disclosure was considered a prophylactic device to make the fiduciary rules more effective. In that respect, the
reporting and disclosure requirements were seen as functioning similarly to the writing requirement. Thus, as one of the congressional
reports explained:
The underlying theory of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act to date has been that reporting of generalized infor1nation
concerning plan operations to plan participants and beneficiaries
and to the public in general would, by subjecting the dealings of

70. Pub. L. No. 85..836, § 4(b)(4), 72 Stat. 997, 999 (1958).
71.. The WPPDA, as originally enacted, was exclusively a reporting and disclosure
statute. In 1962, it was amended to impose criminal penalties for embezzlement, certain
forms of fraud, and kickbacks in connection with benefit plans, and to impose bonding
requirements for administrators, officers and employees of plans, and persons who handle
plan funds and property. See Pub. L. No~ 87-420, 76 Stat. 3 (1962).
72. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2351 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4642.
73. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 22, at 3; H.R. 462, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 67; S. 1557, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 280.
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persons controlling employee benefit plans to the light of public
scrutiny, insure that the plan would be operated according to instructions and in the best interests of participants and beneficiaries. . . . But experience has shown that the lilnited data
available under the present Act is insufficient. Changes are therefore required to increase the infor1nation and data required in the
reports both in scope and detail. Experience has also demonstrated
a need for a more particularized form of reporting so that the individual participant knows exactly where he stands with respect to
the plan
what benefits he may be entitled to, what circumstances may preclude hiln from obtaining benefits, what procedures he must follow to obtain benefits, and who are the persons to
whom the management and investment of his plan funds have been
entrusted. At the same time, the safeguarding effect of the fiduciary responsibility section will operate efficiently only if fiduciaries
are aware that the details of their dealings will be open to inspection, and that individual participants and beneficiaries will be
armed with enough information to enforce their own rights as well
as the obligations owed by the fiduciary to the plan in general.74

To implement these policies, ERISA imposes reporting and disclosure obligations on every plan within its scope. 75 It requires that
every plan administrator furnish the participants with a sutnmary
plan description76 (a brief, nontechnical description of the plan) and
77
file a plan description with the Secretary of ·L abor. The administrator must also publish and file annual reports with the Secretary of
78
Labor. The report must disclose information on transactions with
parties in interest, losses caused by wrongdoing, plan finances, actuarial projections, and changes in fiduciaries. 79 The administrator must

74. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 613 and in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4863.
75. Pursuant to statutory authority, the Secretary of Labor has exempted from some
of the reporting and disclosure requirements for certain small, unfunded welfare benefit
plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2520. 104-20; group insurance arrangements, id. § 2520.104-21; and
apprenticeship or training plans, id. § 2520.104-22.
76. ERISA § 102(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1).
77. ERISA § 102(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(2).
78. ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023. Certain reports must also be filed with the
Secretary of the Treasury, I.R.C. §§ 6057-6059 (1989); and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, ERISA §§ 4041, 4043, 4065. In practice, a plan files a single annual
report with the Secretary of the Treasury, which is distributed to the Secretary of Labor
and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp.
79. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-l{b). See Internal Revenue Service Form 5500 (''Annual
Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan (with 100 or more participantsY').
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also furnish information regarding the plan and individual benefit entitlements to any participant who seeks such infor1nation. 80
ERISA also contains a specialized enforcement provision that allows imposition of substantial civil damages and heavy fines on ad..
ministrators who refuse to comply with the reporting and disclosure
rules. For example, an administrator must provide a participant,
upon request, with information to which he is entitled within thirty
days. Otherwise, the administrator may be subject to liability to the
participant in an amount up to $100 per day. 81 The administrator
may also be fined under these provisions up to $1000 per day for failure to file an annual report on time. s2 The incentives thus are very
strong for administrators to comply with the rules.
E.

I.

Fiduciary Standards: Generally

Pre-ERISA Fiduciaries

ERISA's fiduciary provisions are sweeping, stringent, and one of
the most innovative features of the law.
Prior to ERISA, there were three sources of fiduciary protection
for plans. One was the Internal Revenue Code, which required as a
condition for qualification that the trust part of a plan be "for the
exclusive benefit" of the participants and their beneficiaries. 83 An~
other was the various state laws of trusts. The third was the Labor
Management Relations Act, which, for employee benefit plans established by unions, pertnitted only those trust funds "established ... for
the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families
and dependents."S4
Congress found substantial flaws with these existing forn1s of
protection. One problem was scope. of coverage. Not all plans are
union-established, and not all plans are qualified. The labor laws and
tax code governed only select employee benefit plans. A more subtle,
but equally serious problem, was that not all employee benefit plans
are established as trusts. There were only minimal restrictions im-posed up,on persons responsible for employee benefit plans whose. as-

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

ERISA§§ 105, 502(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1025, 1132(c).
ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C~ § l132(c)(l)(B).
ERISA § 502(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(2).
l.R.C. § 401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 40l(a).
Labor Management Relations Act§ 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
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sets were not held in trust. ss
Another problem was substantive. Traditional trust law was
designed for the purpose of implementing the intent of settlors of inter
vivos and testamentary trusts. Congress found this body of law to offer inadequate protection to participants and beneficiaries of employee
benefit plans because its rules allowed fiduciary conduct that Congress
believed should be prohibited. As one of the early Committee reports
explained:
[E]ven where the funding mechanism of the plan is in the form of a
trust, reliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.
This is because trust law had developed in the context of testamentary and inter vivos trusts (usually designed to pass designated
property to an individual or small group of persons) with an attendant emphasis on carrying out the instructions of the settlor.
Thus, if the settlor includes in the trust document an exculpatory
clause under which the trustee is relieved from liability for certain
,a ctions which wo~ld otherwise constitute a breach of duty, or if the
settlor specifies that the trustee shall be allowed to make investments which might otherwise be considered imprudent, the trust
law in many states will be interpreted to allow the deviation. In
the absence of a fiduciary responsibility section in the present Act,
,c ourts applying trust law to employee benefit plans have allowed
the same kinds of deviations, even though the typical employee
benefit plan, covering hundreds or even thousands of participants,
is quite different from the testamentary trust both in purpose and
in nature. 86

To address these problems, Congress made two substantial
changes in the law. First, it codified general fiduciary standards, derived from trust law, and made them applicable to virtually any employee benefit plan irrespective of whether it used a trust as a funding
mechanism. 87 Second, it eliminated rules that Congress deemed to be

85. 120 CONG. REc. 12,075 (Aprill2, 1973), reprinted in l LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 275 (statement ofSen. Javits); S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29
(1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 615 and in 1914 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4865 . Thus, one of the bills that led to ERISA provided
that "[e]very employee benefit plan shall be deemed to be a trust." H.R. 2, lll(a)(l), 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 41. This unnecessary legal fiction was subsequently discarded.
86. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 615 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4865.
87. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 294-97 (1974), reprinted in III
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unacceptable in the plan context. Thus, for example, ERISA prohib88
its exculpatory provisions and prohibits fiduciaries from deviating
from the plan document. 89 To i1nplement ERISA's fiduciary policies,
Congress also authorized courts to develop a fiduciary law specially
adapted to benefit plans, that takes into account their special
character.90

2.

ERISA Fiduciaries: Who Are They?

There are itnportant differences between a plan fiduciary under
ERISA and a fiduciary under the common law of trusts. Trust law
has one fiduciary, the "trustee," in whom all significant fiduciary responsibility for a trust is reposed. 91 ERISA fiduciary law is more
complex, in that it contemplates the existence of several plan fiduciaries, each of whom has a diiferent set of responsibilities.
There are two types of fiduciary that every plan now must have.
One is the so-called "named fiduciary," who has "authority to control
and manage the operation and administration of the plan."92 This
fiduciary is wholly a creature of ERISA, with no obvious counterpart
in the common law of trusts. The importance of this fiduciary role
lies in the fact that its holder is name,d in the plan document or pursuant to it. Its existence ensures that there will be at least one fiduciary
known as such to the participants and beneficiaries.
The other fiduciary that every plan must have is the so-called
''administrator." 'T he administrator's fiduciary function is not defined; there are sirnply obligations mainly ones dealing with reporting and disclosure
imp-osed by ERISA on the person who has this
role. 93 Unlike the named fiduciary, the adtninistrator need not be
named in or pursuant to the plan document, for if the plan document

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22,
NEWS 5076.

at4561-64 and 1974 UtS. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

88. ERISA§ 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § lllO(a). See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text.

89. ERISA § 404(a)(l)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(D).
90. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974), reprinted in Ill
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4569, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD·
MIN. NEWS 5083. See generally Section II(C)(3),-infra notes 279-327 and accompanying
text.
91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169, 171, 184.
92. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § l102(a)(l).

93. ERISA §§ 101-105, 502(c), 606(a)(4), 4041, 4043, 4044, 4046, 406.5-4066, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025, 1132(c), ll66(a)(4), 1341, 1343, 1344, 1346, 1365-1366.
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94
default.

is silent, the plan sponsor becomes the administrator by
In addition to these two mandatory fiduciaries, every plan whose
assets are held in trust must have a trustee, who is designated in or
pursuant to the plan document. 95 The trustee is the ERISA fiduciary
most like the trust-law trustee; he has "exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan." 96 In addition to
the trustee, a plan may also have an "investment manager," appointed
by the named fiduciary, who has power "to manage (including the
97
power to acquire and dispose of) any assets of a plan. "
The named fiduciary, administrator, trustee, and investment
manager are the four main fiduciary roles with respect to ERISA
plans. ERISA contemplates that these roles may be filled by officers,
agents, or other representatives of the employer. 98 More than one
person may be assigned each role and one person may be assigned
two or more of such roles. 99 In addition, there is a network of rules
governing allocation and delegation of these fiduciaries'
responsibilities. 1oo
But those four roles do not exhaust the fiduciary roles with respect to a plan. ERISA defines "fiduciary" very broadly, through a
function-and-discretion test. Under ERISA, any person is automatically a fiduciary to the extent that he perfortns certain functions involving discretion:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct
or indirect, with respect to any monies or other property of such
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has
any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan. tot
This is a novel approach to fiduciary status. Unlike the common

94. ERISA § 3(16)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A).
95. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
96. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
97. ERISA § 402(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
98. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3).
99. ERISA § 402(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(l).
100. ERISA §§ 402(b)(2), 402(c)(2) & (3), 403(a), 405(b)(l){B), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1102(b)(2), 1102(c)(2) & (3), 1103(a), 1105(b)(l)(B).
101. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2l)(A).
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law, in which fiduciary status most commonly arises because of title
(e.g., trustee, partner, lawyer), 102 ERISA diminishes the importance
of title and imposes fiduciary status because of the discretionary role
played in management or administration of the plan. 103 This approach has three important corollaries for plan attorneys.
First, a person's actual role in the plan may override the name of
his office in determining fiduciary status. Thus, courts have found
persons to be plan fiduciaries, notwithstanding their efforts to evade it
through creative plan draftsmanship or avoidance of a title. 104 Con105
versely, courts have found persons labelled "trustees" or "administrators"106 not to be fiduciaries, after examining their actual roles and
responsibilities.
The second corollary arises from the "to the extent" language: in
general, ERISA ·fiduciaries are limited fiduciaries, having fiduciary responsibility only for certain functions. This, too, is a novel feature of
ERISA. It is an accommodation to the fact that benefit plans, unlike
testamentary trusts, are complex, ongoing activities, often with tens of
thousands of participants and often with hundreds of millions of dollars or more of assets held in trust. Division of managerial, financial
and administrative responsibility is as essential in a large ERISA plan
as it is in a large business enterprise. Because fiduciary responsibility

102. See generally J. SHEPARD, LAW OF FIDUCIARIES, ch. 2; Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 795, 795-96 (1983). Thus, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act defines
"fiduciary" as follows:
'Fiduciary' includes a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied, resulting or
constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, curator, receiver,
trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer
of a corporation, public or private officer, or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person, trust or estate.
UNIF. FIDUCIAR1ES ACT 1, 7A U.L.A. 395-96 (1985).
103. Munoz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 633 F . Supp. 564, 568 (D. Colo. 1986)
(''it is a person's ability to make policy decisions outside of a pre-existing or separate
framework of policies, practices and procedures which saddles that person with ERISA
fiduciary liability").
104. See, e.g., PBGC v. Solmsen, 671 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (defendant
could not escape fiduciary responsibility "by relying on the failure of an apparently nonexistent corporate board of directors formally to give him a fiduciary title~').
105 . Richardson v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 350 (D.D.C.
1985).
106. Chambers v. Kaleidoscope, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust, 650 F. Supp. 359
(N.D. Ga. 1986). See also, e.g., Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1325
(9th Cir. 1985) (corporation hired to administer plan was not a fiduciary); Munoz, 633 F.
Supp. at 567-69 (company that performed non-discretionary processing of claims was not
a fiduciary).
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with respect to a plan follows upon managerial, financial and administrative responsibility, the natural division of labor in running the plan
means division of fiduciary responsibility as well.
Third, there is an inescapable element of arbitrariness in ERISA
.fiduciary determinations. "Discretion," the key to fiduciary status, is
a flexible term. A secretary to a fiduciary may have discretion as to
some mundane matters of plan management, but secretaries are not
thereby made fiduciaries
not even limited ones. In principle, they
could be, but experience and common sense suggests that a minimum
level of discretion should be fixed, below which a person has no fiduciary responsibility at all.
The arbitrariness of the line drawn can be seen in the case of an
attorney who regularly gives advice to a plan fiduciary. The attorney's opinion might be extremely influential in, for example, cases of
contested benefit determinations, and interpretation of the plan document might, as a matter of practice, always be accepted by the fiduciary responsible for benefit claims. It is entirely plausible to consider
the attorney's responsibility for giving advice to be "discretionary authority in the administration of [the] plan,'' or to consider the act of
giving advice, to the extent accepted, an e~ercise of discretionary authority in plan administration. 107 But policy choices have been made
to the contrary, and so regulations place plan attorneys, to the extent
they act solely as attorneys, below the_fiduciary-status line.-108
It should be kept in mind, though, that the line easily could have
been placed elsewhere, all the while_remaining consistent with the text
and policies of ERISA. Secretaries, attorneys and other persons
could have been included as part of the class of fiduciaries by virtue of
their discretion albeit limited in plan affairs. Thus, the fact that
a person who is involved in a plan is not an ERISA fiduciary does not
mean that he entirely lacks the kind of discretionary authority that is
of concern under the policies of ERISA. As a result, ERISA's policies, though not its full complement of fiduciary rules, may still apply
to persons below the line.
107. Cfi Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988) (international
union official was fiduciary with respect to local unions' dental plans because of influence
in fact over plans' choices of provider).
108. ERISA § 404(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l).
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ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility
General Standards

ERISA's basic rule goventing the conduct of fiduciaries is set
forth in section 404(a)(l):
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect. to a plan solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering
the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the cir...
cumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to miniInize the risk of large losses, unless under the circurnstances it
is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of this title or title IV. 109

Three of the basic duties made part of the rule ·· loyalty, c.are, and
prudence
are derived from the common law of trusts. The other
two duties
risk minimization and adherence to plan documents represent new fiduciary requirements adapted to the special needs. of
plans. All of the fiduciary requirements apply, with very minor exceptions, to every plan subject to ERISA.
Two of the fiduciary duties are of especial importance to plan
attorneys: the duty of loyalty, and the duty to follow plan documents.

z: The Duty ofLoyalty
The fiduciary duty with which we shall be most concerned is the
duty of loyalty: that of discharging duties ''solely in the interestu of
participants and beneficiaries and ''for the exclusive purpose" stated
in the section. 110 Loyalty is not only the basic duty of ·any fiduci-

109. 29 C.P.R. § 2509..75-5, at D-1.
110. ERISA§ 404(a)(1) & (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(l) & (A) (1988). See also
ISA § 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b).

ER~
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ary, 111 it is one of the defining characteristics of any fiduciary. 112 The
precise scope and character of the duty of loyalty varies from one
113
ERISA largely incorporates the
fiduciary relationship to another.
loyalty obligations of the law of trusts, with adaptations to take into
account the special characteristics of plans.
One adaptation is reflected in the characterization of the fiduciary's duties as ones "with respect to a plan." 114 This is an 11nusual
formulation, because duties, and especially fiduciary duties, are conventionally described as being "with respect to" matters or areas of
responsibility, but as "owed to" persons or entities. 115 Nothing in the
legislative history of ERISA explains why the formulation, "with respect to a plan," was chosen instead of a conventional fortnulation,
such as that the fiduciary's duties are owed "to the plan" or "to the
participants and beneficiaries.'' What, if anything, does it suggest
about the differences between the ERISA fiduciary's duty of loyalty
and the duty of loyalty of the comtnon law trustee?
It suggests a subtle, but si · cant, difference. Recall that a plan,
although a legal entity, is also a regularly conducted activity established for the purpose of providing benefits. 116 The duties of the ERISA fiduciary are thus duties "with respect to" this benefit-payment
activity. But there is no one to whom those duties are said to be primarily owed. A fiduciary is not required, or even per1nitted, under
section 404(a)(l) to carry out his duties in the separate interests (plural) of the participants and beneficiaries. To the contrary, he is required to carry out his duties in their- "interest'' (singular). That
single, collective interest is just the obverse of the purpose of the plan:
it is the interest in receiving benefits and having the plan properly
administered. Thus, the ERISA fiduciary's duty of loyalty is a duty
to discharge his substantive obligations solely to further the activity

111. G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 543 (rev. 2d ed. 1978); IIA A.
SCOIT & W. FRATCHER, LAW OF TRUSIS § 170 (4th ed. 1987).
112. J. SHEPARD, supra note 102, at 35, 48 & ch. 6 (no fiduciary status without a
duty of loyalty).
113. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 541 (1949).
114. This characterization applies to all of a fiduciary's duties, and not just that of
loyalty.
115. See, e.g., RESI'ATEMENT SECOND OF AGENCY§ 13 (fiduciary duty "with respect to matters within the scope of the agency"); Investment Advisors Act 36(b), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (fiduciary duty "with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature").
116. See Section I(A), supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
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that constitutes the plan. Missing from ERISA is a traditional duty
of loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries, or to anyone else. In
its stead is a duty of loyalty to an activity. This is a novel sort of duty,
one that requires of a fiduciary a loyalty more akin to a player's loyalty to "the game," than akin to a trustee's loyalty to a beneficiary.
In a practical sense, of course, the fiduciary,s obligations ultimately run to the participants and beneficiaries. Since the fiduciary
must carry out his responsibilities to further the purpose of the plan in
providing benefits, he will necessarily perform his obligations to their
advantage. But this loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries is derivative of, and limited by, the fiduciary's statutory obligations to the
ongoing program of providing benefits. Because the. primary obligation of the fiduciary is generally to the program, rather than to the
participants and beneficiaries, a fiduciary is prohibited from furthering an interest of the participants and beneficiaries, or any group of
them, in anything other than receipt of benefits. A fiduciary cannot,
for example, act primarily to further some or all of the participants'
interests in job security, 117 by loaning money to the employer118 or by
assisting the employer to resist a hostile takeover effort. 119 Similarly,
because the fiduciary's duty of loyalty is not owed directly to the participants and beneficiaries, they have no claim for compensatory damages, under ERISA, against a fiduciary who causes injury to them
through a breach.12o

117~ This point was explained by Senator Williams:
There is an extremely important social purpose that is intended to be fostered
by ERISA's fiduciary and other rules.. It is the supplying of retirement and

deferred income and health and welfare benefits to employees covered under the
plans, and it is the duty of every plan sponsor and any fiduciary investing plan
policies, proceassets to adopt economically sound objectives and methods
dures, and particular investment decisions
designed to achieve that goal.
• • • •

... [S]ituations may arise where the interests of active employees may be at
odds with the retirement income security interests of those same employees or
present retirees. In such cases, a pension plan fiduciary must choose the course
which is consistent with the primary duty of loyalty to the retirement income
needs of plan participants.
125 CONG. REc. 932 (Jan. 24, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See generally Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1340 (1980).
118. ERISA§ 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a).
119. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069
(1982).
120. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (no individual right to damages under§ 502(a)(2)); Amos
v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 868 F.2d 430, 432 (11th Cir..), reh. denied (en bane), 875 F.2d
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Recognizing that the fiduciary's duty of loyalty is owed primarily
to the plan activity, and that it does not run directly to the participants and beneficiaries, helps clear up some apparent perplexities in
ERISA's fiduciary rules. For example, the statutory provision which
allows a plan sponsor to appoint an "officer, employee, agent, or other
representative" as a fiduciary 121 is sometimes thought to be an inexplicable departure from ERISA;s stringent duty of loyalty.122 'T he
reason for such belief is that the employee-fiduciary is seen as necessarily having dual loyalties: to both the sponsor and the participants
and beneficiaries. This is thought to create an otherwise impermissible conflictofinterest. But there is no dual loyalty in the sense feared,
and no necessary conflict of interest, for there is no duty of undivided
loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries that would be underrnined
by the fiduciary's obligations to the sponsor. The duty of loyalty to
the program of providing benefits is consistent with a generalized loyalty of the fiduciary to the sponsor. The consistency of the two should
be obvious from the fact that the sponsor established and maintains
the program of paying benefits, and that the sponsor appointed the
fiduciary to the position of responsibility for it, presumably with the
hope and expectation that the fiduciary would carry out those responsibilities. Conflicts, of course, can arise in such a case, but conflicts of
some kind can arise no matter who the fiduciary happens to be. 123
ii.

The Duty to Follow Plan Documents

Another fiduciary duty is the duty to act "in accordance with the
documents and instruments goverrring the plan insofar as such docu-

874, cert. denied,- 110 S. Ct. 158 (1989) (compensatory damages not available under
§ 502(a)(3)); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F . 2d 821, 824-25 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988) (compensatory damages not available under § 502(a)(3)).
But see Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990) (allowing claim for
compensatory damages against administrator under § 502(a)(3)). The only compensa...
tory relief available under ERISA inures to the benefit of the plan. See ERISA
§ 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). See generally Section I(F), infra notes 134-146 and
•

accompanYing text.
121. ERISA § 4(l8(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3).
122. E.g., Fischel & Langbein, ERISA''s Fundamental Contradiction~· The Exclusive

Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. 'L'! REv. 1105, 1126 (1988).
123. Fischel and Langbein propose to resolve this and other perplexities relating to
the ERISA fiduciary's duty of loyalty by "apply[ing] the exclusive benefit rule in a fashion that recognizes that for -some purposes the employer is also a beneficiary of the pension plan." Fischel & Langbein, supra note 122, at 1128. This artificial proposal cannot
possibly be squared with the statutory language defining "beneficiary." ERISA § 3(8), 29
u.s.c. § 1002(8).
'
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ments and instruments are consistent" with ERISA. 124 The duty promotes the policy behind the writing requirement (which itself is
designed to help ensure proper fiduciazy conduct), 125 and is designed
to prevent the kinds of deviations from written instruments that were
permitted by the com•non law of trusts.
One consequence of the duty is to give an itnportant role to attorneys in plan management and administration. The construction and
interpretation of legal documents is an activity within the special expertise of attorneys. The peril to a fiduciary in failing to act in accordance with plan documents can be great; it may lead to a suit for
breach of fiduciary duty and concomitant exposure to huge liability.
Thus, fiduciaries have great incentive to rely on the opinion of legal
counsel as to the propriety of actions that might be questioned. In
very difficult cases, the fiduciary may even deem it prudent to petition
a court for instructions as to how to proceed126 a course of -conduct
that also calls for the involvement of an attorney.

b.

Prohibited Transactions
ERISA recognizes that plans will engage in business and investment activities in order to increase the funds available to pay benefits
and as part of the day-to-day management and administration of the
plan. ERISA contains a set of rules to govern the plan's business
• • •
act1vtt1es.
First, ERISA identifies a class of persons called "parties in interest."t27 A party in interest is a person who potentially has power,
directly or indirectly, to influence the plan. Parties in interest include
the employer of the participants, any union that represents_them, and
.anyone who provides services to the plan. It also includes controlling
persons, partners, related business entities, relatives, officers, directors
and employees of any of the foregoing~ 128 The plan's business dealings with these persons are subject to special rules.
129
They proThe rules are called "prohibited transaction" rules.
124. ERISA§ 404(a)(l)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l)(D).
125. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
126. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989).
127. ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14).
128. The definition of "party in interest" also includes fiduciaries, but it is confusing
and unnecessary to treat a fiduciary also as a party in interest. In this article, the term
"party in interest" will mean a party in interest who is not a fiduciary.
129. The Internal Revenue Code contains parallel prohibitions in I.R.C. § 4975, 26
u.s.c. § 4975.
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hibit sales, leases, loans, services, transfers of assets, and stock transactions between a plan and a party in interest, 130 unless the
transaction meets statutory or administrative criteria of propriety. 131
These rules do not invalidate or otherwise prohibit the transactions,
however. Instead, they merely prohibit fiduciaries from causing
or per1nitting the plan to engage in the various prohibited
transactions.I 32
F.

Enforcement

Pre-ERISA enforcement mechanisms were scattered, just as
were pre-ERISA fiduciary standards. State law and the Labor Management Relations Act provided some remedies, but, for the reasons
discussed above, did not do so comprehensively or etrectively. 133 Enforcement of the fiduciary standards contained in the tax code was
inherently troublesome, because the only remedy for a violation was
disqualification of the plan ·a remedy that harmed participants and
beneficiaries as much as it punished wrongdoing employers and
fi.duciaries. 13-4
To strengthen the enforcement scheme, ERISA made two substantial changes: it created an arsenal of remedies for participants,
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries to use in redressing wrongs to the plan;
and it gave a substantial enforcement role to the Department of Labor. As an early House report explained:
The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad
remedies for redressing or preventing violations of the Act. The
intent of the Com1nittee is to .provide the full range of legal and
equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to
remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past
appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law for recovery of benefits due
participants. 135

130., ERISA § 406(a),
29 U.S.C~ § 1106(a).
.
131._ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108.
132. ERISA § 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a).
133. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
134. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., lst Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2351 and in 1974 U.S . CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4642.
135. H.R~ REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in· II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2364 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4655.
.
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ERISA contains certain specialized enforcement mechanisms, including criminal penalties, 136 civil penalties, 137 special taxes, 138 and
arbitration provisions. 139 The central enforcement provisions,
though, are the civil liability provisions of section 502(a). Those provisions are as follows:
A civil action may be brought:
(1) by a participant or beneficiary
(A) for the relief provided for
in subsection (c) of this section, or (B) to recover benefits due to
him under the ter1ns of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
tertns of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under
the ter1ns of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary [of Labor], or by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title
or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary [of Labor] or by a participant, or beneficiary
for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 105(c);
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary
[of Labor] (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of
this title; or
(6) by the Secretary [of Labor] to collect any civil penalty under
subsection (i). 140

An extensive body of case law has developed that applies and
gives meaning to these provisions. For purposes of this article, only a
few points are important.
First, an action by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits
under ERISA section 502(a)(l)(B) differs in important ways from an
action for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2), (3) or (5).
An action for benefits is brought to correct a supposed wrong by the
plan to a participant or beneficiary. An action for breach of fiduciary
duty is brought to remedy a supposed wrong to the plan by a fiduci-

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131.
ERISA § 502(i) & (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i) & (1).
I.R.C. § 4971 ff.
ERISA§ 4221, 29 U.S.C. § 1401.
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
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ary. 141 Thus, a benefit claim is brought on the participant's behalf
and a fiduciary claim is brought on the plan's behalf. Individual benefits are sought in the former ,action, while damages or equitable relief
on behalf of the plan are sought in the latter.
Second, Congress intended the enforcement mechanisms under
ERISA to be interprete,d and applied expansively, and one must guard
against too crabbed an interpretation of section 502(a). In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 142 the Supreme Court
stated that the six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions
found in 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it
simply forgot to incorporate expressly, 143 and professed to be "reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident
care as the one in ERISA," 144 As a result of this emphasis on the
comprehensiveness of ERISA's "enforcement scheme,'' some courts
have read section 502(a) very narrowly to prohibit any remedy that
Congress .did not expressly provide. 145
One must be careful not to misapply the Supreme Court's point.
It is true that the civil enforcement provisions of section 502(a) are, in
some respects, "comprehensive." It is also true that to ~'tamper" with
the enforcement scheme in section 502(a) is to risk contravening congressional intent. But unless providing ,a certain remedy can be
deemed "tampering'' with the ''scheme" of section 502(a), it is not
prohibited under Russell's reasoning. Thus, it is important to understand the sense in which section 502(a) may be said to be
"comprehe.nsive."
What is the enforcement scheme of section 502(a) that may not
be tampered with? It surely is not a scheme for all remedies relating
to benefit plans. ERISA itself contains others, as does the Labor
Management Relations Act 146 and (as we shall see below) federal
common law. Thus, section 502(a) is not comprehensive in any absolute sense. It is substantially comprehensive only in the areas of benefit claims ,a nd private civil remedies against plan fiduciaries. The

141. See Russell, 473 U.S . 134; Lister v. Stark, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
1611, 1616--17 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
142. 473 u.s. 134.
143. /d. at 146 (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 147.
145. E.g., Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1991).
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
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scheme of remedies, so understood, should not be tampered with because it can sensibly be understood to strike a balance between two
competing policies: facilitating redress of wrongs while lirniting or
controlling potential costs to plan sponsors. But it is obvious that
per1nitting other kinds of claims will not necessarily upset the balance
and the i1nplicit scheme of section 502(a), and so may not be disallowed by Russell's logic.
II.

THE SOURCES OF LAW FOR ERISA PLAN ATTORNEYS

Our concern in this article is the ERISA plan attorney. As we
explained above, the reason for attending to the subject is that a plan
attorney may be extremely influential in helping fiduciaries properly
to conduct the affairs of the plan. His activities may involve
indeed, to the extent he gives legal advice, should involve
the exercise
of discretion. 147 As explained above, while the blanket exclusion of
plan attorneys, acting as such, from the class of ERISA fiduciaries is
certainly consistent with the language of ERISA, it is not compelled
by it. 148 But correct or incorrect, the i1n1nediate result is that ERISA's fiduciary rules do not apply to plan attorneys. What, then, are
the legitimate sources of rules that 1night govern the conduct of these
important plan actors?

A.

ERISA Fiduciary Rules

Although a plan attorney, qua plan attorney, is not an ERISA
fiduciary, 149 he is a party in interest. 150 Accordingly, his dealings with

147. See~ e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 2.1 ("(i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment"); L. P ATIERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Pt. 11-4 (1982)
(''[t]he task of lawyering ... has always required the lawyer to exercise discretion"); C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 4.2-4. 3 (1986) (reviewing decisionmaking authority of attorneys).
148. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
149. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, at D-1. See Yeseta v. Baima, 837 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.
1988) (attorney who reviewed plan and its compliance with ERISA was not fiduciary);
Useden v. Acker, 721 F. Supp. 1233 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (law firm providing legal counsel to
plan was not fiduciary); Anoka Orthopedic Assocs. v. Mutschler, 709 F. Supp. 1475 (D.
Minn. 1989), aff'd, 910 F. 2d 514 (8th Cir. 1990).
Of course an attorney may be a fiduciary with respect to a plan by virtue of other
non-legal responsibilities; for example, be may regularly provide investment advice for a
fee. But that situation presents issues different from those of concern here. See generally
Note, Attorney's Liabilities Under ERISA, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 129 (1979).
150. ERISA § 3(14){A) & (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A) & (B).
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the plan do fall within the scope of the prohibited transaction rules.
In particular, they fall within the scope of the prohibition concenting
a party in interest's providing legal services to a plan 151 unless the
services are "necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan"
and the compensation paid for it is "reasonable." 1s2 This is the totality of ERISA's regulation of plan attorneys.

B.

State Law: Preemption

Since ERISA provides virtually no rules to govern plan attorney
conduct, one normally would look to state law for guidance. Under
state law, an attorney has well-delineated fiduciary, 153 professional154
and other obligations 155 to clients, benefit plans and plan fiduciaries
would seem perfectly capable of being clients. A central feature of
ERISA, however, makes problematic the applicability of state attorney-client law to the conduct of ERISA plan attorneys.

1.

The Expansiveness of ERISA Preemption

The problem arises because ERISA undoubtedly contains the
most expansive preemption clause found in any federal statute. 156
Section 514(a) provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, ERISA "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 157 "State law" is defined to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law, of any State.''tss
Because ERISA preemption arises from an express statutory pro-

151. ERISA § 406(a)(1){C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C).
152. ERISA § 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2).
153. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 90 N.E.2d 785 (1950).
154. See generally G. HAzARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (2d ed.
1990).
155. See generally R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d ed. 1989).
156. An express preemption provision, nearly as expansive as ERISA's is contained
in the Federal Aviation Act, as amended, which provides that:
[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other
political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to
rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority ... to provide air
•
transportation.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(l) (1985). See, e.g., Anderson v. USAir, Inc~, 818 F.2d 49, 57
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (state tort suit arising out of discourteous service would be preempted).
157. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
158. ERISA § 514(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c).
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vision, rather than by implication, its scope is determined by the clear
statutory language, rather than by the accommodation of state and
federal concerns in individual cases. 159 Congress has already balanced
state and federal interests on a wholesale basis. Thus, Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the preemption clause have made clear that this
language must be applied literally, and that the key term, "relate to,"
must be given its "broad common sense meaning" 160 of having "a
connection with or reference to" a plan. 161 Applying this literal standard, courts have found a wide variety of state laws to be preempted
- to the extent they relate to employee benefit plans
that on their
face appear to have nothing to do with such plans. Among the subjects found to be preempted have been probate law, 162 contract law,t63
166
164
165
trust and fiduciary law, tort law, wrongful discharge law, escheat law, 167 bankruptcy exemption law, 168 and workers compensation law. 169 The result in an individual case may be counterintuitive.
For example, in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency, 110 the Supreme
Court was called on to deternline whether ERISA preempted a provision of a state garnishment law that expressly exempted employee

159. As is often appropriate for the analysis of implied preemption. See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm., 461 U.S. 375 (1983). See generally L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 499-500 (2d ed. 1988).
160. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987). See Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983).
161. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
162. MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1987); Board of Trustees
of W. Conf. of Teamsters Pension Fund v. H.F. Johnson, Inc., 830 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir.
1987).
163. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Cefalu, 871 F.2d
1290; Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1987).
164. Ingersoll-.Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990); Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 161 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1166 (1990);
Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416, 425 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
165. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58; Straub v. Western Union. Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262 (lOth
Cir. 1988); Farlow v. Union. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1989).
166. Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 800 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 888
(1985); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 801 (9th Cir. 1987); Pratt v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Md. 1987).
167. Attorney Gen. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 168 Mich. App. 372, 424 N.W.2d
54 (1988). Contra, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 57 (1989).
168. Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 99 Bankr. 343, 352 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
169. Pacific Bell v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1603, 1615, 231
Cal. Rptr. 484, 491-92 (1986).
170. 486 u.s. 825 (1988).
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benefit plans from garnishment orders. Clearly, the state was trying
to prevent its garnishment law from relating to employee benefit
plans. The Supreme Court nevertheless held the exemption to be preempted because, on its face, it referred to employee benefit plans, and
171
as such "relate[d] to" them.
Without doubt, such rampant preemption was a result intended
by Congress: it does not stem from judicial activism 172 or judicial
mistake. The early versions of the bills that became ERISA would
have limited the statute's preemption to state laws, only "insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit
plans"; 173 or to state laws only "insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act ... "; 174 or with analogous subject mat-

171. The Court's conclusion here nicely demonstrates the fallacy of mechanically
reasoning about preemption. The state could just as well have indirectly exempted benefit plans from garnishment by listing the proper subjects of garnishment orders, and failing to include benefit plans. There would be no improper reference to employee benefit
plans and thus, it would appear, no ground for preemption. Yet, if the state can exempt
plans from garnishment orders by omission, it surely should be able to exempt them by
express statement as well. It is the consequences of a law that should matter; not its
syntax.
The Court also held in Mackey that the state's general garnishment law was not
preempted to the extent that it related to welfare benefit plans because of evidence in the
text of ERISA that Congress intended to permit garnishment in such cases. Four Justices dissented from this holding. See id. at 841(Kennedy, Blackmun, O'Connor, and
Scalia, J.J., dissenting).
172. To the contrary, judicial activism in this area generally finds expression in arti..
ficiallimits on preemption, devised in order to avoid an unsympathetic or undesirable
result. See generally Hutchinson & lfshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 96 U. CHI. L. REv. 23 (1978); Kilberg
& Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of
ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1313 (1984). To take just one example, in Greenblatt v. Budd Co., 666 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1987), an employee whose company was
acquired allegedly was told by the new employer that his pension benefits would be increased to the level of benefits provided to comparable employees of the acquiring company. The promise was not fulfilled, and the employee sued, inter alia, for state law
misrepresentation. Ignoring a plethora of contrary precedent, the court held the misrep·
resentation claim not to be preempted, mainly because the employee otherwise would be
left without a remedy. Id. at 742. But absence of remedy is not a legitimate factor in the
analysis, since it is clear, from other provisions of ERISA, that Congress intended there
to be no monetary remedy in such cases. See, e.g., Cefalu, 871 F.2d at 1296.
173. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 51.
174. S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 602(a) (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 186. In addition to S. 4, the Senate also considered S. 1557, which
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ter limitations. 175 It was not until the Senate and House bills emerged
from the Conference Committee that the section on preemption was
amended. to its current sweeping form. 176 The purpose of the· atnend""
ment was explained as follows by one of ERISA's sponsors:
Both House and Senate bills provided. for preemption of State law,
but
with one major exception appearing in the House bill defined the perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such a fortnulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action that 1night impinge
on Federal regulation, as well as opening the door to multiple and
potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with
some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans
not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme.
Although the desirability of further regulation
at either the
State or Federal level
undoubtedly warrants further attention,
on balance, the emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of unifortnity with respect to interstate plans required ·
but for certain exceptions
the
displacement of State action in the field of private employee benefit
programs. 177

Congress recognized that such a novel, sweeping provision could
generate unexpected results, and that those results would have to be
evaluated subsequently. Thus, the atnended bill also provided for the
establisl}ment of a Joint Pension Task Force to study the consequences of the preemption provision, as well as other provisions
which were also deemed to warrant further consideration. 178 As was

contained preemption language identical to that in H.R. 2. See I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 319.
175. E.g., H.R. 12906, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 514, reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE His..
TORY, supra note 22, at 2920--21.
176. H. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4357 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5162.
177. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,942 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4770-71 (remarks of Sen. Javits). See also id. at 29933, III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4745-46 (remarks of Sen. Williams); 120 CONG. REC.
29,197 (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4670
(remarks of Rep. Dent).
178. H. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 205-06, 360-61, 383 (1974)
-reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4476-77, 4627-28, 4650. ERISA § 3022 provides that, within 24 months of the enactment of ERISA, the Task Force
shall "make a full study and review of . . . the effects and desirability of the Federal
preemption of State and local law with respect to matters relating to pension and similar
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explained to the Senate:
The conferees
recognizing the ditnensions of such a policy also agreed to assign the congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of studying and evaluating preemption in connection
with State authorities and reporting its findings to the Congress. If
it deter1nines that the preemption policy devised has the effect of
precluding essential legislation at either the State or Federal level,
then appropriate modifications can be made. 179

2.

Limits to ERISA Preemption

But, even if the language and legislative history of ERISA require extremely broad preemption, beyond the statute's express subjects, tso preemption still cannot be limitless. It would be impractical,
if not absurd, to apply the ''relate to'·' language as far as semantic
considerations alone might allow. To do so would place all persons
connected with a plan, merely because they are connected with the
181
plan, in ''a fully insulated legal world" where ERISA alone is the
law and where all state regulation of them is ousted. This surely is
182
not a result that a rational Congress would have intended.
But

plans,'' and report the results to the committees. No report of the Task Force was ever
submitted. For a review of Congressional consideration ofthe preemption provision after
the enactment of ERISA, see Irish & Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and
Statutory Rigidity, 19 MICH. Jtt OF L. & REFORM 109, 114-16, 148-56 (1985).
179. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,942 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4771 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
180. Some courts
particularly state-courts · still fail to understand or to accept
the fact that preemption extends beyond the subjects explicitly addressed by ERISA. See.
e.g., Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349, 1359 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied; 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Smith v. Crowder Jr.,- Co.., 280 Pa. Super._626, 421 A.2d
1107, 1113 (1980).
181. Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1008 (1985).

182. Actually, there is an approach to preemption analysis, on the basis of which
such limitless preemption would make sense. As we shall see below, because in much of
the area where ERISA preempts state law
whatever that area might be
ERISA
provides no rule of conduct, courts must supply rules through the common law process.
In framing a federal common law rule, a court always has the option of incorporating the
ousted state law rule, and making it the federal standard. Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U"S. 448 (1957); Mishkin, The Variousness o/ Pederal Law'~· Competence and Discretion in the Choice ofNational and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 797 (1957). Thus, the "relate to" language can be construed literally, provided that
the question of where preemption reasonably should end is replaced by the question of
-where federal courts should begin to incorporate state law wholesale as rules of decision.
The difference between the two approaches is that, under the current one, the applicable
1
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where does one draw the line?
In drawing the line, one must be careful not overly to limit the
scope of preemption~ For although Congress did not intend to create
a fully insulated legal world around a benefit plan, it surely did intend
to insulate plans from state law within a very substantial domain, one
broader than the subjects of ERISA alone. The task, then, is to define
a boundary for the exclusion of state regulation, which lies beyond the
express scope of ERISA, but only at a reasonable distance beyond

it.183
The Unavailability of a State-Interest Test
The difficulty is that the boundary cannot be fixed
as it is
tempting to do
at a supposed line where state interests become so
compelling that federal regulation should not intrude. The language
and legislative history of the statute simply will not per,1nit the courts
to balance state and federal interests in individual cases, because Congress_has already done the balancing for them. Most courts have resisted the temptation to set the bounds of preemption this way.
Some courts, though, have unwittingly used a disguised state interest test, and have upheld state laws relating to plans that should
have been found preempted. The disguised state-interest approach
has been used mainly in cases in which the person whose conduct is of
concern simultaneously has both a substantial role in a benefit plan
and a signi:fic_a nt role outside it. The _a pproach purports to examine
the "capacity', in which that person acts, or else his "relationship" to
other parties in a given case. The purpose of the examination is to
determine whether the capacity or relationship,-in that case, is, in its
essential respects, a state or an ERISA one.
A leading example of this approach is Sommers Drug Stores Co.
Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc. 184 In Corrigan, a plan was a minority stockholder of the employer" The plan
alleged that the employer and one of its directors had violated ERISA
and had breached state corporate law fiduciary duties by inducing the
plan to sell its stock back to the employer _a t an unfair price. The

state standards are part of state law, whereas on the alternative they become part of
federal law., Nothing in thi$ article turns on which approach is chosen.
183. For an effort to define the boundary systematically, see Kilberg & Inman, supra
note 172.
184. 793 F.2d 1456 (Sth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987).
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employer and director were ERISA fiduciaries. 185 The trial court had
ruled that the state law fiduciary claims were preempted by ERISA.
The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the state corporate fiduciary law in question "centers on the relation between corporate director and shareholder" and that "the law imposes the duty
upon [the director] in that capacity only." Since the state law duty
was not itnposed on the defendants in their capacities as ERISA fiduciaries, the court reasoned that the law did not relate to the plan so as
to be preempted. 186 Similar reasoning can be found in other cases. 187
The analysis has a superficial plausibility, but it plainly begs the
question. The Court of Appeals was correct in noting that state corporation law imposed obligations on the defendants only by virtue of
their corporate status. But making the point adds nothing to the analysis, for ERISA preemption extends to many state laws that impose
duties on a person in some state law capacity. 188 An easy example is
state negligence law. It" imposes liability on a person solely in his capacity as a person under a state law duty of care. But the mere fact
that the duty of care "centers" on a purely state relationship does not
save from preemption a state law negligence suit against a plan administrator for malfeasance in processing a benefit claim. 189 Indeed,
because the negligence suit does relate to a plan, ERISA not only
preempts the suit, it preempts the state-created status (person with
duty of care) to the same extent as well. Thus, the Corrigan court
begged the question
indeed erred
by failing to realize that ERISA might preempt the state corporate fiduciary status on which the
state fiduciary duty "centered."
b.

The Remoteness Test and Practical Rules

The Supreme Court has suggested an approach to defining the

185. However, it was unclear whether they were fiduciaries with respect to the sale
of the stock. The case was remanded for a determination of that issue, because of improper jury instructions on the functional limitations of ERISA fiduciary responsibility.
Corrigan, 793 F.2d at 1470.
186. 793 F.2d at 1468.
187. E.g., Williams v. Cypert, 708 F. Supp. 229 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
188. If a state imposed duties on a person or plan because of his or its ERISA status,
the law would, of course, be preempted; indeed, that would be an easy case. But ERISA
preemption is not limited to state laws that so explicitly affect ERISA plans.
189. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58. See also Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1095
(9th Cir. 1985) (since state suit "originates from the handling and disposition" of a claim
for benefits, it is preempted, even though it is brought against defendants "in their capacity as employer ... and seemingly concerns the employment relationship").
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limits of preemption. It has stated, albeit in dictum, that some state
laws "may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a fashion to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the
plan." 190 Unfortunately, the Court has not had occasion to apply
those concepts to save a state law from preemption on grounds that,
even though it related to an employee benefit plan, it did so too remotely. Few lower courts have had the opportunity to apply the "remoteness test'' either. 191 Necessarily, the test must be construed as
one that seeks to interpret congressional intent; 19 2 in difficult cases,
the focus must be on whether Congress would reasonably have intended preemption to extend so far. 193
Most cases, though, do not require application of a remoteness
standard. Whether a state law is preempted usually can be easily determined, by reference to the articulated concerns of Congress or by
application of one of the narrower tests used in cases of implied preemption. It is obvious, for example, that any state law which imposes
standards or requirements inconsistent with ERISA is preempted.
For instance, in Alessi v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 194 the Supreme
Court held that an ERISA method of calculating pension benefits preempted a New Jersey law that proscribed the same manner of
calculation.
Inconsistency with ERISA, of course, is not the touchstone for
preemption. A broader rule used by courts, but one which still does
not exhaust the scope of preemption, is that ERISA preempts any
state law which purports to regulate the subjects ofERISA, 195 such as

190. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
19L See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 142 (state escheat statute); Quigley v.
Unum Life Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd mem., 887 F.2d 258 (1st Cir.
1989); Cornell Mfg. Co. v. Mushlin, 70 A.D.2d 123, 420 N.Y. S.2d 231 (1979) (claim
against corporate officers for waste of assets by making improper contributions to pension
plan; "the involvement of the pension plan .... was at most incidental"); Lynn v. Allied
Corp., 41 Ohio App. 3d 392, 395, 536 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1987) (state law claims for emotional distress resulting from telephone call to hospitalized plan participant about early
retirement benefit: ''[t]his incident .•• affects ERISA too remotely or tenuously to be
considered related to ERISA,).
192. "[T]he question whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is
one of congressional intent. 'The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.~ "
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 45. See also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S.Ct. 403, 407 (1990).
193. Cefalu, 371 F.2d at 1294.
504 (1981).
194. 451
195. MacLean, 831 F.2d at 727; In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191
(6th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1470 (llth Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987).
·

u.s.
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funding, 19 6 adrninistration, 197 vesting, 198 reporting, or fiduciary duties.199 Laws of this character are preempted, even if application of
them would effectuate ERISA's policies in the subject area. 200
Another rule of preemption often used by courts is that any
clai1n over which there is subject matter jurisdiction under ERISA
section 502(a) is ipso facto an ERISA claim, and purported state law
causes of action for that claim are preempted.201 As the Supreme
Court emphasized in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux:202
[T]he detailed provisions of § 502{a) set forth a comprehensive
civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the
need for prompt and fair clairns settlement procedures against the
public interest in encouraging the for1nation of employee benefit
plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely under1nined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress
rejected in ERISA. "The six carefully integrated civil enforcement
provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted ...
provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize
other remedies that it siinply forgot to incorporate expressly."203

As a result, any state law clairn alleging a wrong in the payment or
nonpayment of benefits by a plan, or wrongful conduct by a fiduciary
in the course of administration of the plan, is preempted. 204 This is so
even if ERISA provides no remedy for the alleged wrong. 205 For exatnple, state law tort or contract actions by beneficiaries, which seek

196. E.g., Local Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeyman & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones Canst. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 488
U.S. 881 (1988) (state law requiring minimum contribution levels).
197. Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1990); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. Va., 780 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1985).
198. E.g., Rasmussen v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp. 1497 (W.D. La. 1987).
199. Muscar v. Arco Chem. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
200. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815
(3d Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
201. Thus, a putative state law claim seeking benefits from a plan is an ERISA
claim, and may be removed from state to federal court. See, e.g., Taylor, 481 U.S. 58;
Lister, 890 F.2d 941; Amos, 868 F.2d 430.
However, ERISA does not preempt a state law claim merely because it is pendent to
an ERISA claim. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 1989).
202. 481 u.s. 41 (1987).
203. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 54 (citation omitted).
204. See id. at 56; Taylor, 481 U.S. at 62-63.
205. See Phillips, 199 F .2d at 1470.
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benefits based on an oral promise or representation, are preempted,
even though ERISA has generally been held to bar any action to enforce a purported oral term or oral modification of a plan.206
Together, these rules just described cover most cases, but not all.
It is only in cases where a state law arguably relates to a plan, where
there is no corresponding regulation under ERISA, where there is no
obvious conflict with any ERISA policy, and where there is a strong
state interest in the subject, that preemption questions become difficult and -a standard of remoteness will come into play.2o7
3.

Preemption of State Laws Governing ERISA Plan Attorneys

No reported federal court decision has yet addressed the issue of
whether ERISA preempts any state laws governing plan attorneys.2°8
The case for sweeping preemption, though, is sufficiently clear that
the remoteness test is not even required to evaluate the result.
·206!1 E.g., Lister, 890 F . 2d 941;- Cefalu, 871 F . 2d 1290; Straub, 851 F.2d 1262;
Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 19·86). But see Black v. TIC Inv. Corp.,
900 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1990) (estoppel principles are applicable to claims for benefits
under unfunded single-employer welfare benefit plans).
201. It is in these difficult cases, which the rules of analysis just discussed do not
reach, that it may be proper to consider the intensity of the state interest in regulating the
subject matter, as a factor bearing on "remoteness., See Aetna Lifo Ins.- Co., .869 F.2d
142; .J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213.
208. The Florida Supreme Court was recently presented with an argument that ERISA would preempt a suggested bar regulation governing the unauthorized practice of
pension plan law. While the court was receptive to the preemption argument, it chose to
reject the proposed regulation on other grounds.
In 'Florida State Bar re Advisory Opinion Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension
Plans,- 571 So. 2d 430 (1990), a committee of the Florida State Bar had presented an
advisory opinion to the Court for approval. The opinion sought to define the unauthorized practice of law with respect to pension plans, and would have prohibited nono·lawyer professionals (such as certified public accountants, actuaries, pension consultants, and
insurance underwriters) from selecting and drafting plans for clients, .qualifying the plan
before the Internal Revenue Service, and terminating a plan. Non-lawyer professional
organizations argued that, because ERISA itself regulated some aspects of non...Iawyer
practice, the proposed regulation was preempted. The court reviewed the extensive federal regulation of pension plan practice by accountants and actuaries, but declined to rest
its detet1nination on preemption grounds. Instead, it concluded that:
[W]e find that our authority is restricted because much of the practice in this
field of law is before administrative agencies, and we are not convinced by this
record that there exists a public need for the protection sought in this proposed
opinion. Consequently, at this time, we find that we should disapprove the proposed opinion.
571 So. 2d at 433. On the other hand, courts in New Jersey and New York have simply
brushed aside the possibility of ERISA preemption .o f state regulations of attorneys, after
superficial consideration of the issue. See In re 1115 Legal Serv!' Care, 110 N.J. 344, 349
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The Reasons for Preemption

State laws that govern attorneys, in their representation of plans
or plan fiduciaries, "relate to" employee benefit plans within the
meaning of ERISA section 514(a). The relationship that is the focus
of such laws has a plan or plan fiduciary as one of the two parties.
The conduct sought to be regulated is conduct by the attorney that
directly or indirectly affects the plan, its fiduciaries, its participants
and others closely connected with the plan. Four major bodies of
state law purport to regulate that plan-related conduct: fiduciary law,
tort law, agency law, and professional responsibility law. The first
three are well-established and uncontroversial areas for expansive ERISA preemption; the fourth area contains rules that are largely derived from the first three. Application of the preemption provision to
plan attorneys thus appears to present a straightforward case.
Yet the case for preemption is made stronger still by several additional considerations. One is that a plan attorney is a party in interest and so his conduct is already expressly governed by ERISA under
the prohibited transaction rules. One prohibited transaction rule that
applies to every plan attorney is the prohibition of the "furnishing of
[legal] services"209 unless the services are "necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan"210 and unless "no more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor." 211 Since ERISA does regulate
the furnishing of legal services to a plan, it follows from a basic rule of
preemption that any state law which purports to regulate that same
subject must be held to be preempted.212 It makes no difference that
ERISA's regulation of attorney services is more limited than the body
of state law it preempts. That is a common occurrence, since ERISA
preemption in general is far broader than the statute's regulatory
scope.

n.2, 541 A.2d 673, 675 n.2 (1988); In re UAW Legal Servs. Plan, 69 A.D.2d·995, 416
N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (1979)..
The only article to date that has been concerned with the law governing plan attorneys largely ignores the issue of preemption. See Note, Attorney's Liabilities Under ERISA, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 129 (1979).
209. ERISA § 406(a)(l)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(l){C) (1988).
210. ERISA § 408(b)(2)lt 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (1988).
211. /d.
212. Cf. Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (state law claims
against non-fiduciary benefits administrator were preempted); Light v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Ala., 790 F.2d 1247, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1986); Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.,
715 F. Supp 1021 (D. Kan. 1989).

.
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A second consideration is that state rules and requirements for
attorneys,- so far as they apply to plan attorneys; frequently conflict
with ERISA's policies. For exatnple, as we shall see below,z13 ERISA's policies require that plan attorneys take affirtnative steps to help
rectify fiduciary breaches which they learn about, and that such steps
may include, if necessary; disclosure of the wrong. This requirement
is flatly inconsistent with standards of professional responsibility imposed by many states. To permit those state rules to set standards for
plan attorneys would undermine ERISA's substantive policies. It
would also subject attorneys for interstate plans to varying, and possibly conflicting, requirements. These are precisely the results that ERISA'S sweeping preemption rule was adopted to prevent.
A third, and related, consideration is that the relationship between an attorney and his client is traditionally considered to be a
fiduciary relationship.2 14 But a central purpose of ERISA was to federalize the law of fiduciary relationships_with respect to a plan.21 s In
particular, ERISA's fiduciary policies, although derived from state
tmst law, are to be developed and applied by federal courts with sensitivity to the character of employee benefit plans. We have seen that
plan attorneys, as persons who might well have been deemed ERISA.
fiduciaries, may be within the ambit of ERISA's fiduciary policies.
For the states to try to regulate the fiduciary relationship between
plan attorneys and plans clearly threaten the full implementation of
ERISA's fiduciary policies and purposes~ 21 6
Finally, the legislative history of ERISA makes it clear that Congress did intend to preempt some state regulation of plans in the form
of state-enforced rules of professional responsibility. ERISA expressly includes prepaid legal services plans within the scope of its
coverage,217 and Congress was concerned that state bar associations

213. Section V(A), infra notes 404-441 and accompanying text.
214. E.g., Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1989).
215. Consistent with this result, suits alleging breach of state law fiduciary duty by
persons connected with ERISA plans have generally been held to be preempted. E.g.,
Light v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1986) (claim against
plan administrator); Powell, 780 F.2d 419; Authier, 151 F.2d 796; Metzner, 663 F. Supp.
716. Some courts have held such suits to be preempted even when brought against persons who are not ERISA fiduciaries. See P*l*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157; Muscar,
647 F. Supp. 1164 (suit against employer). See also Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
915 F. 2d 414 (9th Cir. 1990)(suit against non-fiduciary claims handler for breach of duty
of good faith).
216. See Part IV; infra notes 357-403 and accompanying text~
217. ERISA § 3(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1988).
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would try (as they had been doing) to hinder the development of such
plans through state-enforced disciplinary rules. 218 Indeed, the perceived need to preempt state professional rules that threatened to interfere with the development of prepaid legal services plans appears to
have been one of the main reasons that the Conference Committee
expanded the scope of the preemption clause from the subjects of ERISA alone, to all state laws which relate to plans.219 This aspect of
ERISA preemption emerges clearly from an explanation of the new,
broadened preemption provision, on the Senate floor:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in
the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of contlicting or inconsistent
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle
is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or
local govertunents, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the
force or effect of law. Consistent with this principle, State professional associations acting under the guise of State-enforced professional regulation, should not be able to prevent unions and
employers from maintaining the types of employee benefit prograrns which Congress has authorized
for example, prepaid
whether closed or open panel
authorlegal services programs
ized by [ERISA].220

Thus, state regulation of the practice of law was intended to be within
the scope of ERISA's preemption provision.

218. For a review of this legislative history, see Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Employee
Legal Service Plans: Conflicts Between Federal and State Regulation, 1976 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 787, 80 l-03, 828-30.
219. As Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 218, explain:
[W]hen in the course of the negotiations of the conference committee some participants wanted to be sure the preemption would override the restrictive rules
in state codes of professional responsibility that might prevent the establishment
of closed panel legal service plans and doubts were expressed whether the
phrase "relate to any employee benefit plan" in the preemption clause would
cover ethical rules that were directed at lawyers and only indirectly affected
employee benefit plans, the definitions of "state law" and "state" were added to
the preemption section to eliminate doubt.
/d. at 829.
220. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,933 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4745-46 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
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Arguments Against Preemption

Several reasons might be urged against preemption. None,
though, is persuasive.
First, it might be urged that state interest in attorney regulation
is so intense as to preclude federal regulation. But as we have seen,
this very form of argument is unavailable, since Congress has already
made the policy choice to oust state laws that relate to benefit plans,
irrespective of the intensity of state interest in the area. In any event,
an unstated premise of the argument is false, since state interest in
regulating attorneys is not obviously more intense than the federal
interest in doing so. Federal courts, no less than state courts, have the
power to regulate the conduct of attorneys admitted to practice before
them. 221 "The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures
and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct
of ... lawyers."222 Congress itself has evinced substantial interest in
regulating the practice of law in matters such as fees, provision of
legal services to the poor, and other areas. 223 So, too, has the executive branch, for example, through enforcement of the Sherman Act by
the Justice Department,224 and through Federal Trade Cornmission
enforcement activities. 225 Attorney regulation is very far from being
the exclusive province of the states.
Another argument that might be urged is that state laws govern
attorneys only in their state-created status, as attorneys licensed to
practice in the forum. 226 This argutnent, too, is unavailing. As we

221. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985); In re Com Derivatives Antitrust
Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Cochrane & Bresnahan v.
Plaintiff Class Representatives, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 610 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Del. 1985). See also Grievance Comm. of United States
Dist. Court, Dist. of Conn. v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988).
222. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (state disbarment does not
require federal disbarment).
223. See generally Tunney & Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 333 (1975).
224. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. American Bar Ass•n, (D.D.C. 1976) No.
76.. 1182, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 980 (1976); DOJ Bids to Block ABA Rule Change,
Legal Times, Feb. 12, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
225. E.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990) (concerted refusal to deal in order to raise hourly rates for services); FTC v. American Legal
Distribs., Inc. , 890 F.2d 363 (11th Cir. 1989) (fraudulent legal services program); FTC v.
Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1980) (violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
226. Cf. Feinstein v. Attorney General, 36 N.Y.2d 199, 206, 326 N.E.2d 288, 292,
366 N.Y.S.2d 613, 618 (1975) (ERISA "may, perhaps, preempt the regulation of union
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saw when analyzing the analogous reasoning of the Corrigan case, the
argument shows only that if the state laws regulating attorneys do
relate to the plan under the language of the preemption provision, the
state laws creating the status may pro tanto be ousted as well. And as
we shall see from the later discussion, ERISA may indeed be construed to oust the state-law status of attorney (so far as the attorney
represents the plan) and create a new status of plan attorney that is
wholly federal in character.
Another argument that might be raised is based on legislative
history. When the final preemption provision emerged from the Conference Conunittee, and it was made clear that the changes were
adopted, in part, to prevent state interference with prepaid legal plans
through standards of professional conduct, some concern was expressed on the Senate floor that ERISA might preempt general state
rules of professional conduct for those attorneys who provide legal
services through the prepaid plan. 227 The Senate sponsors made it
clear that there would not be preemption in such cases. That conclu-

prepaid legal services plans, qua plans, but does not reach the professional licensure and
regulation of lawyers, qua lawyers, who would render legal services under the plans.").
227. The colloquy on the senate floor was as follows:
MR. TAFT....
[W]hile there is preemption under section 514 of the substance of the pension legislation including the matter of provisions relating to attorneys
services under employee benefit plans does this section 514 of the act seek
to preempt State bar associations from adopting ethical rules or guidelines
generally and/or from disciplining its members?
Some question arises in regard to that because of the remarks made indicating that the preemption doctrine extended to rules of professional
•
•
organtzattons.
MR. JAVITS....
My answer to that is no. Section 514 of the act does not preempt State bar
associations from adopting and enforcing ethical rules or guidelines generally and/or from disciplining its members or acting to discipline members
of the bar, which bar associations often do.
Section 514 does preempt State law with respect to any employee benefit
plan described in section 4(a) and not exempted in section 4(b).
Since the plans subject to Federal supervision would include plans providing prepaid legal services, it is intended that State regulation
but not bar
association ethical rules, guidelines or disciplinary actions
in regard to
such plans be preempted. But the State, directly or indirectly through the
bar, is preempted from regulating the fonn and content of a legal service
plan, for example, open versus closed panels, in the guise of disciplinary or
ethical rules or proceedings.
120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,949 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 22, at 4789.
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sion seems right, and from it, one Inight argue that state regulation of
plan attorneys should also be saved from preemption.
Such an argument would be incorrect. Merely because state
rules governing attorneys are not generally preempted insofar as they
govern attorneys who provide their services through a plan, it does
not follow that those rules are not preempted insofar as they purport
to regulate attorneys who provide services to ERISA plans. Plan attorneys have a very different relationship to a plan than do attorneys
who perfortn ordinary legal services to ordinary clients, but through a
prepaid legal services plan. The latter are either employees of a plan
or persons with a contractual relationship to it. 228 Rules of professional responsibility, as well as other state laws governing attorneys,
are mainly concerned with attorneys' dealings with their clients, not
with the attorneys' dealings with their employers. Accordingly, in the
case of an attorney associated with a prepaid legal plan, the state rules
may fairly be said to relate to the plan only tenuously. 229 By contrast,
the plan attorney is intitnately involved in the plan; indeed, he treats
the plan or a plan fiduciary as his client. Thus, state rules and regulations which govern his conduct as an attorney do govern his relationship with the plan in a very direct way and, as we have seen, present a
strong case for preemption.
A final argument against preemption points to its consequences.
An argument sometimes advanced against ERISA preemption is that
it would leave a gap in the law: an unregulated area or a wrong without a remedy.230 That argument might be thought to apply here, for
if ERISA preempts all state laws gover11ing benefit plan attorneys,
there would appear to remain a regulatory gap, ERISA itself establishing few relevant rules. The argument, however, ignores the proper
role of federal common law.

C.

Federal Common Law as a Source of Law for ERISA Plan
Attorneys

Federal coxnmon law is law of the United States to the same ex-

228. See, e.g., F. MARKS, R. HALLAUER & R. CLIFTON, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN:
AN EXPERIMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES 2-3 (1974).
229. Of course, as the legislative history shows, where the state regulation does not
relate to the plan only tenuously
for example, where it would have the effect of
preventing an attorney from providing services through a closed panel plan
it is
preempted.
230. See~ e.g., Lister, 890 F.2d 941; Phillips, 199 F.2d at 1470.
,
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tent as is statutory law. By virtue of the supremacy clause of the
Constitution,231 it is_the "supreme law of the Land," applicable in all
courts and governing all persons to the same extent as federal statutory law.232 It preempts all inconsistent state laws, just as does federal
233
So .much is uncontroversial. Yet federal common
statutory law.
law is misleadingly named234 and difficult to define. 235 It is also an
object of suspicion by some judges236 and academians.237 To understand how federal coinJnon law may properly supply rules concerning
plan attorneys, we must briefly examine what it is and what authority
courts have to develop it.
1.
a.

Federal Comm_on Law: An Overview
Th_e Heterogeneity of Federal Common Law

Federal common law is not easy to describe or to explain, primarily because it forms such a motley assemblage. Some portions of
federal common law closely resemble traditional common law, and
warrant the "common law" appellation, for they constitute dynamic
bodies of rules that emerge from judicial development of a few basic
principles and policies. There are, for example, expansive, continually
developing bodies of federal cotnmon law that deal respectively with
_admiralty,23'8 Indian affairs, 239 and collectively bargained labor con231. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution; and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 'fhing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding~").
232. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie
And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L~ REv. 381, 405, 407 (1964).
233. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). However, in
framing rules of decision, federal courts exercising their common lawmaking power may
decide to follow the rules of the forum state, and not create a uniform, nationwide rule.
See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See generally Mishkin,
The Variousness of 'Pederal Law'': Competence and Discretion in the Choice ofNational
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. R.Bv. 797 (1957).
234. The Supreme Court once proposed that it might more accurately be called
''law of independent federal judicial decision.', United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332

u.s. 301, 308 (1947).

235. For efforts to do $0, seeP. BATOR, P~ MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSI"EM 770 (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope ofFederal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L . REv. 881, 890-96 (1986).

236. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
237. E.g., Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and Jhe Interpretive

Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U.. L. REv. 761 (1989) .
238. See Moragne v. States Marine-Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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tracts; 240 and each has been developed substantially through the traditional connnon law process,.241 But there are limits to this genre of
federal common law. Courts have not developed bodies of federal
conunon law whose rules systematically deal with fundamental and
widely applicable topics such as contracts, torts, or agency.242
Although there is federal common law covering, for example, certain
collective bargaining agreements, government contracts, and oral settlement agreements, there is no general federal c.ommon law of contracts as exists in the states. The result, as the Supreme Court stated
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins., is that "[t]here is no federal general
common law.,243 There are only areas where discrete topics of federal interest have been more or less broadly developed.
Although these bodies of law governing specific topics of federal
interest are the parts of federal common law best known and most
discussed in the academic literature,244 the great bulk of federal common law actually consists of isolated rules, or groups of rules, devel-

239. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (198'5).
240~ See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.,S, 448.
241 ~ This list of such areas is not exhaustive. There are also, for example, welldeveloped bodies of federal common law for oral settlement agreements, Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc. 1 733 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1984); Casey v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 687 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (W.D. Ky. 1988); conversion of goods in international
transport, Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 783 F.2d 33, 3'8 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 u.s. 827 (1986); fiduciary duties or officers and directors of federally
chartered savings and loans, Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kidwell, 672 F. Supp. 436
(N.D. Cal. 1987); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819
(N.D. Ill. 1975); and a wide variety of other matters. See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 4514 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
242. For a review of the failure of courts to unify the various subject-specific federal
common law rules of alter-ego liability into a coherent set ofprinciples of general applicability, see Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal
Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1982}.
243. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
244. Even more specifically, the bulk of academic discussion of federal common law
centers on the few areas where the topic ofbroad lawmaking-is not clearly suggested by a
statute or constitutional provision. SeeSI e.g., M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 79-107 (2d ed. 1989).
It is true that the existence of these few areas raises interesting questions about the
power and competence of federal courts to make "common law." But it is also true that
these areas of common lawmaking are-only a very small part of the assemblage of federal
common law. To let the analysis of them drive the analysis of the general authority and
competence of courts to make federal common law is to invite distortion into the analysis.
Even if it were agreed that federal common lawmaking in the areas as to which there
is controversy were improper, there would be little; if any, impact on the issue of the
propriety of courts to develop federal -common law of the far more common type discussed in this article.
•
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oped by courts to supplement or clarify a statute or statutory
scheme. 245 No statute can comprehend all the rules needed to regulate a given subject area. Gaps, oversights, and ambiguities are inevitable. Indeed, there are certain questions .· usually of a procedural
character
that Congress persistently neglects to attend to. 246
Courts must deal with these statutorily neglected questions. This "interstitial" cornmon lawmaking is extremely cotninon and is essential
to the successful implementation of many statutory programs.247 Yet
the fact that courts engage in this form of comrnon lawmaking is so
uncontroversial that little attention is ever paid to it.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to be aware that federal common law is a collection of rules, groups of rules, and bodies of rules,
each part of which deals with a discrete area of federal interest.
Although denominated "common law," it substantially lacks the collections of rules of universal applicability that are the core concerns of
traditional comtnon law. It also differs from traditional common law
by so largely consisting of fragmentary sets of rules. It is heterogeneous in the subjects addressed and is heterogeneous in the degrees to
which its parts resemble traditional cotnmon law.

b._ The Written Bases for Federal Common Law
The practical reason that federal cotnmon law has this heterogeneous character, and substantially omits systematic treatment of basic
legal topics, is quite easy to diagnose. It lies in the jurisdictional dependence of federal co1nmon law on federal written law.
In principle, federal common law may be created by either a federal or state court. In practice, though, the overwhelming portion of
it is developed by the federal courts.248 Even more specifically, the

245. Little of the recent commentary on federal common law has anything to say
about this extensive collection of discrete rules. Redish, supra note 244, ignores it as do
Field, supra note 235, Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 805 (1989),
and Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, ,52 U. CHI. L. REv.- 1 (1985).
The only extensive discussion of it appears to be the one contained in WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, supra note 241.
246. Thus, for example, federal courts are often called on to determine the legal
effect of a statutory prohibition, e.g., Deitrick v~ Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940); In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp._22 (D. Mass. 1987),
to supply limitations periods for a statutory cause of action, or even to supply claims,
defenses; and procedural rules that are missing from a statutory framework, e.g., Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
247. See Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U.. L. R.Bv. 1, 6-7 (1990).
248.. This is not a necessary state of affairs. If state court lawyers and judges had
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overwhelming portion of federal comrnon law is developed on occasions where a federal court decides a case or controversy under its
federal question jurisdiction.249 Most cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,"250 and thus falling
within the courts' federal question jurisdiction, arise under written
federal law. As a result, federal common lawmaking is usually contingent on there being a statute or other written provision that opens
the door to federal court jurisdiction and federal court decision-making.251 Thus, the subjects federal cotnmon law may address are
largely confined to the subjects Congress chooses to enact legislation
on. If not for ERISA, for exatnple, a federal common law of benefit
plans probably would be impossible.
The upshot of the present state of affairs is that written federal
law is antecedent to federal common law: it is the precondition to
most of federal common law and is the preexisting background
against which it is developed. By contrast, in state legal systems, it is

been trained to be more sensitive to the federal concerns involved in cases brought in state
courts, they might by now have produced an expansive, state-court created, federal common law. For example, they might have created a federal common law of interstate
transactions, of the kind the Supreme Court once hoped would be developed in diversity
actions. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). But matters are otherwise. In the
absence of a controlling federal statute, state courts invariably apply state law without
giving much thought to the potential federal interest in the subject or the possibility of
developing and applying federal common law.
And if it is at least possible that state courts could have taken the initiative in creating federal common law, it is also possible that federal courts could have done so, as state
court surrogates, in the course of deciding controversies under the grant of diversity jurisdiction. But again, matters are otherwise. Federal common law is rarely created in diversity cases. For cases where it has been, see~ e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. 500; Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
249. The federal common law of interstate relations is developed in cases as to
which there is jurisdiction under the Constitution's grant of power to federal courts to
hear ''Controversies between two or more States," U.S. CoNST. art. Ill,§ 2; and in these
which is
cases the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. Federal admiralty law
almost exclusively common law
is created in cases brought pursuant to the Constitution's grant of power to federal courts to hear "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CoNST. art. Ill,§ 2. And the common law of the rights and obligations of
the United States is developed in cases brought pursuant to the Constitution's grant of
power to federal courts to hear "Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
§ 1331 (1988).
250. 28
251. It is because of this critical dependence on codified law that there is no clear
demarcation between federal common law and statutory construction. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 235, at 771; Field, supra note 235, at 893-94; Merrill, supra note 245, at
3-7.

u.s.c.
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state comtnon law that is the preexisting background against which
the state legislature legislates. 252 Thus, state and federal comtnon law
differ in this basic respect, that state and federal legal systems have
foreground and background reversed.

2.

Preconditions to Development of Bodies of Federal Common Law

This jurisdictional explanation of federal common law ultimately
serves only to point to a deeper question: Why does federal cotntnon
lawmaking in an area usually depend on prior congressional lawmaking in the area? Why shouldn't federal common lawmaking more
often proceed independently, or even in advance, of legislation, as is
the case with state common lawmaking? After all, the Constitution
does not expressly limit federal court common lawmaking, and it is
doubtful that the Rules of Decision Act253 can be read as posing a
significant litnitation, either.254
The answer is far from clear. The most plausible explanation,
though, is that the effective limitation of federal common lawmaking
to areas of congressional lawmaking is an institutional, rather than a
Constitutionallixnitation. That is to say, while federal courts, in principle, have extensive cotninon lawmaking power arguably as extensive as Congress's legislative power
they have nonetheless evolved
a pragmatic reluctance to develop federal common law, which has
become an integral aspect of the federal judicial approach to deciding
cases and controversies. This reluctance, in its application, yields the
prevailing limitation.
There are two aspects to this institutional reluctance. One involves considerations of federalism. Federal courts conduct their Article III activities within the constraints of a political model in which
state law (both statutory and cotnmon law)255 is taken as the preexisting background against which all federal law
both statutory and
judicial is made. 256 Federal lawmaking, whether legislative or judi-

252. See Field, supra note 235, at 885 n.ll.
.. 253. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). The Act states, in pertinent part: "[T]he laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." /d.
254. See Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks
Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 860 (1989).
255. See Erie R.R., 304 U.S. 64.
256. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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cial, often constitutes an invasien of this background legal corpus.
Because of the supremacy clause, any such invasion necessarily ousts
portions of state law. Now, it is taken as a principle of federalism that
state interests, as reflected in state law, are not lightly to be invaded
and ousted by federal lawmaking. In the case of legislation, there are
safeguards to protect against ill-considered invasions. In particular,
the representation of state interests in Congress serves as an internal
restraint on excessive or objectionable federalization of an area. But
there are no such internal restraints that govern federal courts. How,
then, can federal courts respect the principle of federalism?2 57
They can do so through self-restraint. One aspect of such restraint is institutional reluctance to develop federal common law.
Formally, the reluctance manifests itself as a presumption against developing_common law rules, particularly where such rules would
trench on the state law background. Sometimes, this presumption is
said to be more·than institutionally compelled, and to be a necessary
result of the tenth .a mendment258 or the Rules of Decision Act. 259 But
it is more accurate to say that those constitutional and statutory provisions simply reflect the very satne principle of federalism, in furtherance of which federal courts have devised their presumption. The
provisions reflect the concerns underlying the presumption, but do
not themselves demand it.
Yet as the pervasiveness of federal common law makes plain, the
presumption is not absolute. To overcome it, so as to be able to deem
itself authorized to announce a rule of federal common law, a federal
court need only find a proper justification for exercising its already
existing lawmaking power in that instance. A meta-common law of
federal common lawmaking has developed to deal with the question
of what constitutes an acceptable justification. The basic rule is no
more than distilled comtnon sense: to overcome the presumption
against creating federal common law in an area, a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition is a showing of preexisting federal interest in that
area; 260 and proof of such preexisting interest may most straightfor.

·.

257. See generally Merrill, supra note_245, at 13-19.
258. U~S. CONST. amend. X (''The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.'').
259. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 {1988).
260. See REDISH, supra note244, at 121 ("federal common law will be applied in a
case only if there is an affirmative showing that federal interests are in some manner
affected by the substantive legal principles that are to be employed.").
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wardly be found in Congress's decision to legislate in the
This
is very much a pragmatic rule. If Congress has already legislated with
respect to a subject, the states have already had the opportunity to
protect their interests against invasion and displacement, and have
failed to do so. Thus, the effect of the rule is that the internal restraint
on congressional lawmaking is borrowed as an external restraint on
the courts. A corollary is that the stronger the federal interest expressed through the statute, the more thoroughly the presumption is
overcome and the more extensive is the authority of the courts to develop federal corntnon law in the statute's wake. 262
Considerations of federalism are not the only ones underlying the
federal courts' self-itnposed limitation on their common lawmaking
activity. A second consideration derives from the notion of separation of federal powers.263 The Constitution vests all legislative power
in the Congress.264 Now, it is true that common lawmaking is not the
exercise of legislative power, and so the provision does not of its own
force limit corntnon lawmaking by federal courts. Nonetheless, the
Constitution's express allocation of legislative power to Congress is
widely regarded as a reflection of the broader, unexpressed principle
that Congress has the primary responsibility and authority to deter261
area.

261. E.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. 500; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102
(1972). See generally HART & WECHSLE~, supra note 235, at 800-06; REDISH, supra note
244, at 122.
Preexisting federal interest may also be shown from non-statutory sources, but these
cases are less unequivocal. Compare Boyle, 481 U.S. at 500 (majority opinion), with
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("federal common law cannot supersede state law in vacuo out of no more than an idiosyncratic determination by five Justices
that a particular area is 'uniquely federal.'"). The few areas in which there have been
non-statutory federal common law are those where other considerations show federal
interest to be so intense, and federal regulation so necessary that displacement of state
law by federal common law is compelled. They are substantially limited to the areas of
the rights and duties of the United States, West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305
(1987); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973);
Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. 363; the rights and duties of government contractors,
Boyle, 487 U.S. 500; interstate rights and obligations, Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); foreign relations, Sabbatino, 316 U.S. 398;
admiralty and maritime law, Moragne, 398 U.S. 375; and Indian affairs, Oneida Indian
Nation, 470 U.S. 226.
262. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448; City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 336 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263. See, e.g., City ofMilwaukee, 451 U.S. 304; Northwest Airlines, Inc., 451 U.S. at
95.
264. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 1.
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mine national policy.26s
Common lawmaking is itnpossible without reference to selected
policies. Indeed, common lawmaking, like legislative lawmaking, is
simply a method of implementing preselected policies. Because of the
institutional principle that Congress should be the primary source of
national policy, courts deem themselves generally not free to make
policy choices on their own and generally obligated to adhere to Congress's policy choices instead. This reluctance of ,c ourts to choose important policy becomes most important when courts are presented
with Congress's failure to legislate as to an issue
i.e., precisely
when the occasion arises to develop a rule of federal common law.
For, in those cases, the court must deter1nine whether congressional
silence reflects a policy choice that there should be no federal regulation at all. 2·66 Thus, while congressional silence is, on the one hand, a
predicate for making federal cotnmon law, on closer examination it
might actually demand abstinence from the court's actually doing so.
These considerations of federalism and separation of power have,
led federal courts to the general principle that they ordinarily should
not make comrnon law in an area unless they have been "authorized"
by Congress to do so.267 Courts, therefore, proceed cautiously in developing federal common law.
It should be obvious that the tertn "authorized''. is misleading,
because authorization to engage in. common lawmaking has nothing
to do with judicial competence or power. Nor does "authorized'' necessarily mean expressly permitted, or even implicitly permitted. Permission is not the issue. "Authorized," here, means only that the
exercise of common lawmaking power would not trench upon the
state or congressional prerogatives that are thought to be threatened
by federal common lawmaking.26s
Isolated rulemaking to supplement or cl -~ · a statute is usually
uncontroversial. The very process of legislating demands as a concomitant this so-called interstitial lawmaking, and it generally is easy

265. See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313-14; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 38'8
(1983).
266. See;. e.g., Farmers Educ~ & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525,
531-33 (1959) (legislative silence too equivocal to be taken as bar to common law rule).
267. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641
(1981); Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451.
268. Cf. Friendly, supra note 232, at 407 ("state courts must confonn to federal
decisions in an area where Congress, acting within the powers granted to it, has manifested, be it ever so slightly, an intention to that end.").,
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for the courts to recognize the difference between filling in an oversight and contravening congressional intent. Disagreements over "authorization'' in these cases are less common than in situations
involving the development of expansive bodies of federal comtnon
law,. It is in these latter cases that uncertainty about "authorization"
is likely to arise and it is here that common lawmaking usually demands strong and articulate justification.
One accepted circumstance where courts may properly develop a
comprehensive body of federal common law is where Congress, in the
statute, expressly or impliedly delegates such comtnon lawmaking
power to the courts.269 Cotnmon lawmaking in such circumstances
obviously creates no problem, either of federalism or separation of
powers, since Congress has already made the determination that common lawmaking is proper.
Probably the most straightforward example of such delegation is
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, govern1nent, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles·of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. . . .21o

This rule substantially provides that rules of privilege shall be
whatever the federal courts detertnine they should be. Rarely,
though, is the delegation so express. More often it has to be inferred
from the language of the statute or its legislative history.
Use of open-ended language
language that must be invested.
with clarity and meaning .,, .. in a standard or prohibition is good evidence of congressional intent to delegate lawmaking power. It is particularly good evidence where the language repeats, or draws upon, a
cotnmon law standard that has already been developed by the
courts. 271 A well-known case of such implicit delegation is Section 1

269. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642. Merrill, supra note 245, at 40, has called this
form of common lawmaking "delegated lawmaking,'' and we use the term here.
270. FED. R. EVID. SO 1.
271. See, e.g., Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 64345. See generally Merrill, supra note
245, at 43-45.
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of the Sherman Act, 272 which specifies that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce a•n.ong the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. " 273 The legislative history does support the
conclusion that the courts should develop a cornmon law of restraints
of trade to implement the general prohibition expressed in the statute.274 Yet one need not appeal to the legislative history for this conclusion, since the statute's use of a very general standard, derived
from the common law, itself justifies the courts in developing this

common law.275
Another circumstance where broad common lawmaking may be
justified by a statute is where the federal interests identified in the
statute are so intense, and the need for displacing state law so great,
that preemption of state law extends beyond the express provisions of
276
the statute.
In cases of this kind, courts themselves may have to
supply a panoply of federal rules of conduct and federal rules of deci27
sion. Otherwise, there would be a regulatory void. '
Common lawmaking of this latter sort is eminently proper under
the guidelines discussed above. Since state law has already been displaced by Congress, creation of federal common law in the area of
displacement does not invade state interests, and so does not transgress principles of federalism. Nor does it infringe on congressional
policy-making prerogative, at least to the extent courts fill in regula-

tory gaps in a manner consistent with the intent of the legislation.
Rather, development of federal common law in those circumstances

272. 15 U.S. C. -§ 1 (1988). The scope of delegated common lawmaking power under
this statute is delineated in Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 642-46.
273. 15 u.s.c. § 1.
274. E.g., 21 CoNG. REc. 4089 (May 1, 1890) ("Now, I take it, with all due deference to what the Supreme Court may ultimately decide, that that is a contract in restraint
of trade within the meaning of the bill.'') (remarks of Rep. Culberson).
275. Other similar examples of implicit delegation are the prohibition of ''deceptive"
and "misleading" practices in the various securities laws and regulations, e.g., 15 U.S. C.
§§ 771(2) & 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990); "unfair'' and "deceptive" prac~
tices under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1988); "unfair methods of competition''
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); and "deprivation of any rights ...
secured by the Constitution and laws,'' under the civil rights laws, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982).
276. Merrill, supra note 245, at 36, calls this form of lawmaking "preemptive lawmakingjl" We shall use that term here.
277. Or else there would be regulation by default, where failure ofcourts to make a
rule de facto makes one.
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simply carries out congressional aims.27S
Preemptive and delegating are not the only sources of authority
for large-scale federal comtnon lawmaking. But they are the most
cotnmon ones. Nor are they always sharply distinguished. For example, where preemption is accompanied by congressional expectation of
com1non lawmaking in the preemptive domain, the resultant comtnon
lawmaking may partake of both preemptive and delegated characteristics. Nonetheless, the differences are sometimes obvious and, as we
shall see, the categories have value as a tool for analysis.

3.
a.

Federal Common Law of ERISA
Plans
..
Authority for Common Lawmaking

ERISA authorizes federal courts
indeed, charges them
"to
develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."279 Supreme Court pronouncements have
placed the matter beyond dispute. 280 However, neither the Supreme
Court nor any other federal court has carefully examined the source
and scope of federal common lawmaking authority concerning benefit
plans, presumably because most of the exercises of that power have
been uncontroversial. 2 81

278. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
In these latter circumstances, the aim of common lawmaking is to devise rules that
best carry out the purpose of the statute. As the Supreme Court described the process
under the Taft-Hartley Act:
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under§ 30l(a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive
law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations.
Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some
will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of
the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The
range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem.
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. But state
law, if compatible with the purpose of§ 301, may be resorted to in order to find
the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of
private rights.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57 (citations omitted).
279. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 110.
280. See, e.g., Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 56; Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559 (1985); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983).
281. For example, courts have exercised their common lawmaking power to develop: standards for judicial review of benefit determinations by plans, Firestone Tire &
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There are, in fact, several sources of authority for courts to develop a body of common law for benefit plans, and it is essential to see
what they are and to understand their scope.
i.

The Two Primary Sources of Authority for a Benefits Plan
Common Law

The two major sources of authority for courts to develop federal
comtnon law for benefit plans are the two important ones identified
above: preemption and delegation.
ERISA's expansive preemption provision is one basis of common
lawmaking authority. It is obvious, in light of the prior discussion,
that courts are authorized to develop rules to carry out the congressional purposes underlying ERISA in areas not addressed by the statute, but which, because of preemption, cannot be fille,d in by state
law.282 This area is extensive.283 Broad ERISA preemption calls for
broad common lawmaking in its wake.
Preemption, as a basis for common lawmaking, was, in fact, foreseen in the legislative history. Congress expected courts to develop
federal common law under ERISA, on the model of the federal common law developed under the Labor Management Relations Act,

Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101; rules for exhaustion ofintra~plan remedies before challenges to
benefit detern1inations are brought in court, e.g., Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d
458, 466 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1066 (1987); rules concerning the validity
and enforceability of plan provisions in light of the policies underlying ERISA, Northeast
Dep't ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare
Fund, 764 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 19'85); Victor v. Home Sav. of Amer. , 645 F. Supp. 1486,
1496-97 (E.D. Mo. 1986); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978); rules to govern disputes over contracts
relating to plans, Kinek v. Gulf & W., Inc., 720 F. Supp 275, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (third
party beneficiary standards); Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Cormier, 675 F. Supp. 337
(B.D. La. 1987); rules of liability for non-fiduciaries who participate in a fiduciary's
breach, see section VI(A)(l), infra notes 360-362 and accompanying text; rules for alterego liability, Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986); rules pennitting restitution to
employers who mistakenly over-contribute to plans, Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters
Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 949-50 (D. Del. 1985); and rules for
preemption of state laws that "relate to'' employee benefit plans, see section II(B)(l ),
supra notes 156-179 and accompanying text.
282. Seei e.g., In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d at 1191-94; Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1351-56 (8th Cir. 1980); Victor, 645 F. Supp. at
1495-96.
283. See, e.g., Sherrnan, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of
Creditors' Rights, SS IND~ L.J. 247 (1980) (developing federal common law of' creditors'
rights, made necessary by preemption).
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which itself implicitly preempts a large area of state law.284 This expectation emerges clearly, for example, in Senator Javits'' explanation
of the effect of preemption: ''It is ... intended that a body of Federal
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension
plans.-" 285
The other major source of authority is delegation by Congress.
Congressional intent that courts should have broad common lawmaking authority in certain areas relating to plans is reflected in the general and often discretionary language of basic ERISA provisions: in
particular, the provisions govertting fiduciary duties and the provisions governing remedies for violations.286 It also emerges from the
legislative history, which reflects congressional intent that specific areas
again, rules governing fiduciary conduct and liability in particular
should largely be left to the courts for development. 287
The existence of these two sources is quite clear, and generally
recognized by .c ourts. But confusion sometimes arises because courts
do not always appreciate the si · · cance of the fact that there are two
distinct sources of authority to develop federal common law. Yet the
character of the common lawmaking power differs in the two grants
of authority, and so it is important for courts to understand the basis.
on which they might proceed in a given case.
Preemptive common lawmaking under ERISA has an extensive
subject matter s.cope: in principle, it extends to any subject not ex-

284. As the Supreme Court explained in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux; 481 U.S. 41,
.56 (1987): "The expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations under
ERISA-regulated plans would develop, indeed, the entire comparison of ERISA'S
§ 502(a) to § 301 of the LMRA, would make little sense if the remedies available to
ERISA participants and beneficiaries under § 502(a) could be supplemented or supplanted by varying state laws."
The analogy between ERISA § 502(a) and section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act is specifically noted by Congress at 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,933 {Aug. 22,
1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4745 (remarks of Sen.
Williams). For a brief discussion of labor-contract common lawmaking as preemptive
lawmaking, see Merrill, supra note 245, at 43 n.188.
285. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,942 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4771 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
286. ERISA §§ 404(a), 502(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1109(a), 1132(a) (1988).
287. E.g., H. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974),-reprinted in Ill
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4569 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5083 ("[t]he conferees expect that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule
(and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of
employee benefit plans. ").
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pressly regulated by ERISA, but within the scope of the preemption
provision. However, preemptive common lawmaking is supplementary lawmaking, a prograrn of carrying out the purposes of Congress
in areas Congress could have addressed, but did not. Ordinarily,
courts will have limited discretion to make policy choices in developing this law.
Delegated lawmaking, on the other hand, is narrower, in that it
is limited to the specific subjects for which there has been delegation.
But delegated lawmaking is more discretionary than preemptive lawmaking, since courts are authorized to make policy choices in place of
Congress, so long as the result is consistent with the mandate of the
delegation. All ERISA-related corntnon lawmaking may be treated as
preemptive common lawmaking, as a program to fill in the gaps and
supplement the program of federal regulation, consistent with Congress's intent. But some of it is also authorized as delegated common
lawmaking, and, where it is, courts have substantial discretion to
make policy choices in developing the law. It thus may be important
to identify the areas in which Congress delegated such authority to
create comtnon law.

ii.

A Note About Inherent Judicial Power

In seeking to understand the scope and character of ERISA-related common lawmaking, it helps to examine the impact of one of
the inherent powers of courts.
Courts have many so-called "inherent powers." These powers
"consist of all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective. These
powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because the court exists. " 288 They are also "inherent" in the sense that they exist even
without specific constitutional or statutory authorization. They include, among many others, the fatniliar powers of courts to punish
contempt,289 to regulate their proceedings,290 to regulate their own fi-

288. J. CRATSLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE CoURTS 2 (1980). See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 147, § 2.2; Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J.
635 (1935).
289. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook, & Wheat, Civil and Criminal Contempt in
the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 169 (1955).
290. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); J. CRATSLEY, supra note 288,
at 37-39.
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nancial affairs, 291 and to regulate the practice of law. 292 The inherent
powers are sometimes deemed to be a source of common lawmaking
authority. 293 However, exercise of inherent power is not necessarily
the exercise of cotnJnon lawmaking power, since an inherent power
need not be exercised through the usual dispute resolution process.
Inherent power may, for example, be exercised through promulgation
of rules or issuance of orders on the court,s own initiative.
One inherent judicial power, albeit a power not well recognized,
is the power of courts over the administration of trusts. Like other
inherent powers, this one is often exercised in proceedings that are not
necessarily adversarial in character. For example, the inherent power
over trusts includes the power to give instructions, on request, to
trustees regarding trust administration;294 to accept the resignation of
a trustee; 295 to appoint a trustee; 296 and to authorize leases and sales
not permitted by the trust instrument.297
Courts have substantial discretion in the exercise of this power,
just as they do with any other inherent power. The power, moreover,
may be exercised sua sponte. Thus, a court with jurisdiction over a
trust may, on its own initiative, compel a trustee to carry out his responsibilities under the trust. 2 9 8 As Scott on Trusts explains:
As a general rule, of course, a court does not act on its own initiative in protecting rights or enforcing duties. It is the function of
the court to deternline controversies brought before it by the parties.... There is, however, a modem tendency ... for a court that
has supervision over the administration of trust estates to enforce
the duties of trustees even though not called upon by the beneficiaries to do so. The notion seems to be, although it is never very
explicitly stated, that it is the function of the court to see that the
directions of the settlor are carried out, even though no one com-

291. J. CRATSLEY, supra note 288, at 27, 29-37.
292. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 147, § 2.2.2; J. CRATSLEY, supra note 288, at 39-40.
293. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 245, at 18, 46-47•.
294. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 259 (1959). In several pre-ERISA cases involving pension plans, the employersponsor petitioned for instructions as to the resolution of employee claims. See Stein v.
National Bank of Commerce, 181 S.W. 1072 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916); Wallace v. Northern
Ohio Traction & Light Co., 57 Ohio App. 203, 13 N.E.2d 139 (1937).
295. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 106.
296. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 108; In re Parker's Trust Estate,
228 Mo. App. 400, 67 S.W.2d 114, 119 (1934) ("authority inheres in the court").
297. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSI'S §§ 189 comment d, 190 comment f.
298. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 200 comment h.
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plains to the court of the failure of the trustee to carry them out;
that the court has administrative powers as distinguished from
strictly judicial powers; that once the court acquires jurisdiction
over the administration of the trust, it is the function of the court
to see that the trust is adtninistered in accordance with the directions of the settlor . ~ . .299

.

This inherent power derives from the courts' role as creator of
the system of trusts. Unlike other institutions
such as partnerwith trusts, courts did not simply
ships, corporations, or bailments
take a pre-existing arrangement or an arrangement created by another
branch of govertrment and develop rules for deciding disputes about
it. To the contrary, courts themselves developed the institution of
trusts, and did so in the face of substantial opposition by the British
King and, to a lesser extent, Parliament. 300 Trusts exist only because
courts exist, and because courts consistently exercised their powers as
a politically independent part of goverrunent to protect and enforce
them. 301 The inherent power that courts now have over trusts recapitulates their power to create the institution.
This inherent power is one that properly may be exercised with
302
Many ERISA plans use a trust as the vehirespect to benefit plans.
cle for holding assets. 303 The traditional judicial power just described
should apply unproblematically to these trusts and plans, since the
use made of the trust device is irrelevant to the exercise of judicial
power. The power should also apply with respect to those plans
whose assets are not held in trust. All plans are trust-like in their

299. III A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, supra note 111, § 200.4.
300. On the development of the system of trusts, see F. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 23-42 (1929); I A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER,
supra note 111, § 1; Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HARV. L. REv. 261 (1908);
Holmes, Early English Equity, 1 LAW Q. REv. 162 (1885).
301. Trusts are largely unknown outside the legal systems based on British law,
except to the extent consciously borrowed from those systems. See G. BOGERT, supra
note 111, § 9.
302. Ct Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1051
(7th Cir. 1987) (courts' traditional, broad supervisory power over trustees explains current standard for review of benefit claim denials). For a case expressly applying such
inherent power in connection with a pre-ERISA pension plan, see Ball v. Victor Adding
Machine Co., 236 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1956). See also the pre-ERISA cases cited supra
note 294.
303. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a), provides that "[e]xcept as provided in
subsection (b), all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust. .... " However, ERISA itself contains no statutory mechanism for the formation of the trust, and, in
practice, state law generally is followed.
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material aspects, having settlors (i.e., the sponsor), fiduciaries and
beneficiaries. They lack only the trust res. But the power in question
relates to administration, not to the trust res,-and it mainly involves
regulation of the conduct of fiduciaries. It loses none of its rationale
through absence of trust funds, and can be adapted to non-trusteed
plans with little, if any, modification.
The legislative history of ERISA suggests that Congress intended
this traditional power to apply to plans. 304 In fact, Congress intended
that a great deal of trust law should apply to benefit plans, including
the part of trust law that results from, and involves discretionary exercise of, judicial power over trusts. For example, under ERISA
courts have been expressly granted the power to remove plan fiduciaries
one of their traditional inherent powers over trusts. 305 More
generally, courts have been given great discretion to issue "remedial"
orders and to "enforce" the terms of the plan, whenever jurisdiction
over a plan has -attached. 306 This delegation would appear to invoke
the traditional power of courts over trust administration. Additional
evidence of congressional intent that courts should have discretionary
power over plan administration is found in the express statement in
the legislative history that fiduciaries may petition a court for instruc~
tions when in doubt over how to proceed on a matter of substantial
concern. 30 7
Yet, in the context of plans, this inherent power does not really

304. When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of
statutory purposes. As this Court long ago recognized, ''there is inherent in the
Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to -. ... give effect to the policy of the legislature."
Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) (citation omitted). See
also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) ("Unless otherwise provided
by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the
proper and complete exercise of [its] jurisdiction.... [T]he comprehensiveness of this
equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied in the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command"); Cumings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 390 (7th
Cir.). cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986) (stating that principle was inapplicable in actions
relating to benefit plans).
305. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). On the other hand, they are denied
the traditional power to authorize deviations from the plan document. See supra text
accompanying notes 83-90 and 126.
306. See ERISA §§ 409(a), 502{a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a), 1132(a)(3).
307. See H.R.. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong_~ll 2d Sess. 300 (1974)~ reprinted in
Ill LEGISLATIVE HISFORY, supra note 22, at 4567, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5080. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112.

1116

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 41:1049

constitute an additional source ofcomJnon lawmaking authority. After all, as we have just seen, ERISA may be understood to have delegated much of the very same authority to the courts. Instead, the
power is better understood as a source of added judicial discretion in
the creation and enforcement of federal common law rules relating to
plans. In delegating this lawmaking power to courts, ERISA recognizes the courts' traditional responsibility for trusts, as well as their
institutional competence in trust~related cotnmon lawmaking and in
oversight of trust adtninistration._ The upshot is to undermine _
arguments for limiting courts' power and discretion in developing a common law for plans.

b.

Two Fallacies to be Avoided

Recognition that preemption is an independent source of federal
common lawmaking power helps expose a fallacy to which federal
courts have sometimes fallen prey. At times, courts have been reluctant to develop federal conunon law as to a matter concerning benefit
plans, because they find no delegated authority to do so. 308 This reluctance is unfounded, since it ignores preemption as a source of authority not dependent on express and itnplied delegations._
Another fallacy to be avoided would also place unjustified limits
on preemptive common lawmaking. Obviously, a proper limitation
on preemptive lawmaking is negative legislative intent: the failure of
ERISA to regulate an area may evince congressional intent to leave
the matter unregulated. For example, there i~ currently wide agreement that the doctrine of estoppel has a limited place, if any, in the
cotntnon law of benefit plans because of ERISA's central requirement
that plans be in writing. 309 A common law of oral plan modifications
arguably would contravene this policy.310
But it by no means follows that the failure of Congress to regulate an aspect of benefit plans necessarily means that Congress wanted
the matter left unregulated, and that cotntnon lawmaking is im-

308. Seei e.g., Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to
recognize federal common law claim "[a]bsent an explicit directive from Congress',).
309. See ERISA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
310. See Cefalu, 871 F.2d at 1296..97. But see TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112 (rules of
estoppel apply to unfunded, single-employer welfare plans); McNabb v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 656 F. Supp. 866, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying principles of estoppel to
claim f.or benefits, but finding no liability).
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proper. 311 That conclusion would follow only if ERISA were thoroughly comprehensive, which, as we have seen, it is not. Thus, to
take a simple example, although Congress has exempted welfare benefit plans from the mandatory vesting standards imposed on pension
plans, it does not necessarily follow that courts may not develop federal common law rules to govern vesting by agreement of the parties
to a plan. 312

c.

Examples of Delegated and Preemptive Common Lawmaking

One important aspect of benefit plans with respect to which
courts have unquestionably been delegated coininon lawmaking
power is that of fiduciary responsibility. Here, Congress adopted
broad, general standards derived from the cointnon law, and left it to
the courts to fill in the details. 313 As the legislative history explains:
''The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes
applicable to ... fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law oftrusts." 314 Si · cantly, it is the "principles," rather
than specific rules, that have been codified in ERISA, and this is reflected in the extreme generality of the basic fiduciary standards.
Another important area of delegated common lawmaking power
is that of remedies. ERISA expressly gives courts broad power to
grant "such . . . equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate"3 15 for breaches of fiduciary duty, and to grant "appropriate equitable relief" 316 to redress violations of ERISA or the tertns
of a plan. This language, like that of the fiduciary provisions, on its

311. See~ e.g., Soft Drink Indus. Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F.
Supp. 743 (N.D. lll. 1988) (restitution for mistaken over-contribution by employer).
312. See In re White Fann Equip. Co., 788 F.2d at 1192 (exclusion of welfare plans
from mandatory vesting standards tells in favor of courts not imposing absolute vesting
requirement, but does not preclude development of common law rules for vesting by
agreement); Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D.C. Tenn.
1985), modified, 822 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Omission of welfare benefit plans from
the vesting provisions of ERISA does not reflect Congressional intent that welfare benefit
rights are entitled to no protection under federal law"); In re Reading Co., 72 Bankr. 258
(B.D. Pa. 1987). See generally Note, Retiree Welfare Benefits: ERISA, LMRA and the
Federal Common Law, 20 AKRON L. REv. 455 (1987); Note, Hansen v. White Farm
Equipment Co.: Does Federal Common Law Require that Welfare Benefit Plans Vest
Upon Retirement?, 17 U. ToL. L. REv. 479 (1986).
313. See Central States, 472 U.S. at 570.
314. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1973), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 615 and in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4865.
315. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
316. ERISA§ 502(a)(3)(B) & (5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) & (S)(B).
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face delegates to the courts authority to develop a body of remedial
common law. 317
Congress's delegation of conrmon lawmaking power as to both
the substance of fiduciary obligations and remedies for their breach
makes for an unusually broad delegation of lawmaking power.3ts It is
significantly broader than the delegation of comtnon lawmaking
power under the Sherman Act, for while the Shertnan Act does delegate authority for courts to create a federal common law of violations,
the Supreme Court has held that there is no accompanying delegation
of authority to develop a common law of remedies.3t9
There are other subjects as to which courts have been delegated
authority under ERISA to make common Iaw. 320 However, for most

317. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26; Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers Union v. Murdock, 861 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1988) (constructive trust on breaching fiduciary's gains, in favor of participants who had already received full distribution of
benefits); Kineck v. Gulf & Western, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Marshall&:
!Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629.
318. This was pointed out by one of ERISA's sponsors:
ERISA's substantive standards and its remedial relief provisions were thought
to be, at the time of their enactment, exceedingly comprehensive and broad,
pennitting courts to fashion virtually any type of civil relief n
to redress
violations of the statute.
125 CoNG. REc. 930 (Jan. 24, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
319. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 643-46. For this reason, the Supreme Court has
refused to recognize a federal common law remedy of contribution among antitrust violators. /d. By contrast, federal courts have developed a federal common law of restitution
with respect to plans, see, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d
985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Em..
ployees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989); Airco Indus. Gases, 618 F. Supp.
at 950; Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Wong v. Bacon, 445 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Soft Drink Indus. Pension Fund, 679 F.
Supp. 743, which arguably includes rules of contribution and indemnity. Free v. Briody,
732 F.2d 1331, 1336-38 (7th Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170,1183-84
(7th Cir. 1985) (Coffey, J., concurring); Alton Memorial Hasp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
656 F.2d 245, 250 (7th Cir. 1981) (dictum); Marshall & /Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp. at 635
n.l; Schaffier v. McDowell Nat'l Bank, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. 2485 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
Contra McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 7 Employee Benefits Cas. 2403 (D. N.J.
1986) (no-third party claim against non-fiduciary); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v.
Yampol, 706 F. Supp. 596, 599 (N.D. Ill. 1989); McLaughlin v. Biasucci, 688 F. Supp.
965, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no third-party claim against non-fiduciary).
320. The preemption provision appears to command development of a body of common law that gives substance to the "relate to'' language. Many of the definitions do, as
well. Of particular note are the definitions of "employer'' and "employee" (ERISA
§ 3(5), 3(6)), see, e.g., Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 706 (4th Cir.
1986); "plan" (ERISA § 3(3)), see, e.g., Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367; Brundage-Peterson,
877 F.2d 509; James v. National Business Sys., 721 F. Supp. 169, 175 (N.D. Ind. 1989);
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areas relating to employee benefit plans, common lawmaking must be
considered preemptive only. For example, because of the preemption
of all state laws concerning plan content and the dearth of ERISA
regulation, courts have had to develop a "contract law" of plan docu-

ments,321 an important part of which deals with the validity of plan
provisions in light of ERISA's basic policies.322 Another such 3-!ea is
the fi.eld of benefit claims. The statutory requirements are minimal,
and development has been left to the Secretary of Labor. 323 Even the
regulations, though, impose only minimal requirements conc,erning a
few aspects of benefit claims. 324 Thus, courts have supplemented ERISA and the Department of Labor regulations with a common law of
benefit claims, which includes. rules for review of claims, 325 rules for
exhausting_plan remedies prior to bringing suit, 326 and .rules concerning the effect of a fiduciary's failure to follow a proper claims
procedure. 327
·.

III.

THE GENERAL CHARACTER oF PLAN AFI·roRNEY COMMON

LAW

We have seen that ERISA broadly preempts state laws that purport to reg:ulate plan attorneys. to the extent needed to fill the regulatory gap. Such preemption authorizes federal courts to develop rules
which carry out the purposes of ERISA.328 There is really no difference between this preemption--based authority to develop a common

and "fiduciary" (ERISA§ 3(21)(A)), see, e.g~, Munoz, 633 F. Supp. at 567-69 (D. Colo.
1986).
321. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26 (meaning and enforceability of antialienation provision); In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 11.86; Teamsters Local
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147; Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
752 F.2d 923, 937 (3d Cir. 1985); Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233 (3d Cir.
1980), cert~ denied 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Vogel v. Independence Fed. Sav. Bank, 692 F.
Supp.. 587, 592 (D. Md. 1988); McNabb, 656 F. Supp. 866.
322. See, e.g.; Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147; In re
C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128 (B.D. Pa. 1977).
323. See ERISA§ 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
324.. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1.
325. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101.
326. See,-e.g., Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F . 2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 19.86).
327. See, e.g., Harris v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.. 1987);
Ellenburg, 763 F.2d 1091; Blau v. Del Monte- Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984);
Henne v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1464 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
328. The conclusion is in accord with the one reached earlier, on other grounds, that
plan attorneys should be subject to ERISA's fiduciary-related policies. See supra text
accompanying notes 91-109.
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law of plan attorneys and the preemption~based authority to develop,
say, a c_omtnon law of plan-related restitution329 or a comrnon law of
plan-related contracts·.33° Courts_simply have not yet recognized that
they have this quite conventional .authority.
In principle, we could now end our examination of the authority
of courts to develop plan attorney common law and proceed to a discussion of the substantive content of a plan attorney common law that
would carry out the purposes of ERISA. We will not do so. It will
prove to be more valuable for us to stop and look even more closely at
the sources of authority for plan attorney common law, including authority other than preemptive authority, and to consider also the rationales for developing such a body of law.
There are three reasons for taking a closer look at the sources of
authority for a plan attorney common law. One reason is practical.
Courts may have common lawmaking power with respect to plan attorneys, but it does not necessarily follow that they will exercise it, or
exercise it as fully as they could. We have already noted the institutional reluctance of courts to develop federal common law and explained how that reluctance limits the areas in which courts will make
federal common law. But reluctance of another sort can also, at
times, be detected in the cases. Decisions not to announce common
law rules are sometimes based not so much on concerns for federalism
or separation of powers as on a generalized discomfort with common
lawmaking. This discomfort may cause a court to decline to act on
lawmaking authority that clearly exists. 331 If the conclusions reached
s_o far are to be accepted and put to practical use, we need to see why
judicial reluctance to exercise common lawmaking power would be
abdication of an important responsibility.
Another reason for a closer look at the foundations of plan attorney common law is that, before one begins to develop substantive
rules, one ought to be clear about what the ultimate purposes of the
rules should be. It is not enough to say that the rules governing plan
attorneys should further ERISA's policies, and leave it at that.
Which policies and purposes, in particular, should guide the substantive rule development? To answer this question, we need to give some

329.: See, e.g., Whitworth Bros. Storage Co., 794 F.2d· 221.
330. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1.
331. See, e.g.. , Nieto, 845 F.2d 868; Pappas, 923 F.2d 549.
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thought to the question of why plan attorneys should be singled out as
a discrete subject for consideration.
A final reason for taking a closer look is that preemption is not
the only source of lawmaking authority. Another one is the delegated
authority to develop common law rules. Indeed, we shall see that
there is delegated authority with respect to some of the most fundamental and most important aspects of the plan attorney's relationship
with the plan, with the fiduciaries, and with the participants and beneficiaries. We shall also see that the inherent judicial power over attorneys makes proper the exercise of great discretion in these areas.
Thus, as we explained above, it is i1nportant to understand the scope
of this delegated lawmaking power, since it affects the proper character of rulemaking on the part of courts.

A.

The Rationale for Plan Attorney Common Law

Why should courts single out plan attorneys for special common
law treatment? Why should courts bother to exercise their-conunon
lawmaking power with respect to plan attorneys? The basic reason is
that, even though plan attorneys are not one of the central concerns of
ERISA, as a practical matter they are integral to the world of benefit
plans. They have tremendous capacity to do good, by promoting the
purpose of ERISA, as well as tremendous capacity to do harm, by
undermining the purposes of ERISA. Their conduct must be regulated, and regulated in a systematic way that recognizes their special
role.
Of all the non-fiduciaries connected with plans, plan attorneys
probably have the most responsibility and influence. They counsel
plan fiduciaries on the propriety of contemplated transactions. They
counsel the plan in cases of benefit disputes. They represent the plan
and its fiduciaries in litigation. They represent the plan and its fiduciaries in dealings with regulators, such as the Department of Labor.
Their constant guidance is necessary, because plans and their fiduciaries must adhere strictly to plan documents and must comply with a
regulatory regime backed by heavy sanctions including civil and criminalliability. Their normal role has been deemed not to give rise to
plan fiduciary status.. Yet, in actual practice, they may have great
discretion and substantial influence with respect to plans
enough to
justify extension of ERISA's policies (if not its express standards) to
the regulation of their plan-related activities. In this regard they dif~
fer from other important non-fiduciaries, such as auditors -and actuaries, whose roles are less discretionary and more limited in scope.
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Because of this infl1.1:ence, rules to guide the conduct of plan attorneys may serve as ,a n important prophylactic for implementing
ERISA's fiduciary principles. ERISA itself has prophylactic sets of
express auxiliary rules. As we have seen, ERISA's disclosure rules
and writing requirement are designed largely to complement and facilitate enforcement of ERISA,s fiduciary rules. In much the same
way can rules to guide plan attorney conduct complement ERISA's
fiduciary rules and help induce proper conduct by plan fiduciaries.
They can do it in two ways,. One way is for plan attorney common law to invest plan attorneys with responsibility, comtnensurate
with influence, to help induce proper fiduciary conduct. 'Since plan
attorneys are in a critical position to be able to deter and correct fiduciary wrongdoing, federal common law should provide them with appropriate standards for exercising that capacity. This is exactly the
same rationale that has underlain efforts by the SEC to regulate the
professional conduct of securities lawyers. Thus, the SEC's comments on the "public implications" of the securities lawyer's role can
be applied, with obvious modifications, to benefit plan attorneys:
We have previously noted the peculiarly (sic) strategic and ,especially central place of the private practicing lawyer in the investment process and in the enforcement of the body of federal law
aimed at keeping that process fair..... [T]he task of enforcing the
securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's shoulders. . . . Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in
character. He doesn't work in courtrooms where the pressure of
diligent adversaries and alert judges checks him. He works in his
office where he prepares prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions
of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the financial
community and the investing public must take on faith. This is a
field where unscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on
those who rely on the disclosure documents that they produce.
Hence we are under a duty to hold our bar to appropriately rigorous standards of professional honor.332

Development of rules to guide plan attorney influence and conduct may help to induce proper fiduciary conduct in yet another way.
Plan attorney common law may be developed to help ensure that the
plan attorney,s conduct serves as a guide for the conduct of fiducia-

332. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at ,84,
ISO n.21 (quoting In re Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20 (1973), a.lf'd mem~, 495 F.2d 1085
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
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ries. If the plan attorney is influential, and his guidance respected,
exemplary conduct by hiin that is motivated to further the goals of
ERISA may demonstrate to plan fiduciaries how they should act in
order to further the purposes of ERISA. Again, this consideration is
one that has been recognized as important in the context of corporate
finance. As foriner Chief Justice Stone explained in his well-known,
Depression-era speech about the public responsibilities of corporate
attorneys:
[T]he very conditions which have caused specialization, which
have drawn so heavily upon the technical proficiency of the Bar,
have likewise placed it in a position where the possibilities of its
influence are almost beyond calculation. The intricacies of business organization are built upon a legal frarnework which the current growth of administrative law is still further elaborating.
Without the constant advice and guidance of lawyers business
would come to an abrupt halt. And whatever standards of conduct
in the performance of its function the Bar consciously adopts must
at once be reflected in the character of the world of business and
333
finance.

What these considerations suggest is that the common law of
plan attorneys should be rooted in the actual role and practical influence of plan attorneys, to the extent that that role and influence itself
can promote the main purposes of ERISA.
But the federal comtnon law of plan attorneys should not be only
a body of hortatory standards with no enforcement mechanisms, or
only weak ones. The power of plan attorneys to influence fiduciary
conduct to the better is also power to influence it to the worse. And
the power to deter fiduciary wrongdoing is the power also to facilitate
it. As Chief Justice Stone also emphasized in the speech just quoted,
"departures from the fiduciary principle do not usually occur without
the active assistance of some member of our profession. . . . " 334 A
plan attorney comtnon law must also be remedial, with provisions for
civil liability to back up its rules.
Indeed, this remedial component is essential, not merely desirable; for what exacerbates the threat of hartn by plan attorneys is the
prevalence of a practice which, while convenient, tends to muddle the
plan attorney's sense of loyalty: the practice of functioning simultane-

333. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1934).
334. /d. at 9.
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ously as both plan attorney and as attorney for the employer or fiduciary with respect to non-plan matters. 335 An attorney who does this
tnight be tempted to advance the employer's or fiduciary's non-plan
interests, to the possible detriment of plan interests, while he is acting
in his role as plan attorney. He might be so tempted because of habitual identification with the employer's or fiduciary's interest, because
of the natural desire to retain the employer or fiduciary as client, or
because of venality. But whatever the reason, unless there are standards of conduct, backed up by the threat of liability, plan attorneys
would face no deterrent to causing or assisting in hartn, and participants and beneficiaries would lack a remedy against this source of
potential wrongdoing.

B.

The Sources of Judicial Discretion

In implementing these purposes through the development of plan
attorney-related common law, courts will carry out the congressional
policies reflected in ERISA. They also have substantial discretion in
determining how best to do so. There are two sources of such discretion: delegation by Congress and inherent judicial power.

1.

Common Law from Delegation

Two main areas exist of delegated corn1non lawmaking authority
with respect to plan attorneys. One area of delegated lawmaking concerning plan attorneys we have already discussed: fiduciary responsibility and remedies. As we have seen, the delegation of cotntnon
lawmaking authority with respect to those areas is extraordinarily
sweeping, and it is generally agreed that the resultant authority extends beyond the mere authority to develop rules for plan fiduciaries.
Just how far beyond it does extend remains an unsettled issue, but on
any plausible view it encompasses at least some areas of plan attorney
conduct.
A parsitnonious approach to the scope of the delegation would
go only as far as to allow courts to develop rules of liability for persons (perhaps, only for parties in interest) who participate in a fiduciary's breach of duty. Traditional trust law contains rules goventing
this kind of non-fiduciary conduct as an integral remedial compo-

335. See Ashenbaugh v. Crucible, Inc. 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d
1516, 1532 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3155, rek denied, 110 S. Ct. 12 (1989)
(upholding plan reliance on advice of corporate counsel).

...
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nent.336 It is not difficult to find authorization in ERISA for courts to
develop a common law goven1ing participation in a breach, based on
principles si1nilar to those found in trust law. 337 This understanding
of delegated, fiduciary,..related lawmaking would bring much of the
remedial component of plan attorney common law within the ambit
of the courts' delegated and discretionary lawmaking authority.
But a more expansive approach to delegated, fiduciary-related
lawmaking is possible. ERISA's .f iduciary rules are designed to be
general expressions of basic principles; they are not framed narrowly.
As general guidelines meant to be judicially developed, they could
easily serve as a set of principles from which the courts could derive
common law rules applicable to those persons who, in some, but not
all material respects, are like plan fiduciaries. This would be a
method of rule development analogous to the traditional process by
which principles of trust law, which were initially developed to gov~
em trustees, functioned as the source for laws governing fiduciaries
other than trustees. 338 Under this approach to the courts' delegated
lawmaking authority, courts would be deemed authorized to proceed
by analogy to develop rules for persons such as plan attorneys whose
level of discretion and influence, while substantial, is not quite enough
to confer ERISA fiduciary status on them. This approach goes beyond the parsimonious one, and would bring much of the prophylactic component of plan attorney common law within the ambit of
delegated lawmaking.
At least in the case of plan attorneys, the latter, more expansive
approach, is the better one, and the parsimonious approach is unnecessarily limited. The latter approach more realistically deals with the
fact that plan attorneys share many of the characteristics of plan fiduciaries; the fact that ERISA'S fiduciary policies necessarily must constitute the proper source of principles for rules of plan attorney
regulation; and the fact that much of plan attorney law should be

336. See RFSI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (''[a] third person who ... has
notice that the trustee is committing a breach of trust and participates therein is liable to
the beneficiary for any loss caused by the breach of trust").
337. See infra text accompanying notes 472-478. In 1989, Section 5020) was added
to ERISA to require the Secretary to impose a civil penalty on persons who participate in
a fiduciary's breach of duty or violation of the statute. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub~L. No. 101-239, § 2101, 103 Stat 2123.
338. Such as is the case with executors, administrators, guardians, receivers, and, to
a lesser extent, corporate directors and officers. See generally G. BoGERT, supra note
111, §§ 12-16.
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auxiliary to ERISA fiduciary law and designed to promote it. Courts
unquestionably have substantial discretion in the implementation of
ERISA's fiduciary policies, and there is no sound reason for limiting
the exercise of discretion only to the development of rules for
fiduciaries~

Discretion regarding plan attorney comtnon law emerges also
from the other itnportant delegated lawmaking authority concerning
attorneys. ERISA recognizes that there will be ~'counsel'' for employee benefit plans339 who provide "legal" services to them. 340 In
this way, ERISA implicitly recognizes the existence of a certain role
to be played with respect to plans: that of benefit plan attorney. But
the role is not defined anywhere in the statute. What, then, does it
mean for someone to be legal counsel for a plan?
Congress left it up to the courts to supply the answer. The institution of "attorney" is idiosyncratic, and Congress's failure to define
the role has very different consequences than its failure to define, say,
"auditor'' or "employer." An attorney cannot be an "attorney" and
cannot provide "legal" services independently of any system of laws.
A person cannot become an attorney simply by diligence and hard
work. A person is an attorney only to the extent he is recognized as
one by some authority and only to the extent that the authority places
him within a network of duties and responsibilities to individuals, the
public, and the courts. 341 ERISA recognizes the institution of "plan
attorney," but does no more. Since some authority must develop the
network of duties and responsibilities in which plan attorneys are located, and since it cannot be the states, ERISA must be read as delegating the responsibility to the federal courts. At the very least,
federal courts must be understood to be authorized (and obligated) to
develop rules governing the fundamental relationships between the
plan attorney and the plan, the .fiduciaries, the participants and beneficiaries, the public, and the courts. 3 4 2
2.

Common Law and Inherent Judicial Power
We have already discussed the respect in which the inherent

339. See ERISA § 3(14)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A).
340. See ERISA§ 408(b)(2}, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2).
341. See Hazard, Rectification ofC/ient Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional
Norm, 33 EMORY L. J. 271, 291 (1984).
342. Cf. Sperry v. Florida ex rel Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (regulation of
patent practice by Patent Office, to exclusion of States).
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power of courts over trusts is a source of discretion in plan-related
common lawmaking. Let us now consider the impact of the inherent
power of courts to regulate attorneys on judicial discretion to make
plan-attorney common law._
Judicial authority over attorneys is wide-ranging. 343 It includes
broad power to set standards of conduct, even outside the process of
litigation, 344 and to issue penalties, sanctions, and remedies for violations of those standards. It includes the power to regulate all aspects
of the attorney-client relationship, the attorney-court relationship, attorney-attorney relationships, and even attorney conduct that is not
itself the practice of law.J4s
The rationale for some source of extensive regulation of attorneys
is based on the position of power and influence that attorneys normally assume in a legal system. It is essentially a refrain of the rationale for regulation of plan attorneys that we discussed above, and,
succinctly stated, is as follows: A responsible attorney has great capacity to promote justice and law-abiding conduct through his influence and example, far more than any other kind of citizen. As one
court articulately explained:
Few vocations offer as great a spectrum for good and honorable
works as does the legal profession. The attorney is entrusted with
the life savings and investments of his clients. He becomes the
guardian of the mentally deficient, and potential savior for the accused. He is a fiduciary, a confidant, an advisor, and an advocate.
However, the great privilege of serving in all of these capacities
does not come without the concomitant responsibilities of truth,

343. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 643; Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529
(1824). See generally Wolfram, supra note 147, § 2.2 (1986); Note; The Inherent Power of

the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law
A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L.
REv. 783 (1976); Dowling, The Inherent Power ofthe Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635 (1935).
344. See Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 129-30, 357 S.E~2d 694, 696 (1987).
345. See, e.g., In re Imming, 131 Ill. 2d 239,-255, 545 N.E.2d 715, 722 (1989).- In
Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew; the court stated:
The professional ethical obligations of an attorney, as long as he remains a
member of the bar, are not affected by a decision to pursue his livelihood by
practicing law, entering the business world, becoming a public servant, or embarking upon any other endeavor;. If a lawyer, elects to become a business man,
he brings to his merchantry the professional requirements of honesty, uprightness, and fair dealing. Equally, a lawyer who enters public life does not leave
behind the canons of legal ethics. A willful and serious malefaction committed
by a lawyer-public servant brings dishonor to both the bar and the democratic
institutions or our nation, and its destructive effect is thereby magnified.
271 Md. 543, 550-51, 318 A.2d 811,- 815 (1974).
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candor and honesty. In fact, it can be said that the presence of
these virtues in members of the bar comprises a large portion of the
fulcrum upon which the scales of justice rest. 346

But on the other hand, power to do good is also power to do bad, and
attorneys have the capacity to wreak extensive harm:
Every attorney occupies a position in our society of particular trust
and confidence. A client comes to an attorney with the expectations that the resources of our legal and judicial system that are at
the attorney's disposal will be used to insure the client's fair treatment. It is not merely money that is at stake when an attorney
embarks on the representation of a client. Livelihood, professions,
reputations, familial relations and even physical and mental health
can all be affected by the actions of an attomey. 347

Because of the power, influence, and importance of attorneys in so
many respects, it is essential that attorneys should be very carefully
regulated by some branch of gover111nent. But still, why should that

branch be the judiciary?J4s
Much of the answer to this question is historical: the institution
of attorney developed as that of an "officer" of the court, a person
whose main responsibility in that office was to represent individuals in
litigation. Thus, as courts are wont to explain, regulation naturally
falls to them:
The primary duty of courts is the proper and efficient administration of justice. Attorneys are officers of the court and the authorities holding them to be such are legion. They are in effect an
important part of the judicial system. . . . It is their duty honestly
and ably to aid the courts in securing an efficient administration of
justice. The practice of law is so intimately connected and bound
up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to define and regulate its practice naturally and
logically belongs to the judicial department of our . . .
government. 349

This historical explanation has important application to common

346. Agnew, 271 Md. at 549, 318 A.2d at 814.
347. McLaughlin v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 980-1 (S.D. Ala.
1985).
348. Some state courts acknowledge coordinate legislative authority as well. See,
e.g., State Bar of Okla. v. McGhee, 148 Okla. 219, 298 P. 580 (1931).
349. In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 268
(1937).
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lawmaking regarding plan attorneys, even though, as we have emphasized, plan attorneys are not principally litigators. For the fact that
there is a long history of judicial regulation of attorneys puts cotntnon
lawmaking concerning plan attorneys in a broader context: it shows
the plan-related comtnon lawmaking to be only a specialized case of
the kind of regulatory activity that courts have traditionally engaged
in without legislative authorization. Making law to govern attorneys
is a nor1nal judicial function, and is one in which courts, by tradition,
have great discretion. Courts are the most experienced regulators of
attorney conduct, and there is no reason that they should not continue exercising discretion when making law to govern plan attorneys.
Tradition, though, is not the sole or even best justification for
discretionary judicial regulation of attorneys. To better understand
the rationale for judicial regulation, one must realize that courts are
not the only non-legislative regulators of attorney conduct. The SEC
has been held to possess irnplied power to regulate attorneys who appear before it,350 as has the ICC,351 the Board of Tax Appeals, 352 and
many other federal agencies. 353 The principle underlying the decisions to such effect is that, where an administrative agency is delegated power to develop rules to carry out the purpose of a statute, and
where attorneys play an essential role in the system regulated, the
agency has i1nplied power to regulate the conduct of those attorneys
so as to help the agency discharge its duties. 354 The reasoning was
quite clearly explained in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 355 where the
power of the SEC to regulate attorneys was justified as follows:
In the general rulemaking provisions of the federal securities laws,
Congress has provided the Com1nission with "broad authority" to
adopt those rules and regulations necessary for carrying out the
agency's designated functions. . . .
The chief purpose of the 1933 Act was to "provide investors
with full disclosure of material inforrnation concerning public offerings of securities in commerce.'' . . . The role of the ... legal

350. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979); Davy v. SEC, 792
F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1986).
351. See Polydoroff v. ICC, 773 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
352. See Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
353. See, e.g., Koden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Immigration and Naturalization Service); Hemtan v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir.
1953) (International Claims Commission).
354. See Goldsmith, 270 U.S. at 121.
355. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
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[profession] in itnplementing the objectives of the disclosure policy
has increased in importance as the number and complexity of securities transactions has increased. By the very nature of its operations, the Commission, with its small staff and limited resources,
cannot possibly examine, with the degree of close scrutiny required
for full dis·closure, each of the many financial statements which are
filed. Recognizing this, the Commission necessarily must rely
heavily on both the accounting and legal professions to perform
their tasks diligently and responsibly. Breaches of professional responsibility jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of the securities laws and can inflict great damage on public investors. As
our Court observed in United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964), "In our complex society
the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or
the crowbar."
Rule 2(e) thus represents an attempt by the SEC essentially to
protect the integrity of its own processes. If incompetent or uneth...
ical accountants should be permitted to certify financial statements, the reliability of the disclosure process would be
impaired. 356

This consideration has obvious bearing on benefit plans. Courts
have special responsibility for such plans, both delegated and inherent. They have been delegated substantial authority to develop rules
to help further the policies of ERISA. As we have seen, attorneys
play a pervasive and essential role in this judicially-guided benefit plan
system, analogous, in some respects, to the role played by securities
attorneys in the securities law system. Thus, for the purpose of helping the courts fulfill their own roles with respect to plans, discretionary judicial regulation of plan attorneys is as necessary and proper as
is discretionary administrative regulation of attorneys in any administrative system where attorneys play an essential role.

IV.

PLAN-ATTORNEY RELATIONSHIPS

Now that we have seen, in overview, why a federal cotntnon law
of plan attorneys is necessary, what it can accomplish, and what discretion courts have in developing it, let us turn to some of the substantive topics and problems that any such body of law must address.
Common law rules are best worked out by the courts as they test

356. 609 F.2d at 580-81.

1990]

Federal Common Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys

1131

policies to see whether and how well they work in concrete cases. 357
Our principal task here is to identify and explain relevant policies and
general principles for use by the courts, rather than develop a corpus
of rules ourselves. Some specific rules will, of course, emerge as appropriate ones, and some specific rules (in particular, ones that have
no grounding in ERISA's policies) will be found unacceptable. But in
the main, what will be developed in the remainder of this article are
approaches and principles to be used in developing plan attorney
common law.
We start, in this section, with some basic principles governing the
plan attomey;s relationships with the plan, with fiduciaries, and with
participants and beneficiaries. It is important to start here for, ,as we
have seen, ERISA's preemption of state attorney law and .ERISA's
delegation to courts of discretionary lawmaking power concerning
plan attorneys re,quires courts to start from scratch and to define the
plan attorney's relationships in a manner consistent with ERISA.
A.

The Client

Rules that govern attorneys invariably presuppose the existence
of a limited number of individuals to whom the attorney has special
responsibilities.358 Where the attorney represents a plan it is obvious
that the individuals with whom he might have special relationships
are the plan, the fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries.
The plan and its fiduciaries are the individuals with whom the plan
attorney will have direct and continuing contact, and to whom he will
give legal advice and assistance. The participants and beneficiaries are
the ones whose interest the plan and its fiduciaries and thus; arguably, the plan attorney
must ultimately serve. The task in developing a common law of plan attorneys, then, is largely the task of
develo,ping rules to clarify and guide the relationships between the
plan attorney and members of those three classes.
In developing any new area of law it is always tempting to start
with an analogy to a more familiar, more established body of law tempting because it is a familiar, indeed, perhaps the most common,
method of legal reasoning, and because it is a method that can elimi•

357. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHgJUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921) (quoting
M. SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909). "Every new case is an experiment; and if the
accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is
reconsidered.'').

358. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 3 (1978).
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nate the need for reasoning from principles to rules. 3 s9 The traditional law govertting attorneys is based on a special relationship called
the "attorney-client relationship." It would seem that, by assuming
the plan attorney to have a client in one or more of those three classes,
one could rely on the traditional rules of the attorney-client relationship by analogy, in which case the task of developing the new area of
law would become so much easier.
At first glance, use of the analogical approach seems reasonable.
After all, ERISA adtnits the role of plan attorney. Since it does so,
one might suppose that it necessarily recognizes the role of plan client
as well. But that supposition would be incorrect. As we shall see, the
traditional concept of client cannot be applied in cases of plan
representation.

1.

The Paradigm of Client

Let us consider first whether a plan can be a client.
To begin the analysis, we need to understand what a client is.
We immediately face difficulty, though, because there is no generally
applicable definition of "client." Since they build on the concept, the
sources that one would naturally consult for such a definition are professional codes such as the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Yet these codes contain no
such definition. 360 Instead, they rely on an implicit paradigm, and
frame rules appropriate to that paradigm. Such an approach raises
the question of whether the implicit paradigm can properly be applied
to plans.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules presuppose, as the
paradigm of a client, an individual seeking legal representation for
himself in a lawsuit. 361 This is a very narrow conception of client.
The problems involved in extrapolating it to other entities
such as

359. B. CARDOZO, supra note 357, at 9-50. See Conison, Restrictive Lease Covenants and the Law ofMonopoly, 9 FRANCHISE L.J. 3 (Winter 1990) (misuse of analogy in
antitrust law).
360. For example, the "Scope" section of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
states that "principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a
client-lawyer relationship exists." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope
(1983).
361. It is true that the Model Rules, to a greater extent than the Model Code, recognize that lawyers have roles other than that of advocate, and that clients have needs for
lawyers other than in litigation. However, the Model Rules emphasize the advocacy role
of lawyers, and even where they do not deal with advocacy issues, they suppose that the
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corporations and to non-adversarial contexts such as non-litigation counseling
are well-known and have been much discussed in
the literature. 362 Yet to try to apply this paradigm to plans is not
merely problematic; it is incoherent. One must avoid being misled by
the fact that plans are legal entities under ERISA. They are essentially programs or activities. An unfunded severance plan for a small
business, for example, is likely to be a regular, but sporadic, practice;
and it may a1nount to little more than the payment of benefits to the
rare, laid-off employee in an amount subject to the employer's reasonable discretion. A program such as this no more fits the traditional
paradigm of client than does a lottery. A plan may be an entity but it
is nothing at all like a person.

2.

The Functional Approach to Client Identity

A more sophisticated approach to the concept of client is available. Consider why one should ever need to define or explain the concept of "client." After all, in both law and everyday life we usually
get by perfectly well without worrying about the meaning of such basic concepts. We need careful definitions only when some problem

arises whose resolution turns on the concept's careful application.
What, then, is the kind of problem that might ever require us to understand exactly what "client" means?
A definition of "client" is needed when there is uncertainty over
who the client is, and thus uncertainty over with whom the lawyer has
a special relationship. 363 This suggests that any workable definition of
"client" should mainly concern itself with client identity, and that
what one really needs is not some type of dictionary definition, but a

lawyer is at work advancing an interest of the client that is in conflict with interests of
others.
Moreover, although the Model Rules try to expand the concept of client, they really
do not stray far from the paradigm of the client as individual person. For example, Rule
1.13, labelled "Organization As Client," in effect makes_the lawyer for a corporation or
other enterprise the lawyer for the enterprise's managers. The commentary to the rule
states that, "[s]ince an organization can act only through its constituents, generally the
lawyer's duty to the 'entity' is indistinguishable from the lawyer's duty to those agents
acting on behalf of the organization." ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT [hereinafter ANNOTATED RULES] 143 (1984). Thus, under the Model Rules,
representation of the enterpris_e is simply a specialized form of representation _o f
individuals.
362. See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 147, § 6.7; G. HAzARD, supra note 358,
at ch. 2.
363. See G. HAZARD, supra note 358, at cb. 3.
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practical test that allows one to detertnine who the client is in any
representation
on any occasion on which a lawyer is taken to be
acting as such in a given situation. 364 What we need, then, is a functional approach that lays down criteria for identifying who plays the
role of client in a given situation. The approach need not presume
anything about the nature of the client; it merely presupposes that
there must be one. 36s
In the traditional view, there are two essential characteristics had
by a client in a representation. One is the characteristic of being the
person or entity whose interest the lawyer is obligated to advance, to
the exclusion of others, in the representation. 366 The other is that of
being the person or entity who controls the representation, as a principal controls an agent. 367 Those two characteristics are counterparts

364. See id. Thus, the operative concept is "client in the representation,, rather
than "client." This approach to defining the concept of client requires, at the least, some
rudimentary concept of "lawyer." On a chicken-and-egg analysis, the concept of "lawyer" comes first.
365. An example of such a functional definition is the one contained in proposed
FED. R. EVID. 503. That definition was to be used in framing rules of client..attomey
privilege, and defined "client" as:
[A] person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or
entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a
lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal
services from him.
Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235 (1973). The operative functional concept here is
that of being "rendered professional legal services": to identify the client
the holder of
the privilege
one need only detern1ine who it is that is rendered the legal services. (At
one place, the Model Rules similarly identify the client as the most comprehensive legal
entity
that is a recognized entity rather than a mere collection of individuals
for
which the attorney is performing services in the representation. See ANNOTATED
RULES, supra note 361, at 154-55.)
Unfortunately, a definition such as that contained in FED. R. EVID. 503 (or the
Model Rules) has only limited utility, and cannot be used as a general rule for identifying
the client. The reason for this is that one often needs a rule for identifying the client
precisely in order to detern1ine who receives, or is entitled to receive, the lawyer's services. Thus, the test presupposes the identification to have been accomplished. Any useful
definition must be broader than this.
366. See G. HAZARD, supra note 358, at 3, 37. This aspect of the client is what gives
rise to problems of conflict of interest. See ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 361, at 73.
367. "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a). Cf. MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 to 7-8. See also ANNOTATED RULES, supra
note 361, at 157 ("The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that
the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters").
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of the two major kinds of uncertainty over who the client is: uncertainty over whose interest should be advanced, and uncertainty over
whose directions the attorney should follow. Thus, we combine the
two characteristics into a two-part functional definition of "client in
the representation/'
It is not difficult to see that this functional concept breaks down
in the plan context. Prima facie, the plan would seem capable of being the client under this test. In a routine representation, the plan's
immediate interest·--· for example, that of obtaining the most advantageous contract terms or winning the lawsuit
is usually clear and
may be treated as the sole interest to be advanced by the attorney.
And, where the plan engages the attorney, it controls the
representation. 368
But this model of the plan as functional client works only in the
simple case, where neither of the uncertainties relating to client identification arises. That is to say, it works only when the test is not
needed. For suppose that the representation is not routine, and the
interest of the plan on an issue
for example, whether to accept a
settlement proposal is uncertain. The client, rather than the attorney, controls the representation, and must decide what to do. 369 To
whom does the plan attorney tum for guidance?
•
At first sight, the answer seems obvious. The Model Rules of
Professional Con,duct provides that: "A lawyer employed or retained
by an organization represents the organization acting_through its duly
authorize,d constituents. " 370 This rule seems only common sense. If
one follows it, the plan attorney should tum to the plan fiduciaries.
Indeed, there would seem to be no plausible alternative.
But turning to the plan fiduciaries for guidance has curious consequences. As we have seen, ERISA fiduciaries must be loyal to the
ongoing activity of paying benefits to participants and beneficiaries,
and are required to act ''solely in the interest of the participants and

368. The Model Code would even seem to encompass this kind of relationship, for it
provides that: "A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes
his allegiance to the entity and not to a ... person connected with the entity. In advising
the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests.... " MoDEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILJTY EC 5-18.
369. The Model Rules provide that "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision

whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."
CONDUCT Rule 1..2(a).
370. Id~ Rule l.13(a).

MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
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beneficiaries.. .. . " 371 Thus, when a fiduciary, in his capacity as the
representative of the plan, consults with or gives directions to an attorney, the fiduciary can be acting properly only if he is acting to
further the interest of the participants and beneficiaries in receiving
their benefits. Accordingly, the interest which the attorney ultimately
must advance is not some interest of the plan entity
the presumptive client but that of the participants and beneficiaries in receiving
their benefits. Indeed, there is no ''plan interest" to be advanced by the

plan attorney separate and differing from the participants' and beneficiaries, interest in receiving benefits.
But this means that the functional test for the client leads to a
bifurcation. The participants and beneficiaries, as those whose interest is to be advanced, have one of the functional characteristics of the
client. And the fiduciaries, as the persons who control the representa-.
tion, have the other functional characteristic of the client. The plan
itself has neither.
Such a bifurcation can arise in other settings . for example, in
representation of incompetents. But bifurcation is not the end of the
difficulties in the attempt to apply the concept of client in the plan
context. For the fiduciaries cannot always fulfill the role of persons
directing the representation. Trouble arises because the fiduciaries are
not managers in the way corporate officers are and they are not
ranked hierarchically. Suppose that the plan fiduciaries disagree as to
whether a proposed course of conduct is in the best interest of the
participants and beneficiaries. Suppose, for example, they cannot de~
cide whether to settle or continue a lawsuit. The attorney knows that
the participants' and beneficiaries' interest is to be advanced; but
whose instructions does he heed on how to do so? The natned fiduciary? The fiduciary who has been allocated dis_cretion for the matter
- if there is only one?
And even if there is a single fiduciary who is authorized to act
and speak with respect to the matter, suppose that that fiduciary
wishes to pursue a course which the attorney knows is not in the best
interest of the participants and beneficiaries. Because the attorney
must advance their interest, may he disregard the fiduciary's wishes?
Indeed, must he disregard them? And if he may (or must) do so,
what happens if he cannot tum to the other plan fiduciaries for guidance? Who, then, speaks for the plan and ultimately for the partici'

371. ERISA§ 404(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l).
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pants and beneficiaries? Should the attorney consult the participants?
If so, which ones? Should he decide hirnself1
We reach exactly the same set of problems and questions in the
related case, where a_fiduciary engages an attorney for the purpose of
representing him solely in his capacity as a fiduciary. The attorney
may presumptively treat the fiduciary as the client, but he must do so
with caution, for there is no genuine interest of the fiduciary to be
furthered by the attomey. 372 For if the fiduciary is acting as a fiduciary, he must act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. As in the case of direct plan representation, the attorney's
ultimate obligation is to advance the participants' and beneficiaries'
interest. But again, what if other fiduciaries disagree with the fiduciary who engaged the attorney about the proper course of conduct?
The attorney cannot take refuge in any supposed obligation of loyalty
to the first fiduciary. Or what if the fiduciary seeks to act in away the
attorney knows not to be in the best interest of the participants and
beneficiaries? There plainly is no i1nportant difference between an attorney who represents the plan and an attorney who represents the
fiduciary.
To salvage the concept of client in the plan context, one might be
tempted to treat the participants and beneficiaries as the collective
client. 373 After all, they do have one of the attributes_of a client. But
this would be a mistake. Although the plan attorney may have duties
to the participants and beneficiaries and must act to further their interest, the participants and beneficiaries generally lack autho.r ity to
make decisions as to how their interest is to be furthered. ERISA not
only reposes discretionary responsibility for the plan in the plan fidu..
ciaries; it divests the participants and beneficiaries of such responsibilities. Even in those special cases in which participants retain some
control over investment or management of their aliquot interest in
plan assets, they are expressly not made fiduciaries with respect to the
plan and have no discretionary authority or responsibility with re-

372. This is not the case where an attorney represents, for example, a plan sponsor
in a non·fiduciary capacity. The sponsor may act in its own interest with respect to the
plan, and the sponsor's attorney may work to advance it. For this reason we limit the
subject of this article to attorneys who represent plans and plan fiduciaries~
373. See, e.g., Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Star Co., 543
F. Supp~ 906 (D.D.C. 1982). Cj Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Pincus, Verlin, Hahn,
Reich & Goldstein P.C., 42 Bankr., 960 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (counsel for creditors' committee
had relationship like that of attorney-client with individual creditor, at least to extent of
owing duty of care).
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spect to the plan. 374 In those circumstances, the plan fiduciaries remain obligated to exercise independent judgment and may override a
participant's choice, if it is a proper exercise of fiduciary responsibility
to do so. 375 ERISA compels a separation of the two essential characteristics
that of the person whose interest is to be advanced and
that of the person with authority to give direction to the lawyer which the paradigm of client fuses in a single person.
.

3.

.

Why Plan Attorneys Do Not Have Clients

The concept of client in the plan context does not work, and the
question of who the client is leads quickly to questions about the relationship between the plan attorney and the fiduciaries, participants,
and beneficiaries. A plan is an activity carried out for the sole purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries, and the
plan attorney must ultimately serve the participants' and beneficiaries'
interest. But what does this mean? Does the attorney have a fiduciary-like duty of loyalty to them? If so, what is its scope? Does he
have a duty of disclosure? A duty of care? A duty tg keep confidences? Does he have any duties or responsibilities to the plan fiduciaries? If so, how are those duties reconciled with the duties to the
participants and beneficiaries? These are the kinds of questions that
the federal common law of attorneys must answer. The concept of
client simply does not contribute to their resolution.
Proposing at the outset of analysis that the plan attorney necessarily lacks a client may seem to be a drastic step. After all, problems
with the concept of client always arise in the representation of an organization, yet no one has suggested that the· concept of client be dis·
pensed within those other areas. Why, then, should it be dispensed
with here? The reason lies in two essential differences between a plan
and a corporation or other business entity to which the concept of
client is still comfortably applied.
First, the duty of corporate managers is not narrowly focused on
serving the common shareholders alone or any other single group.
Officers and directors have obligations to preferred shareholders,
bondholders, creditors, and employees as well. When a corporate of374. See ERISA § 404(c)(l), 29 'U.S.C. § 1104(c)(l).
375. See; e.g., Department of Labor Opinion Letter re Profit-Sharing Retirement
Income Plan for the Employees of Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. (April 30, 1984);
Labor Department Proposed Regulations on Participant Directed Individual Account
Plans~ 52 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (September 3, 1987).
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ficer consults with an attorney on behalf of the corporation, he speaks
on behalf of an adtnixture of interests whose proper balancing is his
continual responsibility~ The corporation is a complex enterprise
whose goals are broad and which has an interest separate from those
of the shareholders or any other constituent. The resolution of the
competing interests is the corporate interest;376 and only because there
is a corporate interest distinct from the interests of the shareholders377
and others it is useful, or even intelligible, to say that there is a corporate client distinct from the shareholders or any other group.378
By contrast, a plan is simply a prograzn for paying benefits; it is
not an entity to which we may ascribe interests. But, even if it were
intelligible to do so, there still could be no plan interest to be advanced distinct from that of the participants and_beneficiaries.
•
Second, the kinds of repres_
entations engaged in by attorneys for
corporations and other business enterprises tend to have a strong adversarial character. The business attorney may be advocate, negotiator, or counselor. Those roles generally involve dealings with persons
outside the enterprise; presume that the outsider's interest is adverse
to that of the enterpris_e; and involve assisting the client to gain an
advantage over (or avoid being_disadvantaged by) the adverse interest. 379 Certainly plan attorneys will advocate, negotiate and counsel.
But these activities are not exhaustive and are not the most important
plan attorney functions. Plans and plan fiduciaries transact business
with outsiders only as an incident of their main purpose of providing
benefits to participants and beneficiaries. Unlike business enterprises
and their managers, plans and their fiduciaries are not intrinsically
adversarial to anyone; and they will not necessarily engage _a n attorney to help disadvantage someone else. Indeed, a plan attorney's
most useful role may be that of assisting the plan fiduciaries to carry
out their duties of serving the participants and beneficiaries. Because

376. Pierce, The Code ofProfessional Responsibility in the Corporate World: An Abdication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 350, 358 (1973).
377.: Shareholder interests are not always the primary ones. The Bankruptcy Code,
for example, requires subordination of-s hareholder interests to those of creditors, and this
in tum affects the corporation-attorney relationship in bankruptcy proceedings. See
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub~ 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985).
378. Significantly, "when a close corporation is indistinguishable from its owners,
lawyers have been held to represent the owner, in disregard of the entity fortn." ANNoTATED RULES, supra note 346, at 148.
379. See Hoffman, On Learning ofa Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud
The Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAw~ 1389; 1389 n.2 (1978).

1140

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 41:1049

the plan attorney's principal responsibility is not to represent the plan
or a fiduciary against someone else, it is less important that the attorney have a working concept of client as emboditnent of the interest he
represents against all others.
.

B.

.

Privilege

Our conclusion about the plan attorney's having no client ilnmediately suggests another important question. The existence of the attorney-client privilege is usually thought to depend on the clientstatus of the person who communicates with the attomey. 380 Because
the concept of client has no place in the world of plan attorneys, does
it follow that the attorney-client privilege must be absent as well?

1.

The Current State of the Law

Interestingly, in some cases, federal courts have concluded that
the answer is yes. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules ofEvidence delegates
to the federal courts plenary power to develop rules of privilege,381
including rules to govern the attorney-client privilege. One rule that
has been developed is that, when an attorney renders legal services to
a plan fiduciary which relate to matters within the fiduciary's area of
responsibility, the fiduciary cannot shield his communications with
the plan attorney from disclosure to plan participants and beneficiaries in subsequent litigation brought by them. 382 At least in these
circumstances, there is no attorney-client privilege. 3 83
In developing this rule, courts have not relied on the policies underlying ERISA, or even considered the question of the rule's consistency with those policies. Instead, courts have relied on supposed
analogies between the plan fiduciary/plan participant relationship and
more familiar relationships involving corporations and trusts.

380. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub
nom. Garner v. First Am. Life Ins. Co., 401 U.S. 974 (1971); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 313-327.
382. See 'P etz v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 494, 497 (D. Conn. 1985); See also
Washington--Baltimore Newspaper Guild, 543 F~ Supp. 906; Mioni v~ Bessemer Cement
-Co., 4 Employee Benefits Cas. 2392 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90
F.R.D. 583 (N.D. ill. 19'81) (no privilege in suit by Secretary of Labor).
383. This rule does not itself prevent there from being a privilege between the fiduci.ary and litigation counsel which shields communications during the litigation. Cf. Panter
v. ·Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D~ 718, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (com.parable rule in shareholder derivative suits). That issue of privilege must be dealt with separately.
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One justification for finding no privilege, or at least a greatly constricted privilege, in the plan context is the corresponding rule in the
shareholder litigation context. In Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 384 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that where a corporation or its management is sued by shareholders, allegedly for "acting inimically to
stockholder interests," the privilege of the corporation and its man·
agement to refuse to disclose comtnunications with attorneys for the
corporation is "subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause
why it should not be invoked in the particular instance."385
The rule of Gamer is designed to help resolve competing interests. On the one hand, as the court there recognized, "management
does not manage for itself and ... the beneficiaries of its action are the
stockholders." 386 More specifically, the shareholders may be the ultimate beneficiaries of the communications with the attorney, and so
may have a legitimate interest in knowing the contents of them.
Thus, there is no basis for the absolute withholding of managementcorporate attorney communications from the shareholders. But on
the other hand, shareholders are not the only persons with a legitimate stake in the corporation, and corporate management must balance all the competing interests. The decision1naking process of
corporate management is often one in need of privacy. There are
times when management cornmunications with attorneys should be
protected, even though the conduct to which the communications relates is alleged to be wrongful: "[I]t is difficult to envision the management of any sizeable corporation pleasing all of its stockholders all
of the time, and management desires protection from those who tnight
second-guess or even harass in matters purely of judgment."387 To
resolve these competing considerations for and against disclosure to
shareholders, the court in Garner laid down criteria for detertnining
whether there existed, in a given case, good cause sufficient to defeat
the privilege. 388 The upshot is that, in the shareholder litigation con-

384. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
385. Gamer at 1103-4.
386. Id. at 1101.
387. Id.
388. The Court identified the criteria as follows:
There are many indicia that may contribute to a decision of presence or absence
of good cause, among them the number of shareholders and the percentage of
stock they represent; the bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or
desirability of the shareholders having the information and the availability of it
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text, the corporation-attorney privilege is qualified. 389
The first case to consider the availability of the attorney-client
privilege in the context of plan fiduciary litigation closely followed
Garner, and by analogy held that the attorney-plan privilege is similarly qualified. 390 Subsequent cases, though, have generally gone further and concluded that plan fiduciaries should never be able to assert
an attorney-client privilege against participants and beneficiaries.
Drawing on the common law of trusts, these courts have held that
'" [w]hen an attorney advises a fiduciary about a matter dealing with
the . . . plan, the attorney's client is not the fiduciary personally but,
rather, the . . . beneficiaries.'' 391 As the leading state comxnon law
case on the subject explains:
As a representative for the beneficiaries of the trust which he is
administering, the trustee is not the real client in the sense that he
is personally being served. And, the beneficiaries are not simply
incidental beneficiaries who chance to gain from the professional
services rendered. The very intention of the com1nunication is to
aid the beneficiaries. The trustees . . . cannot subordinate the fiduciary obligations owed to the beneficiaries to their own private interests under the guise of attorney-client privilege. The policy of

from other sources; whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by
the corporation it is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful
legality; whether the. communication related to past or to prospective actions;
whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself; the extent to which the communication is: identified versus the extent to which the
shareholders are blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other
inforn1ation in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons.
Id. at 1104.
389. The rule has been applied to relationships other than that between shareholders
and corporate management. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., JS Bankr. 802 (Bankr. S.D.,
Ohio 1984) (creditors' committee
creditor); Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co.,. 112
F.R.D~ 671, 681 (D. Kan. 1986) (union member); Boswell v. IBEW, Local 164, 106
LRRM 2713 (D.N.J. 19'81) (union member); Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., S67 F.
Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (agency relationship).
390. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D,. 583, 586 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Fitzsimmons did go beyond
Garner in one respect,. in that it held that the privilege was similarly qualified in suits
brought under ERISA by the Secretary of Labor. A case that antedated Donovan, United
States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), contains dictum that "the
'client' may be viewed as the pension and retirement benefit fund, or possibly its board of
trustees,', and so "[a]n individual trustee would seem to have no proper personal interest
in protecting against disclosure of communications which pertain to the fund's business.''
/d.
391. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, 543, F. Supp. at 909. See also Petz,
113 F.R.D. 494.
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preserving the full disclosure necessary in the trustee-beneficiary
relationship is . . . ultitnately more itnportant than the protection
of the trustees' confidence in the attorney for the trust. 392

And on the basis of this principle, that the participants and beneficiaries are the true clients, the attomey•plan privilege has been held
unavailable, not only in fiduciary litigation, but in benefit claim and
other non-fiduciary litigation as well. 393
It is unfortunate that these approaches to the attorney-plan privilege have been developed without any regard for the policies of ERISA and without attention to the distinctive characteristics of
employee benefit plans. Both the qualified-privilege and the no-privilege approaches are certainly plausible, and are superficially consistent with ERISA. But they are each based on freewheeling
analogizing that is analytically suspect and that is useless in the hard
cases.
Reliance on Garner's qualified privilege approach is flawed analogizing because, as we have seen, benefit plans differ materially from
corporations. Plan fiduciaries, unlike corporate officers and directors,
are required to be loyal to only one interest group
the participants
and beneficiaries- and they are not ordinarily called upon to exercise judgment in order to balance competing interests. Thus, the features of managerial decision1naking that the Gamer court relied on to
sustain the privilege at all are much less prominent in the context of
benefit plans. Hence, the scope of the privilege in the plan context (if
it exists at all) is .necessarily more limited than in the corporate
context.
Yet the alternative approach equally involves flawed analogizing.
Whatever sense it makes to call a trust beneficiary the client of the
trustee's attorney, it makes no sense to .call the plan participants and
. beneficiaries the client of the plan attorney. They lack the very attribute of a client
decisionmaking authority
that underlies the
rules govertting cotntttunications with an attomey. 394 Hence, conclu-

392. Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 713-14 (Del. Ch. 1976). See also
Estate of Torian v. Smith, 263 Ark. 304, 564 S. W.2d 521 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
88~ (1978) (no privilege could be asserted by executor of estate against beneficiaries).
393. Helt v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 113 F.R.D. 7 (D. Conn. 1986). See also
United States.v. Evans, 796 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1986) (criminal prosecution for embezzle-

ment from pension fund).
394. Developments in the Law
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv.
1450, 1472-80 (1985); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 2291
(J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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sions drawn from categorizing the participants and beneficiaries as the
client are based on a demonstrably false prernise. An especially suspect conclusion reached under this approach is the facile extension of
the rule of no privilege beyond the context of fiduciary litigation to all
suits brought by a participant against a fiduciary.
Let us then examine the attorney-plan privilege, not as an isolated rule of evidence, but as a part of the common law of plan attorneys, and in light of ERISA's policies, to see what should be the
appropriate rules.

2.

Should There be a Privilege?

Any testirnonial privilege is an exception to the general duty of
all persons to provide testimony when called on to do so, and must be
limited to the narrowest scope consistent with the policies that legitimate it. 395 Let us consider when, if ever, communications between
plan fiduciaries and plan attorneys should be privileged. To do so, it
is useful to make some distinctions.
a.

Intra-Plan and Extra-Plan Litigation

The first, and broadest, distinction to be made is between intraplan litigation and extra-plan litigation.
Intra-plan litigation is between plan actors
fiduciaries, particiin
pants, beneficiaries, parties-in-interest, the Secretary of Labor
their capacities as such. It includes clairns under ERISA section
502(a) or any other civil remedy provision in ERISA; claiins involving a plan that arise under section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act;
and certain claims arising under the federal comtnon law of benefit
plans. The specific kinds of claims in this category will be discussed
in more detail below.
Extra-plan litigation, on the other hand, is litigation between a
plan or plan fiduciaries on the one side of the suit and persons not
involved in the establishment or operation of the plan on the other
side of the suit. It includes connnercial and tort litigation with plan
outsiders, and will normally arise from the plan's incidental business
activities. Extra-plan suits usually will have nothing to do with the
internal management, administration, or operation of a benefit plan.
This distinction is obviously rough, and it is easy to envisage bor-

395. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 394, § 2291, at 554.
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derline cases. 396 Refinement of the distinction, though, is not possible
until it has begun to be put to use in real cases. Still, the distinction is
useful for making the key point, that plan privilege issues will arise in
two very different kinds of suits: those arising from a plan's activities
as a plan, potentially implicating ERISA's fiduciary and disclosure
policies; and those arising from a plan's incidental activities. The
point is important, because the factors
· g upon the existence and
scope of any attorney-plan privilege are very different in the two kinds
of cases.

b.

The Privilege in Extra-Plan Litigation

In general, the question of the availability of the attorney-plan
privilege in extra-plan litigation is an easy one. The paradigm for this
category is litigation concerning a plan's business activities; a breach
of contract action, for example. Ordinarily, there will be no special,
ERISA-based duties running from the plan or its fiduciaries to the
other party, which might justify modifying or elirninating the privilege. Nor are the issues in this kind of litigation likely to be governed
by any ERISA policies that might affect the existence of the privilege.
Thus, extra-plan litigation presumptively should be treated just like
any other case of business litigation involving an organization. The
rationale for according a privilege to attorney-corporation cotnlnunications397 should apply equally to attorney-plan communications, and
yield the same scope for the privilege.

c.

Three Varieties of Intra-Plan Litigation
Intra-plan litigation presents more complex issues. To analyze
this category properly, some further distinctions are needed.
As a first approxitnation, one may distinguish three main kinds
of intra-plan litigation: fiduciary litigation, suits for benefits, and nonERISA claims. These three classes are obviously not mutually exclusive: lawsuits often involve claims from two, or all three, classes. Nor
are the three classes fully comprehensive: ERISA section 502(a)
shows on its face that there may be ERISA suits that are neither fiduciary claims nor benefit claims. 398 Nor are the boundaries between
396. For example, an adversary proceeding by the trustee of a participant's bankruptcy estate for turnover of the participant's benefits or vested plan interest.
397. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
398. For example, a suit to compel an administrator to supply information. ERISA
§ 502(a)(l)(A) & (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(A) & (c) (1974).
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the classes sharp. Still, it is convenient to begin with this classification
scheme, for it helps to isolate the plan characteristics and the ERISA
policies most si . · cant for assessing privilege clairns.
i.

Fiduciary Litigation

Let us begin with the case of fiduciary litigation. The paradigm
for this category is. a suit against a fiduciary, under ERISA sections
502(a)(2) and 409(a), alleging a violation of ERISA sections 404, 405,
or 406.
The prevailing view, discussed above, seems correct: there
should be no attorney-plan privilege at all for pre-lawsuit communications relating to the challenged fiduciary conduct. However, this conclusion is not reached (as it is in current case law) through a
formalistic labelling of the participants and beneficiaries as the clients.
Instead, it is based on factors derived from ERISA; in particular, on
the duty of loyalty of the plan fiduciary, and on ERISA's strong policy of full disclosure.
The analysis is not complicated. To begin, all fiduciaries, of
whatever kind, owe a duty of loyalty. Otherwise, they would not be
fiduciaries. 399 The reasoning of Garner shows that, because of this
duty of loyalty, any attorney-client privilege involving a fiduciary .as
client or client representative must be qualified with respect to the
persons to whom the loyalty is owed. In the case of plans, in particular, the fiduciary's duty of loyalty requires that the attorney-plan privilege be qualified with respect to participants and beneficiaries. It
should also be qualified with respect to other fiduciaries and the Secretary of Labor, at least when they sue on participants' and beneficiaries' behalf~ But, as the reasoning of Garner also shows, a
fiduciary's duty of loyalty is not a sufficient reason to nullify the privilege entirely.
In the case of ERISA plans, there is an additional factor that
bears upon the privilege question: the disclosure policy. As explained
above, ERISA requires plans to make extensive disclosures about fiduciary conduct.400 The disclosure policy is an adjunct to the fiduciary policies, designed to afford participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries,
and the Secretary of Labor an opportunity to review fiduciary conduct, and designed to facilitate the correction of wrongs when neces-

399. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 102, at 48.,
400" See supra notes. 69-82 and accom.p anying text.
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s,ary. It also provides a strong incentive for fiduciaries to ,a ct properly.
All secrecy about fiduciary conduct is inimical to this policy, especially secrecy that would interfere with oversight and correction of
fiduciary wrongs by participants and beneficiaries. Because, of this
central policy, a fiduciary's conduct or decisionmaking, to the extent
it might represent a breach of fiduciary duty, is not entitled to any
privacy. Neither the fiduciary nor anyone else has any legitimate interest in maintaining that conduct or decisiontnaking in secrecy from
the participants and beneficiaries. As corollary, a fiduciary's communications with a plan attorney about matters challenged as a fiduciary
breach are not entitled to privacy from the participants and beneficiaries (or their surrogate$) in litigation about that conduct.
Thus, it is ERISA;s disclosure policy, rather than any supposed
status of the participants as clients, that requires the privilege to be
unavailable. And, as a result, the scope of the disclosure policy must
determine the scope of the region of no privilege.
ii.

Benefit Claims

Very different considerations are involved in benefit claims. The
paradigm for this category is a suit under ERISA section
502(a)(l)(B), by a participant or beneficiary who claims that his benefits were incorrectly computed.
In such cases, the participant or beneficiary sues on his own behalf; and seeks relief accruing only to himself. His claim is that a
.fiduciary was mistaken or acted outside his discretion; not that he
breached a fiduciary duty to the detriment of the plan. Because fiduciary wrongdoing is not the crux of the claitn, the strong policy of
disclosure is not so compelling a reason against the privilege as it is in
fiduciary claims. Yet the general considerations of fiduciary loyalty
still militate in favor of qualification of the privilege under the Garner
rationale. What, then, should be the appropriate rule?
The key is the fact that the result of the s,u it, unlike as in a fiduciary suit, will not necessarily benefit the entire plan or a large group of
participants and beneficiaries. In fact, a decision in favor of the claimant may threaten to harm the interests of others, by leaving fewer
assets, or fewer liquid assets, in the plan for payment of benefits to
them. In benefit cases, the interest of the complaining participant
may be in conflict with the interests of other participants and beneficiaries; perhaps, in conflict with all of them.
As a result, in deciding benefit claims, fiduciaries may have to
balance legitimate, but conflicting interests. By doing so,-the fiduciary

'
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acts in a manner-analogous to that of a corporate manager. A balancing rule of the type announced by Garner, which is designed precisely
for fiduciaries who must resolve competing interests, seems appropriate for deterrnining the availability of the privilege in these cases.401
However, the factors identified by the court in Gamer, as si . · cant
for corporate misconduct claims, are not necessarily appropriate ones
in the context of benefit claims. The factors courts should consider in
determining whether to hold communications privileged in these
cases must be worked out on a case-by-case basis. Clearly, though,
they should be concerned largely with the presence or absence of intra-plan conflicts and the extent to which the fiduciary,s claitned error
in deterntining benefits is alleged to result from something other than
honest misjudgment.
iii.

Non-ERISA Litigation

If an instance of intra-plan litigation should happen not to arise
under ERISA or the federal common law of benefit plans, it would be

unlikely to involve considerations of fiduciary loyalty, fiduciary discretion, or disclosure. If so, there would be little, if any, reason to
qualify or eliminate the privilege. Individual cases might present specialized issues; but, in the main, litigation in this category should be
treated just like extra-plan litigation for purposes of the attorney-plan
privilege.
3.

Difficult Cases

The categories just discussed are only a starting point for analysis, but they do suggest how to deal with mixed, intermediate and
difficult cases.
Consider, for exatnple, a conunon case, where a person is sued
for breach of fiduciary duty and defends on the ground that he is not a
fiduciary. Since either the allegation or denial of fiduciary status
might be specious, how should one proceed? To give full effect to the
traditional attorney-client privilege in this case, or even to recog11ize it

401. There is another important similarity between corporate managerial decisions
and fiduciary determinations of benefit claims that results from their both being committed to the officer's or fiduciary's discretion. Both corporate officers and fiduciaries are
protected from having their discretionary decisions second-guessed. In the corporate
context, these decisions are insulated by the business judgment rule, see, e.g., Shamrock
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 269 (Del. Ch. 1989), and in the ERISA
context by the abuse of discretion standard, see Bruch, 489 U.S. 101.
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pending a preliminary deterntination of fiduciary status, tnight en-.
courage this defense in cases where its justification is weak. Encouraging avoidance of fiduciary obligations is not consistent with ERISA.
But simply to treat the case as a straightforward fiduciary breach
case, and apply the no-privilege rule, might lead to invasion of the
privacy of comtnunications that legitirnately warrant protection. The
problem becomes one of resolving these competing concerns.
A practical way to handle cases of this type, consistent with ERISA's policies, would be to start with a presumption that there is no
privilege
that the case truly involves a fiduciary claim
but allow
the presumption to be rebutted by a strong and early showing that the
defendant is not a fiduciary. The reason for starting with a presumption in favor of no privilege is that ERISA fiduciary status is a matter
of degree. Merely because a person's discretionary authority falls
short of the amount needed to bring him within the fiduciary rules, it
does not follow that he fully escapes the reach of ERISA's policies including those that justify qualification or elimination of the privilege.402 It is fair to suppose, as a general principle, that the greater the
defendant's difficulty in establishing that he fell short of the requisite
degree of discretionary authority needed to make him a fiduciary, the
more intimately he must have been involved in the management and
operation of the plan, and the more he is arguably subject to ERISA's
fiduciary and disclosure policies. Since this approach is a pragmatic
one, it may, of course, result in disclosure of comtnunications in some
cases where a trial subsequently shows that the communicant was not
a fiduciary. But ERISA's policies rnilitate in favor of erring on the
side of disclosure.
It is interesting to note that the arguments advanced here also
suggest that the attorney-client privilege may properly be qualified
even when the attorney in question is not a plan attorney. Consider
the case where a person who is unequivocally not a fiduciary is sued
for participation in a fiduciary's breach of duty.403 In most cases, the
non-fiduciary will owe no duty of loyalty to the plan participants.
Thus, the normal privilege attaching to communications with his attorney cannot be qualified on the Garner rationale. But the non-fiduciary allegedly did bring himself within the ambit ofERISA's policies,

402. See supra text accompanying notes 91-109.
403. This kind of federal common law claim is discussed in Section VI(A), infra
notes 460-483, and accompanying text.
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including its fiduciary and disclosure policies, by assisting the fiduciary to violate his duty of loyalty to participants. If pre-litigation communications with the non-fiduciary's attorney relate to the fiduciary's
breach of fiduciary duty, ERISA's disclosure policies may tell against
recognition of the privilege. A further consideration is that the nonfiduciary who participated in the breach arguably should be in no better position than the fiduciary to withhold infor1nation about it.
As in the prior case, a workable approach to dealing with this
situation would involve be · · g with a strong presu1nption against
application of the attorney-client privilege. Again, case-by-case development would be needed to work out the contours of this rule.
V.

FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF THE PLAN ATTORNEY

Our discussion to this point, concerning the substance of planattorney common law, has provided some insight into the character of
the relationships that the plan attorney has with the fiduciaries and
with the participants and beneficiaries. Our goal, though, is to develop principles and rules that might govern plan attorney conduct
within the context of those relationships. We begin that development
here.

A.

Disclosure and Cofiduciary Duties

The discussion of compelled, testiinonial disclosure of communications with a plan attorney suggests a closely-related question: the
extent, if any, to which a plan attorney is permitted or required to
disclose information, on her own initiative, about a possible breach of
duty or violation of ERISA. This is the so-called "client fraud" 404
problem as applied to the plan "client."
The client fraud problem arises in any comprehensive body of
attorney law. It does so because a duty of loyalty is an essential part
of any acceptable concept of attorney. 405 That duty of loyalty invariably is understood to encompass a sub-duty on the part of the attorney
not to use information gained in the representation adversely to the
interests represented. 406 Prima facie, the duty of non-disclosure in-

404. Hazard, supra note 341, at 291.
405. On the duty of loyalty in the federal common law of attorneys, see, e.g., In re
Com Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d at 161; In re "Agent Orange" Product Liab.
Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1986); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977).
406. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 395.
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eludes a duty not to disclose frauds and wrongs of the client; but that
creates a very serious problem, for an attorney also has duties to per~
sons and interests other than those to whom and to which his duty of
loyalty runs. In particular, he has a duty to promote the administration of justice and to maintain the integrity of the judicial system; and
this duty, arguably, encompasses a duty to prevent the perpetration of
frauds in connection with his representation. Because of this latter
obligation, an attorney's duty of confidentiality arguably should not
be absolute.407 But its proper scope - ... the determination of which is
the "client fraud problem"
is a matter of some disagreement.
The plan attorney, as an attorney, surely has some duty or duties
of loyalty with respect to the plan.408 What does the interaction between this duty or those duties of loyalty and the plan attorney's duties to the.public and to other interests entail about confidentiality and
disclosure in the plan context? Specifically, what is a plan attorney to
do when he has reason to believe. that a fiduciary has committed .a
breach of duty?
To answer this question, we must first determine what sources to
draw on for guidance.

1.

The ABA Codes and the Emphasis on Confidentiality

Two sources that should not be relied on uncritically are the
ABA's Model Code of Profession.al Conduct and Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.409

407. For an argument that the duty of confidentiality should be absolute, see Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defonse Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966).
408. We defer discussion of the contours of the duties until Section B, infra notes
442-459 and accompanying text.
409. One reason is that their provisions were designed to reflect only minimum stan~
dards ofconduct, compliance with which is sufficient to allow an attorney to avoid professional censure~. They do not purport to reflect fiduciary standards or any standards of
conduct; violation of which may result in civil liability. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns,
Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, P.A., 655 F. Supp. 1573, 1575 (S.D. Fla. 1987), ajf'd
mem., 846 F.2d 753 (11th Cir. 1988); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D.
Iowa 1978), ajf'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir~ 1978); ANNOTATED RULES, supra note
361, at 10. But see Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1979) (arguing for use as standards far civil liability).
·
This consideration, though, has not prevented some courts from relying on the professional rules to help identify appropriate standards of fiduciary conduct. E.g., Avianca,
Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1989); Financial Ger.. Bankshares, Inc. v.
Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 680 F.2d 76.8
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The original Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, instructed that:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party,
he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if
his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he

should promptly infortn the injured person or his counsel, so that
they may take appropriate steps.4to

The guidelines for professional conduct have greatly changed.411
While the Canons subordinated the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality to his responsibility to the public, the Model Code and Model
Rules treat as virtually paramount the obligation of an attorney to
keep confidential the information disclosed in the course of a representation.412 The elevation of this duty to such preeminent status is
inconsistent with the policies of ERISA and the purposes of plan attorney common law-.
Consider, for example, Model Rule 1.6, the _prevailing, basic rule
of confidentiality. It gives a very simple answer to the client fraud
question, by providing, in relevant part, that: "A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation."413 This
sweeping rule, which imposes confidentiality on any "information relating to representation,''414 would clearly prohibit disclosure of any
breach of fiduciary duty. The rule is purportedly based on the law of

(D.C. Cir. 1982); Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Constr. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194, 199 (N.D.
Fla. 1985).
410~ CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 41 (1908)..
411. The change is described in detail in Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 421, 429-38 (1984).
412. On the central place of confidentiality in the codes, see, e.g., Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics:- The Making of the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 14 L.
& Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989); Patterson, Legal Ethics & The Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29
EMORY L.J. 909 (1980).
413. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.6(a). The permissive (but
not mandatory) exceptions have no substantial relevance to plan representation.
414. MODEL CoDE DR 4-101, by comparison, prohibits disclosure only ·o f privileged, ''embarrassing'; or ''detrimental" information:
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and "secret'' refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure-of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client.
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attorney-client privilege and on the law of agency. 415 However,
neither putative source justifies so sweeping a rule of silence in the
plan context.
Consider the first justification: the attorney-client privilege. As
we have seen, no privilege attaches to com1nunications with a plan
attorney regarding fiduciary breaches, and many other coJnmunications with hitn are subject to only a qualified privilege. To the extent
the rule of confidentiality is based on the law of privilege or its policies, it must be lirnited when sought to be applied to plan attorneys.
Consider next the other justification: principles of agency. That
rationale also fails to justify any sweeping rule of confidentiality in the
plan context. The common law rule, fo11nd in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, and expressly relied on by Rule 1.6, is that:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to comtnunicate infor1nation confidentially given
him by the principal or acquired by hiin during the course of or on
account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in competition with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or
on behalf of another, although such information does not relate to
the transaction in which he is then employed, unless the information is a matter of general knowledge.416

The thrust of the rule is not to blanket in secrecy all infortnation obtained by an attorney or other agent. Rather, its main purpose is to
protect the client's or principal's confidential business information
against misuse by the agent. That purpose has nothing to do with a
lawyer's knowledge of fiduciary breaches, and has little relevance to
benefit plans, which do not normally have confidential business
information.
Rule 1.6 is not an isolated idiosyncrasy, for the Model Rules as a
whole is structured so as to prevent disclosure of any non-public in-

(B) Except when per1nitted under DR 4-101(c), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.

(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or
of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-101. On the reason for the
broadening of the anti-disclosure provision in the Model Rules, see Schneyer, supra note
412.
415. ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 361, at 61; see also id. at 65 (legal background
to Rule 1.6).
416. RES,.,.,.I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 395 (emphasis supplied).

1154

[Vol. 41:1049

Syracuse Law Review

formation known to an attomey.417 The Model Rules · in particular,
the confidentiality provisions
represents the outlook of attorneys
for whom representation is predo1ninantly adversarial. 418 It also represents the outlook of those attorneys who strongly identify with, if
not adopt as their own, the interests of their clients.419 The result is
an us-against-them outlook that inexorably leads to a de--emphasis of
the lawyer's duties to the public. As one commentator 'h as observed,
the ABA codes invert the proper ordering of interests to be served by
a lawyer, placing lawyer self..;interest first and the interest of the public
in the proper functioning of the legal system last.420 The Model Code
and the Model Rules recognize few, if any, instances where a lawyer is
even pernrltted, let alone required, to disclose client violations of

laws.421
But as we have seen already, plans are not businesses, plan ,attorneys do not play an essentially adversarial role, and ERISA announces a clear and protninent public interest in full disclosure of
fiduciary wrongs as a prophylactic means to facilitate benefit ·plans'
proper functioning. The law of plan attorneys cannot ignore these
important facts. In framing rules of conduct for plan attorneys, one
cannot impose on plan attorneys any duty of confidentiality so stringent as to absolutely bar them from disclosing fiduciary breaches.

2.

The Cojiduciary Obligation of Plan Attorneys
What, then, do ERISA's policies require and permit of a plan
attorney when he learns of a breach?

417. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.13(c), 1.16,
4.1(b).
418. See Nahstoll, supra note 411, at 438. On the dependence of the strict duty of
confidentiality on a strict adversarial view of representation, :see Noonan, The Purposes of
Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1485 (1966).
419. In particular, criminal defendants and corporations. See Schneyer, supra note
412, at 718-21;- Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REv. 891, 898-903 (1983).
420. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 702 (1977).
421.. Indeed, the only substantial exceptions to the confidentiality rule are for cases
of lawyer self..interest: collection of fees and protection against claims of malpractice and
other wrongdoing. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR ·~l01(c)(4);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2).
'
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The Obligation to Take Action

There can be no doubt the plan attorney must do something; he
cannot simply ignore the wrong.
Consider plan fiduciaries, by analogy. ERISA makes them responsible for the proper conduct of each other, imposing liability on a
fiduciary whenever "he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to
remedy the breach."422 As we have seen, for many reasons ERISA's
disclosure and fiduciary policies should apply to plan attorneys, and
ERISA's fiduciary rules may serve as the starting point for comtnon
law development. With respect to knowledge of fiduciary wrongdoing, the saxne fiduciary and disclosure policies that underlie ERISA's
rule of co-fiduciary liability tnilitate in favor of a rule requiring the
attorney to take reasonable steps either to bring about a cure of the
breach hitnself or to cause a fiduciary, or some other authorized person, to do so. Such a rule would help plan attorney comtnon law
fulfill its prophylactic function.
Si · cantly, another body of federal law that relies on disclosure
as a means of protection and enforcement imposes similar remedial
and disclosure obligations on attorneys. In the field of securities law,
the SEC has taken the lead in compelling action by securities counsel
who learn of client wrongs. 423 As the SEC explicated its chosen standard in the leading case of In re Carter:424
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation
of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation violates professional standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance....
• • • •

Initially, counselling accurate disclosure is sufficient, even if
his advice is not accepted. But there comes a point at which a
reasonable lawyer must conclude that his advice is not being followed, or even sought in good faith, and that his client is involved

422. ERISA § 405(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3) (1974).
423. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (1981).
See generally Kaplan, Some Ruminations on the Role of Counsel for a Corporation, 56
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 873 (1981).
424. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172 (1981).
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in a continuing course of violating the securities laws. At this critical juncture, the lawyer must take further, more affirmative steps
in order to avoid the inference that he has been co-opted, willingly
or unwillingly, into the scheme of non-disclosure.
The lawyer is in the best position to choose his next step. Resignation is one option, although we recognize that other considerations, including the protection of the client against foreseeable
prejudice, must be taken into account in the case of withdrawal. A
direct approach to the board of directors or one or more individual
directors or officers may be appropriate; or he may choose to try to
enlist the aid of other members of the fir1n's management. What is
required, in short, is some prompt action that leads to the conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying
problem, rather than having capitulated to the desires of a strongwilled, but tnisguided client.42S

On other occasions, the SEC has gone so far as to impose on attorneys
a duty to make public disclosure of corporate wrongs. 426 The rationale is that lawyers have a duty to the public to protect the integrity of
the legal system; a duty that may supersede the lawyer's duty to an
individual client.427
Yet there is really nothing peculiar to ERISA or the securities
laws in the position that a lawyer's duty to the public may supersede
the duty of confidentiality. For example, in reaction to Model Rule
1.6, the Senate considered a bill that would have made it a misdemeanor for an attorney not to disclose certain client crimes and
frauds. 428 The proposed Restatement of the Law
The Law Gov-

425. Id.
426. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C.
1978).
427.. See Kaplan, supra note 423, at 881.
428. The proposed Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure Actt S. 485, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), provided that:
Sec. 2. Chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting immediately following section 1343 the following new -section:
"SEC. 1344. An attorney · .
"(a)(l) who has in the course of representing a client placed in any post
office or authorized depository for mail documents that the attorney prepared or any other matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered that
could enable or assist the client to commit a -criminal or fraudulent act, or
''(2) who has prepared documents for or who has otherwise been instrumental in assisting a client who has placed in any post office or authorized
depository for mail any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered in
furtherance of a criminal or fraudulent scheme, and who
''(b)(1) upon discovering that his client intends to commit a criminal or
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erning Lawyers includes black-letter statements. of such obligation.429
Many states that have adopted the Model Rules have modified them
so as to require or per1nit disclosure of-crimes or frauds, at least in
certain circumstances.43o
Indeed, the Model Rules themselves recognize some obligation of
disclosure. Geoffrey Ha7~rd, the Reporter for the Model Rules, has
argued that, notwithstanding Rule 1.6's seemingly absolute requirement of confidentiality, the Comment to it invites an attorney who
resigns because of his client's wrong to do so in a way that signals to
affected parties that a wrong is being committed.431 More clearly,
Rule 1.13 provides, in. relevant part, that:
{b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee
or other person associated with the organization is engaged in ac-

fraudulent act fails to make timely disclosure to Federal law enforcement
authorities of such intended conduct in order to prevent such conduct, or
(2) upon discovering that his client has committed a criminal or fraudulent
act fails to make timely disclosure to Federal law enforcement authorities
of his knowledge regarding such conduct in order to mitigate the consequences of hi$ client's criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of
which the attorney's services were used, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both." Hearings on the
bill elicited comments favoring an obligation of attorneys to correct or dis..
close crimes and frauds.

I d.
Much of the testimony at the hearings on the bill were in favor of imposing some
remedial obligations on attorneys, even if not through critninal sanctions. See generally
Lawyer's Duty ofDisclosure: Hearing on S. 485 before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
429. RFSI"ATEMENT OF THE LAW
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS [Reporters' Proposal] ll7B (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989) provides that:
Following an attempt by the lawyer, if feasible, to dissuade the client, a lawyer
may use or disclose confidential client information if and to the extent the law...
yer reasonably believes:
( 1) The client intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to cause_
substantial financial loss; and
(2) The lawyer's use or disclosure is:
(a) Reasonably appropriate to prevent the act; and
(b) Necessary in view of the imminence of the substantial financial
loss.
Id.
430. See generally 2 G. HAzARD & W. HODES, supra note 154, at 1259-61 (discussing state modifications).
431. Hazard, supra note 341, at 301-08. The Comment in question states that
"Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.,8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving
notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any
opinion, document,. affirmation, or the like/' ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 361, at 62.
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tion, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization. In deter1nining
how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature
of the lawyer'~ representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any other
relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to
minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing
infor1nation relating to the representation to persons outside the
organization. Such measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the: highest authority that can act in behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law. (c) If, despite the
lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer
may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.432

Thus, notwithstanding Model Rule 1.6, there is wide agreement
that ,a n attorney who learns of a wrong in connection with a represen""
tation should not be required, or even permitted, to sit silently by. He
has an obligation to use his knowledge and his authority to deal with
the wrongdoing. Both ERISA's co-fiduciary rules and corresponding
rules in other contexts suggest that the conduct required of a plan

432. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13. Cf. Los Angeles

County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm.,, Informal Op. 1981·1 (1981), reprinted in Law. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:1703 (1984) (attorney who learns of breach of fiduciary
duty by clients ''must attempt to persuade the clients to avoid the activity"); San Diego
County Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics & Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 1983-10 (1983), reprinted in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:1803 (1984) ("when representfig a client who as a fiduciary fails to perform his duties or act properly, an attorney must
urge his client to file an accurate account of the facts',).
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attorney in such case must be conduct that is reasonable under the
circumstances. The standard for reasonability, of course, must be
shaped by ERISA's fiduciary and disclosure policies.

b.

The Contours of the Obligation

Under ERISA there are few specific rules for deter1nining what
remedial efforts by a plan fiduciary are to be deemed "reasonable"
under the circumstances. The legislative history -·-· the main guidance for case law development along with the common law of trusts
- says only that if a fiduciary cannot correct the breach hi1nself:
[T]he most appropriate steps in the circutnstances may be to notify
the plan sponsor of the breach, or to proceed to an appropriate
Federal court for instructions, or bring the matter to the attention
of the Secretary of Labor. The proper remedy is to be determined
by the facts_and circumstances of the particular case, and it may be
affected by the relationship of the fiduciary to_the plan-and to the
co-fiduciary, the duties and responsibilities of the fiduciary in question, and the nature of the breach.4 33

This general standard for plan fiduciaries obviously may be an
important source of guidance. However, it clearly must be modified
in order properly to be adapted to plan attorneys. Plan attorneys
have powers and responsibilities different from those of plan fiduciaries, _and one cannot mechanically require them to do what it might be
appropriate for a plan fiduciary to do. A plan attorney, for example,
has no standing under ERISA section 502(a) to bring suit against a
wrongdoing fiduciary, and so cannot himself bring about court intervention to cure the problem. One must develop guidelines responsive
to the powers and responsibilities of plan attorneys.
Co-fiduciary responsibility under ERISA is triggered when a fiduciary ''knew or should have known" of a breach.434 This should be

No~

1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-9-300 (1974), reprinted in
Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4566-67, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5080.
434. Hendershott, 840 F.2d at 342 (''knowledge of the breach can be inferred from
surrounding circumstances raising a reasonable inference of knowledge''). The standard
is derived from the common law of torts, G. BOGERT, supra note 111, § 565; Whitney v.
Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106 (2d Cir. 1986) (fiduciary held liable where "on notice'' of
breach); and is generally consistent with the ABA Codes. See MoDEL RULES OF PRoFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Terminology, paras. 5, 8 (1983); Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to
Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 977, 986.
433. H.R. CoNF. REP.
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the trigger for plan attorney responsibility as well, and cases purportedly based on rules of professional responsibility, that require actual
knowledge of a wrong in order to trigger a disclosure obligation,435
must be rejected as inconsistent with the policies of ERISA. Note,
however, that this standard is only a trigger to do something; it is not
necessarily a trigger to make disclosure about the apparent breach.
Privilege considerations do not litnit disclosure of wrongs to
other fiduciaries
to the Secretary of Labor or the participants
as
a pertnissible course of action. 436 If a plan attorney reasonably believes that disclosure of a wrong to such a person is reasonable under
the circutnstances, there is no extrinsic rule to prevent his doing so.
But it does not follow that disclosure is always appropriate as a
first step. Opponents of rules that permit or require disclosure of client wrongs invariably raise the argument that a rule affording strict
protection for client information will induce clients to confide wrongs,
and thus give the attorney an opportunity to convince the client to
437
remedy them.
As an empirical assertion, the claitn is 11ntested and
probably untestable; but as a piece of coxntnon sense, it has obvious
validity. 438 A plan attorney may be an extremely influential counselor, and a rule always requiring disclosure xnight be counterproductive. Disclosure may be unnecessary, for example, where a breach has
resulted from mistake or negligence, and the breaching fiduciary
heeds the attorney's advice to cure it. The plan attorney may reasonably determine that no further steps
for example, an effort to seek
removal of the fiduciary
are necessary. A strict rule always requiring further disclosure might encourage fiduciaries to engage compliant attorneys, and xnight reduce the incentives for fiduciaries to
consult with attorneys about questionable conduct. If the plan attorney is to be able to fulfill his proper and needed function, he should
have some discretion to treat knowledge of wrongdoing as confiden-

435. E.g., In re Grievance Comm. of United States Dist. Ct., Dist. of Conn., 847
F.2d 57, 62-3 (2d Cir. 1988).
436. Cj. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILfl'Y DR 7-102(B)(l):
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is
unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal,
except when the infortnation is protected as a privileged communication.

I d.
437. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 412, at 719.
438. See 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 154, at 128-29.
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tial, even if the knowledge is not ultitnately privileged against disclosure in litigation. Possession of discretion in this regard is consistent
with the plan attorney's fiduciary-like role in the affairs of the plan.439
Of course, there will be tirnes when disclosure of a fiduciary's
wrong is appropriate, either because the breaching fiduciary will not
remedy the wrong or because the fiduciary, through the breach, has
demonstrated unfitness for his role. For the protection of the plan,
disclosure may be necessary so that further steps can be taken by
those with power to do so. Nortnally, another fiduciary should be the
first choice as the person to whom the disclosure is made. The fiduciaries are the persons with primary responsibility to manage the plan
and to protect the interests of the participants. If that step fails, it
may be appropriate to bring the breach to the attention of the Department of Labor or the participants and beneficiaries.
One further point is important. A plan attorney who learns of a
breach, and who cannot convince the wrongdoer to rectify it, cannot
be allowed the easy escape of resignation, as he is under the Model
Rules. 440 To do so would be inconsistent with ERISA's fiduciary policies, which prohibit resignation by fiduciaries in such circumstances;441 inconsistent with the plan attorney's obligations to the
ongoing activity of the plan and to the participants and beneficiaries;
and would defeat the function of plan attorney common law as auxiliary to ERISA's fiduciary rules. A plan attorney is not a hired gun, a
fungible who mechanically does the bidding of a plan fiduciary. He is

439. See ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSIS 187 comment a.
440. Resignation is easy under the Model Rules. Rule 1.16(b) provides that:
Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client, or if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client bas used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fu1fill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the
lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b).
441. Chambers, 650 F. Supp. 369; Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. at 635.
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a person who may well be intitnately involved in the workings of the
plan; who is likely to be extensively relied on; who has responsibilities
to the plan and its constituents; and who may be, in effect, a fiduciary
with respect to the legal affairs of the plan. His obligations to the plan
cannot be brought to an end at will, and his co-fiduciary obligations
require no less than reasonable efforts to stop wrongs to the plan or to
enlist the efforts of someone with power to do so.

B.

General Fiduciary Standards

In our discussion above of the purpose and general character of
plan attorney common law, we explained how ERISA's fiduciary
rules could be used analogically, to determine rules of conduct for
attorneys, and perhaps other persons who are functionally similar to
plan fiduciaries, in the same way that trust law standards may be used
as a basis for rules governing other kinds of fiduciaries. 442 We now
make use of this approach for purposes of developing plan attorney
fiduciary rules in the following way. As a working hypothesis, we
treat plan attorneys as if they were a new kind of plan fiduciary. In
particular, we begin our analysis of plan attorney fiduciary obligations
by treating plan attorneys as if they were fiduciaries with respect to
the legal affairs of the plan. This approach is particularly appropriate
for an attorney who serves as general counsel for a plan.
The "legal affairs" of a plan consist mainly of the fiduciaries'
compliance with the plan document and with ERISA and its attendant regulations. Accordingly, to say that a plan attorney is a fiduciary
with respect to the legal affairs of a plan is to assign bitn responsibility
for such compliance. This perspective on the plan attorney's status in
a plan, and on his obligations, merely generalizes the principles, discussed above, that plan attorneys have obligations to take reasonable
steps to help remedy a fiduciary's non-compliance with the plan and
ERISA, and that they have discretion in detertnining how best to try
to accomplish this. This provides reassurance that the working hypothesis we use is not arbitrary, but is consistent with the conclusions
already reached.
To detertnine the general fiduciary responsibilities of plan attorneys, let us start by examining ERISA's rules of fiduciary responsibility. ERISA section 404(a) is the fundatnental statement of such
fiduciary rules. It provides that:

442. See supra text accompanying notes 336-342.
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[An ERISA] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the pai"ticipants and beneficiaries and

(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like airns;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is
clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments .governing the plan insofar as such docurnents and instruments are
consistent with the provisions of this title.443
.

.

This standard cannot uncritically be applied to plan attorneys.
Indeed, it cannot be applied without modification to anyone but a

plan fiduciary. ERISA carefully specifies who shall be the fiduciaries
with respect to plans, and imposes the network of specialized duties
on them. The duties, in effect, functionally define an ERISA fiduciary. If some person other than a named fiduciary, trustee, administrator, investment advisor, or section 3(21) fiduciary could be made
subject to these precise obligations, the definition of ERISA fiduciary
would impermissibly be expanded beyond what Congress chose.
'H ow, then, should the duties be modified to take into account the
special characteristics of plan attorneys?

1.

The Plan Attorney's Duty of Loyalty

The analogical approach of treating the plan attorney as essentially a fiduciary with respect to the plan's legal affairs can be used to
derive some basic conclusions about his duty of loyalty. As we have
already seen, the interests he must advance and to which he must be
loyal are, derivatively, the sarne as those which the plan fiduciaries
must advance and to which they must be loyal. 444 Thus, the plan
attorney's duty of loyalty with respect to the plan, like that of the plan
fiduciaries, may be understood as a duty to the activity that is the
plan. The duty may also be treated as parallel that of a plan fiduciary,

443. ERISA § 404(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a){l).
444. See supra text accompanying notes 358-379..
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and be construed to include the nor1nal incidents and corollaries, such
as the prohibition on self-dealing, 44s the duty not to act on behalf of
others with adverse446 or conflicting447 interests, and the duty of impartiality.448 This is consistent, in any event, with an attorney's traditional duties of loyalty to a client.
However, the analogy cannot be pushed much further. There are
important and inescapable factors that necessitate differences between
the duty of loyalty of the plan fiduciary and the duty of loyalty of the
plan attorney. One factor is that plan attorneys
like all attorneys
- owe a substantial duty to the public and to the administration of
the legal system. 449 A plan attorney, unlike a plan fiduciary, cannot
be required to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" and cannot be required or per1nitted to act "for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits" and defraying plan expenses. Indeed,
when duties with respect to the plan conflict with public obligations,
the duties with respect to the plan may have to be subordinated.450
Another factor is that the plan attorney must be understood to
have obligations to the plan fiduciaries. Plan fiduciaries, to the extent
they may be deemed to have duties to individuals connected with the
plan, owe them only to participants and beneficiaries, and not to other
fiduciaries. That is not the case with plan attorneys. Often, a plan
attorney is hired to represent a fiduciary in his capacity as such. Even
where he is hired by the plan, it is the fiduciaries with whom he deals.
The plan attorney's legal advice is given to the plan fiduciaries, and it
is given mainly to assist the fiduciaries
rather than the plan451
to
comply with the law and fulfill their responsibilities. The advice is
given from the perspective of the attorney's superior knowledge and is

445. II A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 111, 170.
446. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 389.
447. Id. § 399.
448. II A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, supra note 111, at 183; Winpisinger v. Aurora
Corp. of Ill., Precision Castings Div., 456 F. Supp. 559, 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
449. See supra text accompanying notes 343-356.
450. An illustrative statement of this point is as follows:
Attorneys are officers of the court and their first duty is to the administration of
justice. Whenever an attorney's duties to his client conflict with those he owes
to the public as an officer of the court, he must give precedence to his duty to
the public. Any other view would run counter to a principled system of justice.
Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984).
451. By contrast, the corporate attorney's advice is mainly to assist the corporation,
rather than the corporate managers individually, to comply with the law. This is another
important cillference between corporate attorneys and plan attorneys.
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given with the understanding and intent that it will be followed. Furthermore, as we saw above, the fiduciaries have one of the essential
attributes of a client (or principal) in that they have authority to direct the plan attorney. A relationship of this kind, with these characteristics, is naturally considered a fiduciary relationship, with
attendant duties of loyalty and care on the part of the plan attorney.4s2 Of course, in cases of conflict, the lawyer's duty to the plan
activity must take precedence over his duty to the fiduciaries, but in
the routine case, where there is no conflict, obligations to the fiduciaries must be recogttized and acted upon.
The plan attorney's obligations are thus responsive to multiple
interests
albeit ones that nortnally should be in harmony. The details of the plan attorney's duties of loyalty can only be worked out
through experience in balancing the influences and through case by
case development. Still, a few general points can be made here to
indicate how future development can and should proceed.
First, while liability litigation will surely be a setting for development of law on the subject, the litigation is likely to be, for the most
part, suits claitning liability for participation in a plan fiduciary's
breach of duty. Plan attorneys, since they are not plan fiduciaries,
have no si · cant control over plan assets, plan management, or plan
administration. They are largely unable to profit si · cantly from
wrongs to the plan committed alone. For that reason, wrongs done to
plans by attorneys, which cause substantial monetary losses, are usually wrongs done as part of a plan fiduciary's breach. In such cases,
ERISA's express fiduciary rules compel a view of the wrong as one in
which the fiduciary is the principal malefactor and the attorney is
only secondarily liable as a participant in the breach.453 This perspective is not likely to be changed by taking a more stringent view of the
plan attorney's duty of loyalty to the plan, because the plan fiduciaries
still remain the ones primarily subject to ERISA's fiduciary policies
and expressly subject to the fiduciary rules. Hence, attorney liability
cases generally do not and will not require substantial elaboration of

452. See, e.g., Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 358 S.E.2d 150, 152
(Ct. App. 1987); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (marriage
counselor).
453. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied
sub nom. K.lepak v. Dole 109 S. Ct. 2428 (1989) (fiduciary, rather than attorney who
participated in the breach, was the one who "owed the primary responsibility to the
Plan,).

1166
,

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 41:1049

the plan attorney's duty of loyalty, except so far as is required to clarify their co-fiduciary responsibilities for plan fiduciaries' breaches.454
Correlatively, a likely focus for development of the law of plan
attorney loyalty will be the area of conflicts of interest. This is the
other significant area in which attorney duties of loyalty are regulated
and clarified by the courts. There already is a small at110unt of law on
the subject of conflicts in the representation of a plan and its fiduciaries. It is clear, for exarnple, that a plan attorney who has represented
a fiduciary in his fiduciary capacity generally cannot represent the fiduciary when he is sued for breach of fiduciary duty.455 His loyalty
with respect to the plan must prevail. On the other hand, there normally should be no obstacle to the attorney representing the interest
of the plan, or its participants and beneficiaries, against the fiduciary.
In this area of law, confidentiality concerns - -- which nortnally might
be an objection to such representation
are less important than in
the traditional law of conflicts of interest, for the reasons discussed
above.456
An especially important area of development here should be that
of conflicts problems involving interests of the plan and interests of
the plan sponsor. As we have noted, it is comtnon for a plan attorney
also to be the attorney for the plan sponsor or the attorney for a fiduciary with respect to non-plan matters. But just as it is not necessarily
an impermissible conflict for a fiduciary to be an officer or employee
of the sponsor, it is not necessarily an impermissible conflict for the
plan attorney also to have the sponsor as a client. Nonetheless, a situation of this kind certainly has the potential for trouble, and case by
case development will be needed to work out guidelines for when the
plan attorney's loyalty to the plan has been or too easily may be undermined. The emerging law of conflicts on the part of employee-fiduciaries in benefit claim cases should have obvious relevance to these
issues.457

2.

Other Plan Attorney Duties

Loyalty may be the most important duty of the plan attorney,
but there clearly are others. A plan attorney should be subject to the

454. See infra text accompanying notes 460483.
455. E.g., Frank v . Ducy, 7 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2374 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
456. See supra text accompanying notes 398401.
457. E.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990);
Lister v. Stark, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1611 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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same duty as a plan fiduciary to act -~'with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man _acting in a like capacity and farniliar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims.''4 S8 This is substantially a statement of the trust law duties of
care and prudence, which have always been held to apply to attorneys.459 In practice,: it states the rule for a federal common law of
plan attorney malpractice. This duty, unlike that for loyalty, is one
whose contours are likely to be substantially worked out in litigation
concertling breaches. An obvious issue is how the standard of care
should be construed. Should the standard be that for attorneys in
general, or should it be a specialized, higher standard for plan
attorneys?
The other ERISA duties specified in section 404(a) do not directly relate to plan attorneys. The duty to diversify investments is
obviously not ger1nane. • Nor is the duty to act in accordance with
plan documents. The conduct of plan attorneys ordinarily is not governed by the plan document. Conceivably, this duty, along withERISA'S writing requirement, might suggest, by analogy, that there
should be an obligation on the part of plan attorneys to reduce their
engagement agreements to writing and act in accordance with them.
Any such requirement, though, would have to be responsive to concrete problems, as they are presented in litigation, or otherwise.
VI.

PLAN A'I*fORNEY LIABILITY

Thus far, we have dealt with what we previously called the pro·phylactic aspect of plan attorney common law. We now turn to its
remedial aspect. Our task here will be easier. Plan attorney liability,
as a subcategory of general non-fiduciary liability for participation in
a fiduciary's breach, is already a well-developed area of ERISA-related law. In the main, our task is only to determine what modifications of existing rules might be appropriate in order to bring the law
into accord with the main principles we have found to govern plan
attorneys.

458. ERISA § 404(a)(l)(B), 29 U~S.C. § 1104(a)(l){B) (1974).
459. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983); C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 147, § S.6.
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Liability for Participation in a Breach

The Black-Letter Rules

Any non-fiduciary who knowingly participates in a breach of
duty committed by an ERISA fiduciary may be held liable to the plan
for damages resulting from the breach.460 Among the non-fiduciaries
who have been held so liable are attorneys. Indeed, a substantial
number of the reported decisions concerning participation in a breach
have involved attomeys.46t
In framing rules for liability, courts have expressly drawn on the
existing rules of the common law oftrusts,462 and have adapted them,
to the extent necessary, to confor1n to the policies of ERI.SA.463 The
fundamental rule that has_emerged was first stated in Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank:464 ''The wrong of participation in a breach of
trust is divided into two elements, namely (1) an act or omission
which furthers or completes the breach of trust by the trustee; and (2)
knowledge at the titne that the transaction amounted to a breach of
trust, or the legal equivalent of such knowledge.';465 The rule has

460. See, e.g., Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339; Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgt., Inc.,, 829
F~2d 1209 (2d Cir~ 1987); Fink v. National Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955,
958 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Dole v. Compton, 753 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Pa~ 1990); Pension Fund
-Mid Jersey Trucking_Industry
Local 701 v. Omni Funding Group, 731 F. Supp.
161 (D.N.J. 1990); PBGC v. Ross, 733 F. Supp~ 1005 (M.D.N.C. 1990); Brock v. Gerace,
635 F. Supp. 563 (D.N.J. 1986); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp.
1143 (D.D.C. 1986); Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361, 1395-96 (D. Nev. 1984);
Donovan v. Bryans, 566 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (B.D. Pa. 1983); McDougall v. Donovan,
539 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Marshall & !Isley-Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629. See also
Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951
(1980) (recognizing principle but declining to impose liability because to do so would
violate policy against forfeiture of benefits).
461. See, e.g., Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298; Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064 (7th
Cir. 1982); Whitfield v. Tomasso, 682 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benvenuto v.
Schneider, 678 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 19,88); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390
(S.D. Ala., 1982); Schajfier, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2485 (W.D. Pa., 1985);
Kouba_v. Burke, No. 83 C 451 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1984) (LEXIS Genfedlibrary, Dist file);
Donovan v. Unicorn Group, 3 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 166S (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
See also Nieto, 845 F.2d 868 (rejecting general principle of liability for participating in
fiduciary's breach but opening to attorney liability in certain circumstances).
462. See generally G. BoGERT, supra note 111, at ch. 43.
463. E.g., Thornton, 692 F.2d 1064; Foltz, 627 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1986).
464.. 485 F.-Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
465. /d. at 642 (quoting G. BOGERT, supra note 111, § 901). In using the common
law term "trustee,'' the court did not intend to limit the rule only to participation in
breaches by ERISA trustees. The rule applies to participation in the breach of any ERISA fiduciary~
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come to be further elaborated. It is not a prerequisite to liability that
466
the participating non-fiduciary have profited from the breach; it is
not a prerequisite to liability that the non-fiduciary have dealt directly
with the breaching fiduciary;46 7 and it is not a requirement that the
participating non-fiduciary have actual knowledge of the breach.
Constructive knowledge is enough.468 Furthermore, liability is not
litnited to the arnount (if any) that the non-fiduciary gained. Rather,
liability extends to the full amount of the plan's loss. 469

2.

The Federal Common Law Character of Non-Fiduciary Liability
Rules

The legislative history of ERISA suggests that Congress may
have intended at least some non-fiduciaries to be subject to liability
under ERISA for participating in breaches of duty.470 However, ERISA's fiduciary and civil enforcement provisions do not unatnbiguously pertnit actions against non-fiduciaries who participate in a
breach. Thus, actions of this kind are better treated as claitns arising
under federal cotntnon law.47t

466. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298; Foltz, 627 F. Supp. at 1168.
467. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563.
468. Hendershott, 840 F.2d at 342; Marshall & !Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp. at 642. See
Schwartz, Non-Fiduciary Liability Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
69 MARQ. L. REv. 561, 565-69 (1986).
469. Lindemann, 853 F.2d at 1303.
470. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 295, reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISfORY, supra note 22, at 4562, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5075: "Fiduciaries (and parties-in-interest) are to be personally liable under the
labor provisions for losses sustained by a plan that result from a violation of these [prohibited transaction] rules."
471. Some recent case law has tried to cast doubt on the propriety of imposing liability on non-fiduciaries who participate in a breach. The arguments of those cases are
misguided.
The leading case that purports to limit the scope of non-fiduciary liability is Nieto v.
Ecker, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988). In Nieto, the non-fiduciary in question was an
attorney. Plaintiffs, participants in a multi-employer fund, sued the plan fiduciaries and
the plan attorney for their failure to collect delinquent contributions from participating
employers. This failure to collect was the principal (but not only) breach alleged. In a
curious opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while the attorney
could be held liable for participating in a prohibited transaction, neither he nor any other
non-fiduciary could otherwise be held liable for participating in a fiduciary's breach.
The holding makes little sense. ERISA prohibits fiduciaries from engaging in prohibited transactions but does not expressly impose liability on parties in interest who
participate in them. Nonetheless, the Court in Nieto pern1itted imposition of liability on
parties-in-interest in such cases, reasoning that prohibited transactions are "illegal under
the Act," id. at 873; that, to "leave plans and their participants with no recourse against
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Authority for the Rules

The rules of liability for non-fiduciaries who participate in a
·breach have been worked out pursuant to the courts' delegated power
to develop a common law offiduciaries.472 The propriety of -imposing
such liability on non-fiduciaries is clear. As explained above, ERISA's delegation of common lawmaking power regarding fiduciary
conduct is exceptionally broad, and is not limited just to power to
develop rules for the conduct of plan fiduciaries. 473 A fundamental
'

'

persons clearly covered by the Act who violate its provisions [is] not a result likely con"'
templated by Congress," id. at 874 n.6; and that, since the prohibited transaction is ·a
violation of ERISA, there is authority under ERISA § 503(c)(2) to redress it, id. at 874.
But ERISA does not make prohibited transactions. illegal: it simply prohibits fiduciaries
from engaging in them. The Court could equally well have said that ERISA makes "illegal" all breaches of fiduciary duty in which a non-fiduciary participates. If it did so, by
parity ofreasoning it would have been forced to conclude that anyone who participates in
a breach of duty would be subject to liability for doing so. But that is precisely the
conclusion the Court strove to avoid.
The Court's arguments against general non-fiduciary liability are equally inconsistent. The first argument is that there can be no non-fiduciary liability for participation in
a breach "under" section 409(a) because the section refers only to fiduciaries, and
"[a]bsent an explicit directive from Congress," one may not create federal common law
claims. 845 F.2d at 871. To the extent the Court meant by "explicit directive'' an unequivocal, express statutory instruction to create federal common law in an area, that has
never been the standard. lndeed, if it were the standard, the Nieto court itself could never
have allowed a federal common law remedy against parties-in-interest. But if "e~plicit
directive" means authorization implied from the statute, then the Court's peremptory
conclusion that there is no such authority simply begs the question and ignores, among
other things, recent Supreme Court precedent exercising the authority to create federal
common law. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101. In any event, the
Court ignores the possibility that common lawmaking authority need not be -delegatedt
but may arise from the preemption of state law.
The court in Nieto also argued that authorization to create a common law claim
cannot be found in ERISA § 502(a)(3), because to treat that provision as allowing monetary recovery would render ERISA § 409(a)
which also allows monetary recovery superfluous. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873. The argument proves too much.. ERISA § 409(a)
allows a court to order "such . . . equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate"; but, in slightly different words, so does section 502(a)(3) on its face. The
Court's argument, if correct, would lead to the absurd result that even equitable relief is
unavailable under section S02(a)(3), because to allow it would render section 409(a) "superfluous." The fact is that ERISA is not the most artfully drafted statute, and here
Congress was simply repetitious. Nothing in section 409(a) can logically be read to prohibit the award of monetary relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3).
472. See, e.g.,Marsha/1 & 1/sley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629; Foltz, 627 F. Supp. at 1168;
see also Pension Fund Mid Jersey Trucking Industry Local 701, 731 F. Supp. 161.
473. Nor is it limited just to the creation of remedies, as some, e.g., Comment, Nieto
v. Ecker: The Propriety of Non-Fiduciary Liability Under Section 409, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 271, 281 (1989), have argued.
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legal principle is that a person should not knowingly assist a wrongdoer in his wrongdoing. To this end, there are com1non law prohibitions, such as those against participation in a breach of fiduciary
duty474 and against inducing breach of contract;475 as well as statutory
and statutory-related prohibitions, such as those against aiding and
abetting crimes and securities law violations.476 This principle is fully
applicable to wrongs perpetrated in connection with benefit plans.477
Arguably, Congress intended that the principle should apply as part
of its clear intent to federalize trust law principles.478 But, in any
event, for courts to apply the principle and impose liability for participation in a breach would help protect the interest of participants and
beneficiaries in receiving their benefits: directly, by imposing standards of conduct that make breaches by fiduciaries even more difficult; and, indirectly, by providing another source from which the plan
can be rei1nbursed for losses. Thus, to allow imposition of liability
would plainly further the purposes of ERISA.

b. Special Considerations Relating to Attorneys
In imposing liability on attorneys for participation in a breach,
courts have relied on the general rules described above. However,
there are special considerations that apply to plan attorneys. These
considerations, when properly taken into account in individual cases,
should make the rules of liability governing plan attorneys somewhat
different from the black-letter rules discussed above.
One consideration is that plan attorneys have obligations which
other non-fiduciaries do not necessarily have. Non-fiduciaries generally have only a lit1lited duty to the plan and its participants and beneficiaries, that of not taking action which knowingly furthers or
benefits from a fiduciary's breach.479 Plan attorneys have many other
obligations that intersect with the obligations of plan fiduciaries. The
most important may be the disclosure and co-fiduciary obligations.
By virtue of these duties a plan attorney, unlike other non-fiduciaries,

474. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 326.
475. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 766 (1977).
476. E.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1981).
477. Cf. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d at 115 (since "estoppel principles generally apply
to all legal actions," there is a presumption that they apply to ERISA actions).
478. See, e.g., Ross, 733 F. Supp. 1005.
479. Cf. G. BoGERT, supra note 111, § 901 (trust beneficiary has right that third
persons shall not knowingly join with the trustee in a breach of duty).
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may be obligated to take reasonable steps to remedy a fiduciary's
breach, and his failure to do so may expose him to liability for participating in the breach. Thus, the disclosure rules discussed in section
V(A) above are not only be guides to conduct; they are properly taken
as rules of civil liability. This is very much different from the case of
most other non-fiduciaries who, under traditional trust law principles,
cannot be held liable for mere inaetion.
Other duties of the plan attorney also affect the contours of his
potential liability for participating in a breach. Because of the plan
attorney's duty of care, for example, he~ unlike other non-fiduciaries,
might properly be subject to liability for negligent participation in a
breach. In general, because of the loyalty and other obligations of the
plan attorney, his liabilities for participating in a breach may closely
resemble the co-fiduciary liabilities of a plan fiduciary under ERISA
section 405(a).
Another consideration affecting the scope and character of plan
attorney liability is that delegated lawmaking power regarding fiduciary principles is really not even needed to authorize a remedy for attorney participation in a breach. Judicial power over attorneys
includes the authority to order attorneys who commit any breach of
duty to make restitution for the amount of the loss. The power is a
necessary incident to the judicial power to regulate attorney conduct,
and is a means of enforcing the standards. Courts have ordered restitution both summarily, in the course of civil and criminal proceedings
480
in which the attorney serves as advocate; and as part of fortnal dis~
cipline imposed for violating rules of professional conduct.481 It has
even been suggested that, ' ' [w]henever possible, the disciplinary process should facilitate restitution to the victims of the [attomey,s] misconduct without requiring victims to institute separate proceedings at
their own expense. "482
What these two considerations reflect is a point alluded to before:
that attorneys who are held liable for participation in a fiduciary's
breach often could just as, well be held liable for breach of their own

480. E.g., In re Paschal, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 483 (1870); State v. Grant, 487 A.2d 627
(Me. 1985).
481. E.g., Grievance Commission v. Garcia, 243 N.W.2d 383, 38S (N.D. 1976). See
also In re Beckmann, 79 N.J. 402, 400 A.2d 792 (1979) (restitution as condition for
reinstatement).

482. ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS
6.12, Commentary (1979).

~
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duties with respect to the plan. As a practical matter, it may not
make much difference for the outcome of a case whether we consider
a plan attorney's liability to be fiduciary or co-fiduciary.483 What is
important, though, is for courts to recogttize that, because of plan
obligations
attorneys' fiduciary obligations with respect to plans
that other non-fiduciaries lack
their potential liability in cases of
plan fiduciary is broader than what is suggested by the canonical rule
of Freund.

B.

Standing to Sue

Under the coJntnon law of trusts, the trustee is ordinarily the
only one permitted to sue third persons for wrongs to the trust. Beneficiaries norrnally have no standing to bring such actions and may do
so only where the trustee cannot or will not enforce the claim.484
Should there be a corresponding litnitation regarding suits against
plan attorneys under federal common law?
It should depend on the kind of claim. As we have seen, many, if
not most, claims against plan attorneys are framed as suits for participation in a fiduciary's breach. ERISA expressly gives participants
and beneficiaries the right to bring suit against fiduciaries to remedy
violations of ERISA, and there is no sound reason for not allowing
joinder of participating non-fiduciaries in the suit. ERISA section
502(a)(3), which contains no express limitation on defendants within
its reach, may be read as creating jurisdiction over suits by participants and beneficiaries against non-fiduciaries who have participated
in a breach, and the common law of trusts itself permitted such actions by trust beneficiaries. 4ss
Different considerations are involved in claixns, such as malpractice suits, involving plan attorneys alone. A plan document may delegate to one or more of the fiduciaries discretionary authority to bring
486
suit and obtain satisfaction for the plan's claims.
A decision by
such a fiduciary not to sue cannot be set aside unless the decision

483. The real difference lies in the plan attorney's susceptibility to suit under federal
common law for wrongs committed without the involvement of a plan fiduciary. Other
fiduciaries may or may not be subject to such liabilities.
484. G. BOGERT, supra note 111, § 869.
485. Id. § 955. And if joinder of a participating attorney is proper, so too should be
a suit against the attorney alone.
486. See, e.g., 3 S. YOUNG, PENSION & PROFIT SHARING PLANS (M-B) Plan 14, at
14.06(c).
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represents an abuse of discretion.487 It would be inconsistent with this
rule of deference to the fiduciary's judgment to allow a participant or
beneficiary to bring suit against an attorney when the appropriate
fiduciary has decided not to do so.
Even where the fiduciaries' authority to file suit and resolve
clairns is not subject to deference, there should be limits on the standing of participants and beneficiaries to sue directly. The fiduciaries
will normally be in the best position to know whether the plan attorney has committed a wrong and as persons charged with responsibility for management of the plan, they should ordinarily have the initial
say regarding the decision to sue. To allow particip,ants and beneficiaries unfettered standing to sue plan attorneys, in matters that do
not involve fiduciary tnisconduct, would underrnine ERISA's allocation of plan management responsibility to fiduciaries and possibly
sanction interference with the fiduciaries' fulfillment of their
responsibilities.
This is not to say that a participant or beneficiary who is dissatisfied with a fiduciary's decision not to sue has no remedy. He does
have a remedy which is in the form of a suit against the fiduciary, on
the theory that the failure to sue is itself a breach of duty. The remedy in a proper case might be an award of damages to the plan in an
amount measured by the potential recovery in the unbrought suit.
The remedy might even be an order appointing the participant as a
special fiduciary for the purpose of bringing suit agai_n st the attorney.
Such remedies would satisfy the interests of both the participants and
beneficiaries in obtaining a remedy for a wrong, and of the fiduciaries
in being able to carry out their plan management responsibilities without unnecessary interference.

VII.

SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY

The topics examined above are only a few of the many in the
common law of plan attorneys that generate important concerns.
There are certainly many others that warrant attention.
One such issue is exculpation. ERISA disallaws "any provision
in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary
from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or
duty under [ERISA's fiduciary provisionsJ.''488 Should the policy re-

487. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101.
488. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § lllO(a) (1974).
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fleeted in the ERISA provision apply to attorneys? The legislative
history of ERISA demonstrates Congress's belief in the importance of
abolishing exculpation as a means of strengthening the fiduciary protection of participants.489 In light of the great importance given to
this modification of the law of trusts, it seems that a strong argument
can be made that the policy should apply to plan attorneys as well.
The result would be consistent with the policy expressed in the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, that "[a] lawyer shall not attempt
to exonerate himself from or litnit his liability to his client for his
personal malpractice. " 4 90
The exoneration question suggests a broader question: are there
any other provisions in attorney-plan (or attorney-fiduciary) contracts
that are prohibited? For exatnple, tnight ERISA's prohibited transaction rule, limiting compensation to "reasonable compensation,"491 restrict the use of contingent fee arrangements? Si1nilarly, are any
conventional practices by attorneys made imper1nissible with respect
to plans? For exat·nple, to what extent, if any, can a plan attorney
hold plan property without having plan fiduciary status attach?492
A plan attorney's dealings with third parties also raise a large set
of questions. There is no reason that many of the basic doctrines of
agency law should not apply to the attorney-plan relationship. But
the applicability of some agency law doctrines in the ERISA plan
context is less certain. For exatnple, a principal may be held vicariously liable for an agent's tort where the agent "purported to act or to
speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent
authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence
of the agency relation. " 493 Yet vicarious liability is not a venerable
doctrine: it is a recent addition to Anglo-American jurisprudence,494
and only in the twentieth century has it come to have wide acceptance

489. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
490. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102 (1980). The
Model Rules, however, do permit exculpation. Rule 1.8 (h).
491. ERISA § 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (1974).
492. See Chapman v. K.lemick, 750 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (health plan paid
benefits to participant subject to subrogation agreement; participant's attorney became
fiduciary with respect to funds received from third party that were to be paid over to
plan).
493. RFSI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d).
494. T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY (1916); Holmes, Agency {pt. 1), 4 HARV. L.
REV. 345 (1891); Holmes, Agency (pt. 11), 5 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1891).

1176

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 41:1049

and applicability. 495 Do the uncertain rationales of vicarious liability
extend to ERISA plans and to attorney relationships with a plan?
A similar question arises with respect to contracts. An agent,
acting within the scope of his apparent authority, may bind the principal to a contract that the agent had no actual authority to enter
into.496 Should the principle apply so as to allow a plan attorney to
bind a plan? Under what circumstances?
Finally, there is the practical question of whether at least some
standards for plan attorneys should be codified, either by court rule or
statute. Preemption and federal comtnon lawmaking would de facto
create a plan attorney bar. But there are as yet few rules govertting
this group of attorneys, and they are all rules developed through litigation. Without a set of clearly stated rules, attorneys may be unaware of their obligations; courts may be hesitant to develop comtnon
law rules; and state courts may continue to exercise disciplinary control over plan attorney conduct. Written rules governing plan attorneys might serve as a stimulus to development of this needed body of
law.
CONCLUSION

This article has sought to establish three basic propositions: that
states cannot regulate plan attorneys; that federal courts not only
may, but must develop rules to regulate plan attorneys; and that there
are special characteristics of plan attorneys which often require, for

495. Originally invoked as a basis for transferring liability for deceit, Hem v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289 (1709), and negligence, Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 488 (1701), it was
eventually extended to other torts. In recent years, the doctrine has been applied to violations of civil rights acts, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); the Sherntan Act, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982); and other federal statutes, e.g.,
Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973);
Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984) (Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act); see generally Black, Application of Respondeat Superior

Principles to Securities Fraud Claims Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 825 (1984); for takings of property by
municipal officials, e.g., San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Brothers, 528 S.W.2d 266,
272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); and for other breaches of constitutional, see, e.g., Norton v.
United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978) (violation of
Fourth Amendment to Constitution); statutory and common-law duties, e.g., United
States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869
(1946) (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); United States v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 446 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (FfC cease and desist order).
496. RFSfATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 140.
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their governance, rules different from those found in professional
codes and in the common law of benefit plans. In elaborating on the
last point, this article has reviewed some of the most itnportant of the
special principles applicable to plan attorneys and some resulting general rules. However, it has not tried to work out rules and standards
in any great detail. That is better done by courts, which, through the
resolution of specific controversies, can propose and test various rules,
so as to find the ones that work best.
The ulti1nate airn of this article is not simply to establish these
basic propositions; rather, its aim is to try to stimulate the process of
judicial lawmaking regarding plan attorneys. The role of plan attorney is an emerging one. It develops and becomes refined as the private benefit plan system and public benefit plan regulatory system
themselves develop and become refined. Regrettably, there seems to
be a general lack of awareness that the role of plan attorney, as a
unique institution, even exists, and because of this lack of awareness,
there is little appreciation of either the possibility or need for a specialized body of plan attorney common law.
As the article has emphasized, the role of plan attorney is important, and should not be left to haphazard regulation unconstrained by
the policies of ERISA. A plan attorney is an integral part of the plan
and is an integral part of the world that is within the a1nbit of ERISA's policies. To treat the plan attorney as if he were just another
business attorney does justice neither to him nor to the plan. If this
article helps to make attorneys and courts aware of the special role of
plan attorney and sensitive to the plan attorney's special characteristics, proper rules may then follow as part of the normal process of
common lawmaking.

